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Summary
From the time of the Reformation in England Anglo-vatican
relations have typically been seen as a long history of
unending antagonism. It is not common knowledge that in
the period between 1846 and 1851 there was a notable, if
temporary, lull in this animosity and even talk of
establishing full diplomatic relations. This thesis aims
to account for this thaw in tensions and to analyse the
British response to the early 'liberal' years of Pope
Pius IX, not only looking at government policy but also
the attitude of the British public towards the new Pope.
In addition, this study sets out not only to look at
individual issues, such as the Risorgimento, the history
of the Roman Catholic Church in England and the Irish
question, but seeks to explain the interplay between them
in order to come to a fuller understanding of British
policy.
This thesis reveals that British policy was based on the
need to achieve a number of goals, such as a peaceful
solution to the political crisis in the Italian peninsula
and the curbing of the Irish agitation, and that it was
held that an enlightened Pope could help in the
fulfilment of these aims. The effort to improve relations
in the end failed as it was undermined by an over-
optimistic assessment of the Pope's liberalism and
failure of the British government to appreciate the depth
of anti-Catholic opinion among the British public and
their representatives in Parliament. The result was that
this short thaw in relations came to an abrupt end.
Contents
Acknowledgements	 1
Introduction	 1
Chapter I: Britain and the election of Pius IX	 10
Section I: The 1831 Memorandum	 11
Section II: Mazzini and the impact of the 1831
revolution	 24
Section III: The Manifesto di Rimini and its
consequence	 36
Section IV: The death of Gregory XVI and the
election of the new Pope 	 48
Chapter II: The Pope's liberal reforms and the origins
of the Minto mission in 1847
	 81
Section I: British reactions to Pius IX'S reforms 82
Section II: Ferrara and Papal diplomacy	 106
Section III: Religious aspects of the diplomatic
negotiation with the Papal States 	 121
Chapter III: Britain and the 1848 revolution in Rome 164
Section I: Pius IX and the establishment of a
constitution	 165
Section II: The Roman constitution and the crisis
of ecclesi4stical power	 188
Section III: Pressure on the Pope for war against
Austria	 192
Section IV: The Mainiani administration 	 206
Section V: The failure of the Diplomatic Bill
with the papacy	 212
Section VI: The Pope's flight	 235
Chapter IV:Britain and the Roman Republic in 1849
	
260
Section I: British reactions to the proclamation
of the Roman Republic and
its political reforms	 261
Section II: The collapse of the Roman Republic
and foreign military intervention 	 278
Section III: Anti-clericalism and the Roman
Republic	 294
Chapter V: British reactions to the restoration of Papal
authority in Rome and the restoration of the English
Catholic Hierarchy, 1850-52 	 332
Section I: The restoration of Papal authority
in Rome	 334
Section II: The re-establishment of the English
Catholic Hierarchy 	 353
Section III: The 'No-Popery' movement as a
reaction to the restoration of the
English Catholic Hierarchy 	 360
Section IV: The government response to the anti-
Papal movement	 386
Section V: The Ecclesiastical Title Bill
	
399
Conclusion	 421
Bibliography	 428
1Acknowledgements
On my arrival in Britain in 1990, I started work on
Anglo-Italian relations in the period of Risorgilnento
under the supervision of Professor John A Davis. My
decision to focus on Anglo-vatican relations for my Phd
thesis was made when I found some cartoons in Punch and a
number of articles in The Times on Pius IX, which led me
to wonder why Britain was so obsessed by this particular
Pope? This simple and curious question has developed into
this Phd thesis.
I could not have completed this thesis without help fron
numerous individuals and institutions. Therefore I would
like to thank the staff at the following institutions for
their assistance in my research: the Public Record Office
in Kew; the Heartly Institute at the University of
Southampton; the Bodleian Library, Oxford; the British
Library (including the Newspaper Archive in Colindale);
the National Library of Scotland in Edinburgh; the Modern
Record Centre at the University of Warwick; the Archives
of the Sacred Congregation of Propaganda Fide in Rome;
the City State Archive in Rome (Archivio Stato di Roma);
the Italian Foreign Ministry Archive (Archivio Storico
del Ministero degli Affari Esteri, Rome); and the
Biblioteca Nazionale Storico Moderno e Contemporeneo, Via
Gaetano, Roina. In addition, I particularly wish to
express my thanks to Dr Ivan Dicicie of the Westminster
Diocesan Archives, London, to Signor Bourne of the
Vatican Archive (Archivio Segreto vaticano), and to
ii
Monsignor Camisassa and his assistant in the Archivio
Storico Congregation Pro Negotiis Eccelesiastics
Extraordinariis. For helping me to gain access to the
Vatican Archives, I am grateful to Sister Tesuko
Nakagawa, the President of University of the Sacred
Heart, Tokyo and to Padore Pittau, the President of
University of the Gregoriana, Rome. I would also like to
thank the staff of the libraries at the University of
Warwick, the University of Birmingham, Senate House
Library, and University College in London.
I would like to express my thanks to Professor Takao
Matsuxnura who gave me the opportunity to study in
England, to Professor John A Davis who supervised my
thesis and provided numerous references on my behalf, to
Professor Gwynne Lewis for his patience, to Dr Tony Mason
for letters and references, to Mrs Ros Lucas for motherly
support, and to the other members of staff in the Centre
the Study of Social History at the University of Warwick.
During the writing of my thesis I was inspired by a
number of stimulating seminars and conferences which were
organized by the staff and the members of the Institute
of Historical Research in London. In particular, I ant
grateful to Dr Robert Oresko who gave me the opportunity
to give a talk to his Sixteenth to Nineteenth Century
Italian History seminar, where Professor Harry Hearder
made some useful comments on my paper. The members of
ASMI (Association of Modern Italian Studies) also
provided me with useful information, among them I would
iii
particularly like to single out Dr Lucy Riall, for her
tremendous patience and extremely helpful suggestions
when she was kind enough to read through my thesis. In
this respect I also wish to thank Dr Rohan McWilliam who
helped me to clarify my arguments and Dr Tony Taylor who
encouraged my research.
I would also like to thank for their intellectual and
personal assistance; Loredana Polezzi, Gabriella Rienzo,
Peter Brown, Kate Beaumont, Anastasia Ioannidou, Fiona
Lewis, Jonathan Sinunon, Mauro Battocchi and Philip Best.
Finally I would like to express my deepest love and
appreciation to my parents who have generously supported
and encouraged me, and to Dr Antony Best not only for his
warm support but also for his intellectual advice.
1Introduction
on 19 November 1847, Lord Minto, the British Lord Privy
Seal and special envoy to the Papal States, wrote to Sir
George Hamilton, the British minister to Florence, about
the policies of Pope Pius IX. It included a surprisingly
positive comment about the Pope:
We are going on as well as possible
here. And if the good Pope and the
Consulta di Stato draw well together
the government will soon acquire the
strength which is at present wanting
to it. 1
There have been only a few times since the Reformation
when a British politician has paid such a compliment to
the Pope. This favourable view was not only expressed by
the British government's representative but was also
shared by the English press, which was usually more
critical towards the Pope than the government. For
example, Punch, which was renowned for its radical
sympathies and its sarcasm towards the Pope, described
Pius IX in 1847 as the embodiment of 'Rational Liberty'
who was giving the 'Roman Punch' to despotism. 2
It is surprising to find in the mid-nineteenth century
this wave of governmental and public enthusiasm for the
Sovereign Pontiff of the Roman Catholic Church. The
traditional view of the Papacy in Britain was very
2negative. The British government's view of the Pope's
role in European diplomacy and politics was that he acted
as a supporter of the conservative powers and in
particular of Austria. There was also the problem that
the nature of the Papal government and administration was
so reactionary that it inspired a series of revolts
within the Papal States; these required foreign
intervention to suppress them and this in turn threatened
to provoke a confrontation between the Great Powers due
to rivalry over control of the Papacy and the strategic
position of the Papal States in the Italian peninsula.
Both at international and Italian domestic level the Pope
was a symbol of autocracy.
For the British public the Pope was traditionally the
embodiment of a despotism which contrasted with the
Protestant constitutionalisin of Britain. The modern
British political system had its roots in the Glorious
Revolution of 1688 and it was not forgotten that the
ousting of James II had been a victory over Catholicism.
The legacy of the Reformation was that Roman Catholicism
and the Pope's claim to temporal and spiritual power were
seen as fundamental threats to British freedom.
The favourable view of the Pope in 1847 was thus a
significant shift from the previous period, but
surprisingly it has not been studied in detail. This is
mystifying considering that there have been many works on
both the international and the domestic impact of Pius
IX. It is well known that Pius, on taking office,
3initiated a policy of reforms, and many accounts have
been written about his 'liberal' period. There are a
number of studies of his diplomacy with the European
Catholic Powers, particularly with France and Austria,
and his internal reform programme. Among then, Giacomo
Martina's Pio IX 1846-1850 	 and Coppa's Cardinal
Giacomo Antonelli and Papal Politics in European Aff airs4
about his Secretary of State, are important for Pius IX'S
domestic and foreign policy. Ivan Scott's The Roman
Question and The Powers, 1846-1865	 concentrates on
Franco-Roman relations, and Alan Reinernan's Austria and
the Papacy in the age of Metternich 6 is the most
important analysis of Austria's policy towards the
Papacy.
However, little has been written on relations between
Britain and the Papal States in this period. The British
government's interest in the Papacy has been discussed
chiefly in the context of British foreign policy towards
the Italian Risorgimento and British competition with
France and Austria. The lack of research on relations
between Britain and the Papal States has in part been due
to the fact that there was no direct diplomatic
communication between the two in this period, except
through the Papal Nuncios in Paris and Vienna. There are
two other reasons why the study of Anglo-Roman relations
has been neglected. First, because of the traditional
emphasis in historical studies concerning Britain and the
Risorgimento on Britain's good relations with Piedmont,
4the course of Anglo-Roman relations has largely been
ignored except in terms of Papal opposition to
unification. Second, Britain's anti-Catholicism has meant
that there has been a marked reluctance to examine its
relations with the Vatican. However, an important if
limited contribution has been made by Ottavio Barrie's
two-volume L'Inghilterra e 11 probleina italiano nel 1847-
48. 1848-49. 7, which is the only study extensively
concerned with Anglo-Italian relations in the period of
the 1848 Revolution. Even here the text mainly discusses
Britain's interests in Southern Italy and Piedmont, being
based on the papers of Minto's mission which is generally
regarded as having a more significant effect on politics
in Turin and Naples than in Rome. Two important works on
Britain and the internal politics and the diplomatic
position of the Papal States do exist, but they do not
deal directly with this period. From the Roman
perspective Einilia Morelli's La politica estera di
Tommaso Bernetti 8 looks at the period of the 1831 Five
Powers Conference, while C.T. Mclntire's England Against
the Papacy. 1858-1861 is significant but concentrates
exclusively on a later period.
Another area of studies which is relevant to Anglo-Roman
relations is the history of the Roman Catholic Church in
Britain. Research on the leading Roman Catholic figures
in England such as Newman and His Age by S. Gilley, 10
Nicholas Wiseman and the Transformation of English
Catholicism by R.J. Schiefen 	 and The Life and Times of
5Cardinal Wiseman by W. Ward 12 are central to an
understanding of religious relations between Britain and
Rome. In addition, Donal Kerr's works on the British
government's policy towards the Irish Catholic Church,
Peel. Priests and Politics 13 and 'A Nation of
Beggars?" 4 , make reference to the British government's
attempts to use interference by the Pope to restrain the
priests of the Irish Catholic Church from their political
activities. However, these studies concentrate on
domestic politics and religion without paying much regard
to the diplomatic situation.
It is, however, vital when dealing with Anglo-Roman
relations during the period of 1846-51 to remember that
diplomatic, political and religious elements were all
exerting their influence at one and the same time. This
thesis therefore seeks to integrate the two strands of
this particular relationship which are normally kept
separate - religion and diplomacy. The aim is to
demonstrate that a true understanding of the nature of
Anglo-Roman relations can only be reached by following
the development over time of the various different
aspects to this relationship and seeing how these issues
influenced each other.
In such a study it is obvious that some aspects of
relationship will appear more significant than others.
Consequently emphasis will be placed on a number of major
themes. First, the effect on Anglo-Roman relations of the
6political developments within the Papal States and the
significance of Pius's reforms on the Italian peninsula.
Second, the British government's concern about the growth
of the Repeal movement in Ireland and its links with the
Roman Catholic Church. Third, the desire of the Roman
Catholics in England to see a re-establishment of the
Catholic Hierarchy. Fourth and finally, the effect of
public opinion in Britain, both radical and conservative,
on the development of British policy towards the Papacy
and the Italian question.
The analysis of these themes is based upon a number of
different archival sources. The material on 'high
politics' and diplomacy has utilized documentary evidence
from both British and Papal government sources,
contemporary published documents and correspondence from
a variety of private papers. On the whole these sources
have underlined the argument behind this thesis, that it
is impossible and unrealistic to attempt to draw a divide
between religious and political diplomacy. The
correspondence of the leading actors in this thesis, Lord
Palmerston, Lord John Russell, Lord Ninto and Cardinal
Wiseman demonstrate time and time again that no such
division existed within their own minds. There are,
however, some problems with these sources as it is
difficult to tell how complete a record of events and
opinions they contain.
7In regard to sources on British public opinion, there are
greater problems. It is obviously difficult in this
period to extrapolate what exactly the British public
thought, but an attempt has been made by using Hansard,
the government's records on public activities and
contemporary newspapers and pamphlets to give at least
some idea of how British opinion reacted to the issues
raised by British relations with the Vatican.
Chapter I discusses the background to the election of
Pius IX, starting with Britain's involvement in the Five
Powers Conference in 1831, Giuseppe Mazzini's contacts
with Britain after his arrival in 1838, the political and
social situation in the Papal States and other parts of
the Italian peninsula, the election of Pius IX, and the
British government's diplomatic and domestic interests
relating to the Papacy.
Chapter II deals with Pius IX's popular political
reforms, such as the introduction of the Civic Guard and
the new press law, which were followed by the Austrian
intervention in Ferrara. It then looks at the British
government's and public's reactions to the reforms and
the Austrian threat, and analyses the motives behind the
British government's decision to send Lord Minto on his
mission to Rome.
Chapter III examines the course of events in the Papal
States in 1848, British reactions to the establishment of
8the constitution, and the battle for power between the
Pope and the political parties. It also analyses the
British government's attempt to open diplomatic relations
with the Papacy and the reasons for the failure of this
policy.
Chapter IV looks at the establishment of the Roman
Republic, and the reactions of the British government and
radical public opinion to the policies propounded by
Nazzini. In particular, it examines the British
government's response to the Pope's call for support and
the resultant French intervention in Rome, and the
British response to the anti-clericalism of the Roman
Republic.
Chapter V discusses the British view of the restoration
of Papal authority in Rome and the subsequent clash
between the Pope and Piedmont. It then deals with the re-
establishment of the English Catholic Hierarchy, which
was followed by the rise of a No-Popery movement, in both
high politics and popular reaction.
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Chapter I
Britain and the election of pius IX
Introduction
The election of Pius IX as the Pope in July 1846 has
often been seen by historians as a critical event in the
development of Italian nationalism. At last a champion of
reform had taken charge of the most reactionary of the
Italian states. The new Pope inherited a state that was
poorly administered, full of corruption and averse to
social and political progress, and began to initiate
policies that led to substantial change.
Before discussing Pius IX'S election and the subsequent
reforms, it is necessary to study the historical
background to his succession to the Papacy, and in
particular the two principal proposals for reform made
prior to this date. The first of these was made by the
five European Great Powers in the Memorandum of 1831, the
second by Luigi Carlo Farini, the Romagnolo intellectual
and politician, in his Manifesto di Rimini of 1844. These
memoranda are important because, although very few
elements in the 1831 Memorandum and the Manifesto di
Rixnini were put into practice by Gregory XVI, after July
1846 Pius attempted to do so. This in turn helps to
explain Britain's attitude towards the new Pope, because
the British government was pleased that the principles
behind the Memorandum, which had not been adopted by
11
Gregory XVI and his secretary of State, Cardinal
Bernetti, had been accepted by the new Pope.
Section I: The 1831 Memorandum
Although Britain's interest in the Papacy was growing by
the time of the 1831 Conference, it is clear that Austria
was still the main power in the Papal States, a position
which it had acquired in 1814 at the Congress of Vienna.
This was inevitable as the Pope had to rely on Austria to
restore his previous possessions and his temporal power.
The Congress introduced a settlement which protected
Austria's Italian interests by decreeing that Austria
would withdraw its military force from the Papal States
on condition that it was allowed to annex a small section
of the Legation of Ferrara that lay on the left bank of
the Po river, and maintained the right to garrison the
citadels of Ferrara and Comacchio, both of which were
important for strategic reasons. 1
After Cardinal Ercole Consalvi, Pius VII'S Secretary of
State, had negotiated the restoration of the Papal
territory and the Austrian evacuation, he collaborated
with Prince Metternich on political reforms, introducing
a more centralized administration, more modernized
finance, an efficient military and police system to
maintain law and order, and a rationalization and
simplification of the judicial system. 2 These
measures led to the Motu Pro prio of 6 July 1814 that
partly secularized Papal offices, gave each province (a
12
Delegation or Legation according to its governor's title)
a consultative council of local notables to advise the
governor, and abolished torture and arbitrary arrest.
Reinerman argues in his Austria and the Papacy in the Age
of Metternich, that even though limited in degree
Consalvi's reforms brought tranquillity to the Papal
States between 1816-23, at a time when Piedmont and
Naples were convulsed by the revolutions of 1820-21.
Metternich too expressed his satisfaction with Austria's
diplomatic relations with the Papacy around this period.4
In spite of Pius VII'S and Consalvi's efforts the
Zelanti, the ultra-conservative elements in the Curia,
were a major obstacle even to gradual and moderate
reforms. When Pius VII died in 1823 Leo XII, who was
close to the Zelanti, alienated public opinion and
popular discontent increased.	 After Leo XII'S death in
1829 a new moderate Pope, Pius VIII, attempted once again
to take up Cardinal Consalvi's policy of conciliatory
diplomacy and moderate political reform. As with Pius
Vii's regime, Pius VIII relied heavily on Austria not
only for military reasons but also for religious motives,
because while Austria supported the Catholic Church's
interests anti-clerical tendencies were growing in
France. In particular, the Papacy closely co-operated
with Austria in suppressing the revolutionary activities
in Italy which were a consequence of the social
discontent that had accumulated during the period of Leo
XII and remained even with Pius VIII. Although Pius VIII
13
was more moderate than his predecessor, he kept strict
control over the political malcontents. 6 But during
this time, revolutionary groups were plotting beneath the
surface, waiting for the appropriate time for an
uprising.
An opportunity arose when revolution broke out in France
in July 1830 and soon spread into Belgium and other parts
of Europe. French radicals openly encouraged revolution
in Italy, but Austria was determined to protect the
existing order in Europe against revolt and reinforced
its army in Italy. '
The Italian revolutionaries, however, realizing that the
Austrian army would always stand behind the Pope, had
begun to make plans to launch an insurrection should the
Pope die, and thus take advantage of any subsequent
power-vacuum.
A promising opening offered itself when Pius VIII died in
November 1830, and the rebels were encouraged further
when, after the Pope's death, French revolutionaries
declared that they would defend Italy from any foreign
intervention. Ciro Menotti, a leading member of the
Carbonari, started an uprising in February 1831 in Parma
and Modena which overthrew the local rulers, and was
followed by uprisings in Bologna, Forli, Ravenna, Imola,
Ferrara and Ancona. In particular, Bologna became the
centre of the revolutionary movement and its provisional
government proclaimed the union of all the insurgent
14
provinces under one government, calling it 'the United
Provinces of Italy.' However, these revolutionary
movements in Italy hoped for French support against
Austria, and therefore, when it was discovered that the
French were not in a position to interfere, the new Pope,
Gregory XVI, called for Austrian military intervention to
restore order. Austria re-occupied the states of Parina
and Modena and then crossed the Papal frontier to enter
Bologna. Subsequently on 27 March the revolutionary
government was forced to surrender. 8
The revolution of 1831 attracted the European Power's
attention to the Papal States, and Papal affairs became
for a moment a major issue in European affairs. This was
an important and sensitive matter for all the Great
Powers as there was a general fear that events in the
Italian peninsula could lead to a clash of interests
between Austria and France. In particular there was
concern that competition between Vienna and Paris over
the Papacy had the potential to lead to war between the
two states. Britain's main preoccupation was its belief
that such a clash might bring about a general European
war involving Russia and Prussia on the Austrian side.
A conference of the five European Great Powers was held
in April 1831 to restore Papal authority in the Papal
territories, such as Bologna, which had been occupied by
the revolutionaries, and to discuss how security in the
Papal States could be guaranteed. The conference led in
15
the end to new conflicts among the European Powers, and
especially to hostile relations between Austria and
France which resulted in 1832 in an Austrian occupation
of Bologna and a French occupation of Ancona. 	 However,
it was not simply a two-sided confrontation between
Austria and France, because the presence of Britain
complicated matters further. Viscount Palmerston's dictum
that "Britain had no permanent friends or enemies, just
interests" 10 can be seen to operate here: it was
Britain's interest that the Papal States should introduce
reforms in order to avoid further revolution and that
they should remain free from foreign domination.
A British representative, Sir Brook Taylor, was sent to
Rome in April 1831 to discuss the reform programme in the
Papal States with representatives of the other four
powers. Taylor's status was "without any official
diplomatic duty" and his mission was to prevent either
France or Austria from increasing its influence in and
domination of the Papal States. Britain would not
support either state's interests in the Papal States, and
it was believed that this policy could work if the
British representative remained an unofficial, and thus
politically neutral, envoy.
Britain's policy towards reform was designed to establish
the foundations of 'good government', and focused on
specific issues such as a Code of Laws. As George
Seymour, the British minister in Florence, noted to
Palmerston on 25 April 1831:
16
As far as I am informed the great evil - or at
least greatest of the great evils of the Roman
system is the absence of any Code of Laws: a
bit of paper pasted upon a wall has, in that
unfortunate country - the force of an Act of
Parliament - and hence uncertainty which
paralyses all enterprises, destroys all
confidence, and places the prosperity of the
people at the mercy of the Pope, or the
Cardinal Secretary or the Cardinal Legate of
the day. 12
Seymour, who was much more vigorous than the mild Taylor
and was regarded as "a desperate radical" by the Austrian
minister, 13 sharply pointed out :
I have no doubt that the evil spirit might be
laid by proper concessions on the part of the
Pope - but aitho' his intentions are said to be
good I dread the uncompromising disposition of
the Sacred College, relieved as it now is from
the influence of present danger. 14
This was a difficult task, for not only was it hard to
persuade the Papacy to accept reforms but also the
French-Austrian rivalry made it almost impossible for the
Great Powers to come to any agreement. Taylor's
instructions were to stay above the international
competition and to work solely to secure reforms.
17
Palmerston said in his despatch to Taylor on 2 April 1831
that even if the French minister, Saint-Aulaire, was
withdrawn
you will nevertheless continue to cooperate
with the Austrian minister in encouraging to
effect the desired arrangement. But you will in
such case consider yourself as more especially
charged with the interests of the subjects of
the Pope, whose cause would probably not be
very warmly espoused by the minister of
Austria. 15
This advice demonstrated that the desire for reform
rather than any pro-French sentiment was the major
influence on British policy. Nevertheless it was expected
that Taylor would find the greatest support for reform
from the French.
France gave support to the liberal movement in Italy and
advocated political reform in the Papal States, but in
fact its primary interest was to force Austria to leave
the Legations. However, Austria was determined to keep
its influence over not only the Papal States but also the
whole Italian peninsula as well, and opposed any liberal
concessions in the Papal States.
George Seymour, the British Minister in Florence,
reported on 25 April 1831 to Palmerston, after the
Conference had started, that the Austrians wanted to
18
commit the other powers to perpetuating the status quo in
Italy. He noted that the Austrian ambassador in Rome,
Count Lützow, had been trying to gauge whether the
representatives of the Great Powers were agreeable to the
establishment of the permanent committee to oversee the
security of Italy. He observed:
As I have alluded to the Austrian Ambassador I
will take this opportunity of noticing to you
an idea which I have heard lately thrown out by
him - it is that the affairs of Italy should be
discussed by Representatives of the Great
Powers in a manner similar to those of Belgium-
and that great advantage might be derived from
the continued sitting of such Junta to consider
any fresh difficulties which might arise. 16
This was obviously a disturbing prospect as it was feared
that such a committee would be used to bolster the
reactionary regimes in the peninsula. However, Metternich
was not in a strong position to push this proposal.
Russia supported Metternich, but was too busy suppressing
the revolution in Poland to take much part in the
conference. In any case Russia's suppressive policies
towards the Catholics in Poland brought a chill to its
relations with the Papacy, so that Britain did not have
to worry about Russia's involvement. 17 Freiherr
Christian van Bunsen, the Prussian representative and
minister at Rome, was moderately in favour of reform, but
19
he was instructed by the Prussian government to support
Austria in the final stages of the conference.
After a month's discussion of a reform programme the
conference submitted a Memorandum to the Pope on 21 May
1831. It included proposals that the central Junta should
be elected from local councils, that laymen should be
admitted to lower and higher positions within the
administrative and judicial system, and that financial
reform should take place. It also asked the Pope to agree
to the evacuation of Austrian troops. 18
The Memorandum was greeted with enthusiasm by the British
government, and on 23 June 1831 Palmerston informed
Taylor that:
This government has been gratified at learning
the success which has hitherto attended the
efforts made to prevail upon the Roman
government to adopt those measures of
conciliation and internal improvement which
have been considered essential to the future
contentment and tranquillity of the Papal
states,... 19
The main contents of the Memorandum, which were a
reflection of French and British liberal ideas, were
obviously opposed by Austria and by Bernetti. On 5 July
the Pope made his response. He adopted part of the
financial and judicial reform provisions of the
Memorandum, but rejected the central proposals for
20
political reform of local councils and the central
Junta. 2° As the Memorandum did not meet with the approval
of Austria or the Pope, the conference broke up at the
end of July.
Taylor was more optimistic than Seymour about the
situation within the Papal States, but was frustrated at
the lack of progress in initiating reform. He noted to
Palmerston on 30 July 1831 that he had advised the Pope
to introduce reforms as soon as possible, but that
Gregory had informed him that:
He has proceeded, he said, with as much haste
as the importance and nature of the
ameliorations in the institutions of this
country would admit, and that his government
would not delay to publish the remaining acts
promised, but that the revolutionary spirit of
his people was such that nothing would satisfy
them. 21
Taylor to a degree sympathized with this view as he
perceived that Papal subjects were just as responsible
for the instability as Papal rule, making a contrast with
Seymour's bitter criticism of the Papal regime. Indeed,
he noted to Palmerston that 'it is perfectly true that
his Holiness's subjects are to the highest degree
unreasonable'. 22
Taylor also referred to the issue of the amnesty for
political offenders who were involved with the February
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revolution in 1831. This was a matter that Saint
(Aulaire) had pressed on the Papacy, but such a "radical"
concession was almost out of question for Gregory XVI. 23
In his letter of 30 July, Taylor noted:
I now ventured to express to his Holiness my
apprehension of the evil effect produced
against His government by the numerous arrests
going on at this moment in Rome and acquainting
him further with my repeated application for
the prisoners confined in the Castello
Santangelo for the conspiracy of February
last.24
The Pope answered that there was very little hope of
release, because they had made a plot against the Papacy
and had tried to seize Bernetti and himself.
Taylor was also frustrated when neither he nor the
diplomats of the other European countries received from
the Vatican a copy of a document sent to the Pope by the
people of the Romagna setting out their political
desires. The Pope's reluctance to publicize this letter
seemed to show that the Pope had no intention of
listening to his subjects.25
Against the rising agitation in the Legations, Bernetti
reorganized the civil and criminal code and promulgated a
penal code. In order to assure the immediate submission
of the Legations to the Papal government and to restore
the Papal authority, Cardinal Albani asked for Austrian
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military assistance and as a result Bologna was re-
occupied by the Austrians. In response to the Austrian
action, French forces occupied Ancona and declared that
they would remain until the Austrians left Bologna and
the Pope introduced several liberal reforms, such as a
separate lay administration in Bologna as well as in the
four Legations, reorganization of the municipal police,
the introduction of a new elective system, and the
secularization of the offices in the Legation, most of
which Britain agreed with. 26 However, such ideas might
endanger the Papal regime and were opposed by the
Zelanti.
The British government's response to this crisis was to
try to persuade both Austria and France to withdraw,
while at the same time Seymour was instructed to revive
the reform programme which had been proposed in the 1831
Memorandum. Palmerston wrote to him on 8 April 1832:
You have correctly understood the character in
which you appear at Rome which is that of the
representative of a great power which has a
strong interest in preserving the peace of
Europe and therefore in making up the quarrel
between its allies and in removing sources of
future differences; but which having no direct
concern in Italian affairs and no established
relations with the court of Rome, cannot take
the same active part in guaranteeing
arrangements which other powers may be prepared
23
to do. At the same time these very
circumstances ought to give more weight to our
advice because they prove that it must be free
from all suspicion of interested motives,
except in as far as our interest lies, in
securing the welfare of other states and the
peace of Europe. 27
Against Austria's position regarding the attitude of the
Protestant powers to the Pope's temporal power,
Palmerston observed that:
to this I reply that on the contrary, we
are endeavouring to render him an important
service and to maintain his temporal authority
by persuading him to do that which if he does
not do, his temporal authority will infallibly
be overthrown either by the attack of his
subjects or the support of his allies. 28
However, Britain's negotiations with France and Austria
were not successful, and Palmerston's relations with
Metternich over the Papal issue became strained.
Palmerston was convinced that the reform programme in the
Papal States had failed owing to Austrian support for
Papal maladministration, and he ordered Seymour to
withdraw from the Papal States. Metternich was offended
by Palinerston's decision to remove Seymour and by the
publication in The Times of an exchange of notes between
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Seymour and LUtzow which contained insulting references
by Seymour to Metternich and the Papal administration. 29
The Papacy had, in fact, to wait until 1838 to see
Austria and France withdraw, which had less to do with
Britain's mediation than with changes within the Papacy.
The Zelanti forced the 'liberal' Bernetti to resign in
1836, replacing him with the ultra-conservative, pro-
Austrian, Cardinal Lanibruschini, who negotiated the
withdrawal with Metternich. 30 With the defeat of the
Anglo-French calls for reform the social and political
situation in the Papal states would not improve until
1846.
Section II: Mazzini and the impact of the 1831 revolution
The revolution in central Italy in 1831 raised two
preoccupations among the European powers; first, concern
that Papal maladministration was the cause of unrest, and
second, disquiet over the activities of the Italian
revolutionaries, in particular the rise of Mazzinian
republicanism, which threatened not only the Italian
states but also the European monarchical powers.
Britain's natural sympathy towards the cause of Italian
nationalism did not extend to Mazzini, whose brand of
revolutionary activity was the antithesis of Britain's
desire for gradual reform within the Italian states.
Britain saw reform as a means to avoid revolution, and
hence the likelihood of Austrian and French armed
intervention. Worse Mazzini's link to radicals and
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revolutionaries, such as the Chartists, made hini anathema
to the British government. 31
After the failure of the February 1831 Revolution in
central Italy, Mazzini escaped to Marseilles with another
thirty or forty revolutionaries, and founded the
Association, Young Italy (Giovine Italia), in July 1831.32
In 1832 he tried to encourage insurrections in Naples and
the Papal States, and in order to further his campaign,
launched a periodical called Young Italy in 1833. Copies
of the periodical inspired young Italian nationalists,
such as Vincenzo Gioberti and Luigi Carlo Farini.
This was a matter of interest to Britain. Seymour stated
to Palmerston on 27 March 1833:
'The Giovine Italia' attributed the failure of
the revolution of 1831 to the incapacity of its
chief directors, and to the difference of
opinion existing among them; and it argues,
therefore, the necessity of any future
revolution finding a select body of Italians
prepared with a set of definite objects, to
prosecute which all their energies must be
bent.
The governments in Vienna, Paris, St Petersburg and
London collaborated to collect information about
Mazzini's activities. Mazzini's letters were intercepted
by the Duke of Tuscany, and their contents were passed to
Sir Augustus Foster, the British minister in Turin. They
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revealed that Mazzini was attempting to convert people
from many different backgrounds to his movement,
including aristocrats and priests.
After being expelled from France, Hazzini arrived in
Switzerland in July 1833 and in the spring of 1834, he
founded a new association called Young Europe with other
European political exiles such as Poles and Germans. 36
Even before this, in the winter of 1834, David Morier,
the British minister in Berne, reported on Mazzini's link
with a plot to overthrow the Sardinian government. On 8
February 1834 he informed the Foreign Office that:
The news received here ... have placed beyond a
doubt the fact, that the movement of the Poles
from Switzerland was connected with a more
extensive plan, which it appears included the
overthrow of the existing government of Geneva,
and the seizure of its warlike stores, to be
used in a more serious attack upon Savoy than
that which has just failed. The failure is
attributed to the impatience of the principal
Italian leader, Mazzini, who, anticipating by
two or three days the term fixed for the
combined operation, revealed the views of the
aggressors in a proclamation issued by the
self-styled 'Provisional Insurrectional
Government of savoy.' 37
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Morier also forwarded to London a copy of a proclamation
entitled 'Liberty, Equality, Humanity, Independence,
Concord!'in which Mazzini declared:
Considering that wherever despotism prevails,
insurrection is the most sacred duty; that when
the moment, matured by circumstances, has
arrived, it is a crime not to assemble under
the banner of insurrection; that this moment
has arrived; that every insurrection, resolved
upon for national purposes, must be carried
into effect by the people; and that a general,
voluntary, and conspicuous outbreak, is a
powerful means of abridging that state of
uncertainty which is the forerunner of
insurrection ••• 38
Expelled by the Swiss government, which came under
pressure from Austria, Mazzini in 1837 escaped to England
where he had some contacts and a few sympathisers with
Young Italy.	 It is obviously a coincidence that this
year also saw the rise of Chartisin, but it is known that
Mazzini had second-hand knowledge of the English social
and labour movement through his contacts with Chartist
and radical friends. In July 1839 he relaunched the
periodical Young Italy in London and in 1840 started a
mutual aid society for Italian artisans in London as a
branch of Young Italy. The idea for the Society was
inspired by Chartism and the Polish political exiles, and
he argued, 'Workers should be organized to be able to
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bargain with their employers' in Apostolato Popolare, a
publication of Young Italy. 40 Mazzini's arrival in
England was significant as his links with the radicals
helped to persuade this group to give active support to
the cause of revolutionary Italian nationalism, which was
in marked contrast to the cautious policy pursued by the
British government.
In 1843 Mazzini once again organized conspiracies in
Italy and although they failed, his reputation as 'a
dangerous man' was confirmed. 41 These revolutionary
plots led the Earl of Aberdeen, the Foreign Secretary,
and Sir James Graham, the Home Secretary, to decide that
the British government should authorize the General Post
Office to open Mazzini's private letters in London and
pass any relevant information to Vienna. 42 This plan
came about after a meeting between Graham and Count
Neumann, the Austrian ambassador in London, in which the
latter expressed Metternich's desire to see Mazzini's
letters.
In addition, in Janu.ary 1844 the Foreign Office passed on
to the Home Office a request from the Austrian minister
in London for information on the whereabouts of Mazzini,
whether he was in London at that time or had proceeded to
Brussels. The Metropolitan Police looked into the
question but on this occasion were unable to provide an
answer. 44 On 12 January 1844 an officer in the
Metropolitan Police was forced to report that:
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I have made every possible inquiry at the
different Foreign Hotels, Lodging Houses, the
Passport Office and the Steam Navigation
Companies Office, respecting two foreigners
named Mazzini and Tabrizzi, but cannot find any
person who knows either of them.
It is well known that the discovery that Mazzini's post
was being intercepted was revealed in the English press,
such as The Times and the Westminster Review, arousing
considerable criticism and attacks on the British
government. 46 Hansard spent 550 pages alone on this
issue.	 The Home Secretary became a particular target
of public hatred.
On the surface it appears that the minister's action was
taken simply to stop Mazzini's revolutionary activities,
but there was another dimension to the Mazzini letter
scandal which helps to demonstrate how for Britain the
issue of Mazzini and his link with the Papal States was a
complicated one that touched on both foreign and domestic
policy.
The Irish Repeal movement
One of the issues with which the British government was
preoccupied in the 1830s' and the 1840s' was the Irish
Repeal movement. Because the link between Ireland and
Papacy was a central aspect of British policy towards the
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Vatican, it is necessary to outline briefly the
background to the Irish Catholic issue. Religious
concessions to the Catholic Church in Ireland and the
rest of British Isles had started with the Catholic
Emancipation Act of 1829. Catholic emancipation was
related to a series of political reforms in British
politics. Although the Parliamentary Reform Act itself
was undertaken in 1832 during the Whig ministry, other
reforms had already started in the 1820s under the Tory
Prime Minister, the Duke of Wellington, in particular
those related to religious toleration, including the
emancipation of the Unitarians, the Non-conformists, the
Dissenters and the Catholics. 48 The most significant
piece of legislation was the Catholic Emancipation Act of
1828 which granted full civil rights to Catholics and
extended the franchise for the first time to Catholic
voters.	 The Act had the broad effect of allowing
Catholics to enjoy freedom of speech and association not
only within England, Scotland and Wales but also Ireland.
However, the fact was that the Irish Catholics still
believed that their rights had not been fully recognized
as the franchise qualification in Ireland was
substantially higher than in other parts of the United
Kingdom and they therefore sought more concessions.
Despite these reforms the political situation in Ireland
remained volatile. As early as 1831 when Britain was
involved in the debates over the Memorandum in the Papal
States, there was sensitivity, at least in Palmerston's
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mind, about the possible comparison between the situation
within the Papal States and that in Ireland. As he stated
to Seymour on 22 March 1832:
If they taunt you with Ireland which all
Foreigners do the moment one begins to talk of
improvements and conciliation and if they say
how would you, England, like us to give you
advice as to the best manner of governing that
Island, the answer is that in the first place,
whether we govern it well or ill, we are able
to govern it ourselves without the help of
foreign aid, and so long as a Sovereign is able
to maintain his authority and enforce the Laws
by his own means, there is no reason why others
should meddle with his affairs. 50
Also he mentioned Irish Catholic and administrative
problems:
The Catholics as a body were discontented at
their political disabilities. Britain removed
those disabilities. The Catholic peasantry were
dissatisfied at the manner with which the
present law required them to contribute to the
support of a Protestant Establishment. Britain
would change that Law, strike out some and put
in others. Justice was ill administered by the
Provincial Magistrates. Some taxes such as
window duty and assessed taxes bore hard upon
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Irish, but Britain repealed them and are now
able to keep order in a country. 51
Despite Palmerston's misplaced confidence, Britain's
problems in Ireland did not go away. In the late l830s
Daniel O'Connell began a new campaign for repeal of the
Union and sought to mobilize clerical support in Ireland
to bolster his cause. Sir Robert Peel, the Prime
Minister, sought to pacify the agitation in Ireland by
appealing to the Vatican. 52 However, Britain did not
have diplomatic relations with the Papacy, and the
English college in Rome was much weaker than its Irish
equivalent. In particular, John MacHale, the Bishop of
Tuant and a great clerical supporter of O'Connell, was
influential in Rome because he had close links with the
Secretary of State, Cardinal Raffaello Lambruschini, who
was a prominent pro-Austrian and who had close contacts
with Metternich.
It was this need to tackle the Irish question that
provided the hidden agenda to the Mazzini affair in 1843-
4. The arrangement reached with Austria in the autumn of
1843 was a quid pro quo in which on the one hand the
British government would pass information about I4azzini
to Metternich, and on the other Austria would persuade
the Pope and Lambruschini, to stop clerical participation
in the Irish Repeal movement. The British government
hoped that it could persuade Metternich to use his
influence upon Lambruschini and the Pope to undermine the
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Repeal movement in Ireland, given Metternich's concern
over Mazzini's revolutionary movement and O'Connell's
radical movement and fears that both might spread over
the Continent.	 Irish affairs thus led the British
government into a tangled international plot involving an
Italian revolutionary and Austrian and Papal diplomacy.
Unfortunately for the British government the Pope was
sympathetic to the Irish Catholics who had long suffered
from English rule, and the Curia had no intention of
antagonizing the Irish Catholics in order to help the
English government out of its emtarrassment. 	 Therefore
nothing was done by Rome to restrict the Repeal movement,
in spite of Metternich's concern about the Irish Repeal
agitation. Instead of solving the Irish problem, this
incident brought nothing but domestic embarrassment to
the British government.
Britain could not solve the question of the Irish Repeal
agitation through its negotiation with Metternich, but it
did not give up negotiations with the Papacy. In November
1843 the Vatican requested through the Papal Nuncio in
Vienna, Cardinal Altieri, that Britain control the
Italian nationalist agitations that had broken out in
Malta.	 As a result, the Colonial Office instructed the
authorities in Malta to restrain the revolutionaries, and
Aberdeen, at Peel's request, sought as a quid pro quo
Papal support against the Irish clergy who were involved
with the Repeal agitations. 56 But although England
checked the Maltese agitations Cardinal Lambruschini
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claimed that 'whereas the government in Malta had the
power to enforce the law of the land, the Holy See had no
such power in Ireland.'	 Once again the British
government's efforts to persuade Rome to influence the
Catholic Church in Ireland had failed, although Britain
would return to this strategy after the election of the
new Pope in July 1846.
The failure of the attempt to outflank the Irish
nationalists in Rome had an important effect on British
policy towards Ireland that was to have significant
ramifications for the future of Anglo-Vatican relations.
The major consequence of this set-back was the
realization on the part of the British government that
they had to make a political compromise on a number of
religious issues relating to Ireland, particularly as the
Repeal movement was attracting support in America, Europe
and among British Chartists. This resulted in reforms
such as the Charitable Bequests Act in 1844 and the
increase of the Maynooth Grant in 1845 which were
designed to appease Catholic opinion. 58
Peel's efforts began with the reform of the law governing
charitable bequests to the Catholic Church in Ireland in
February 1844. This was a move intended to win over the
Irish clergy but it soon met with resistance by those
close to MacHale. Consequently it was felt by the British
government that it was necessary to appeal to Rome and on
27 September 1844, to get the Vatican's approval of the
435
reform of charitable bequests, Peel directed Charles
Canning, Aberdeen's Under-Secretary, to despatch to Rome
William Petre, a member of a well known Essex Catholic
family, who it was hoped would make a favourable
impression on the Papal authorities.	 Petre was
appointed as an agent resident in Rome attached to the
British Legation in Florence, he was not an accredited
ambassador or minister to the Papal States as Britain did
not have formal diplomatic relations with the Papacy.
There was intensive correspondence between Petre and
Aberdeen about this issue but Petre failed to make
progress. This revealed a fundamental problem for British
policy which was that any attempt to address Catholic
issues in Ireland could only be successful if Papal
approval was given, but due to its lack of official
diplomatic representation there was little Britain could
do to influence the Pope. 60
Further to this in 1845 Peel decided to treble the annual
parliamentary grant to the Maynooth Catholic College in
Ireland. The first Maynooth Act of 1795 had established a
college funded by the British government to provide for
the education of Irish priests from poor backgrounds. 61
However, the Maynooth Grant, which had been intended to
placate Irish opinion ironically gave more opportunity
for repeal supporters to study in the College. To
distract them from the Repeal movement, Peel was forced
to consider increasing substantially the grant to
Maynooth, even though he realized that this would be very
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controversial and might create difficulties for his
government. 62 He was convinced that the Maynooth Grant
was important if Ireland was to be subdued, and hoped
that it would conciliate a large section of the Irish
Catholic community. His policy was to appease rather than
confront. However, it was his misfortune that any good
that this reform achieved was swept away by the famine.
The issue of the Maynooth Grant was also significant
because it brought about deep divisions within the
Conservative party, and some would claim that it was not
the repeal of the corn laws but rather the Maynooth Bill,
which became law in April 1845, that caused the final
division within the Tory party. 63 The Maynooth Grant
also had the unfortunate effect of provoking widespread
anti-Catholic sentiment among the British public.
Protestant groups formed a Central Anti-Maynooth
Committee which was led by Sir Culling Eardley Smith.
This Committee organized a number of large public
meetings and indirectly helped in the creation of the
Evangelical Alliance. 64 This growth of anti-Catholic
agitation would also over time have an effect on Anglo-
Vatican relations.
Section III: The Manifesto di Rimini and its consequences
British frustrations with Gregory XVI were not limited to
his refusal to help over the Irish issue; there was also
increasing dissatisfaction by 1844 over his government of
the Papal States. The period between 1844 and his death
37
in 1846 saw the rise of civil strife within the States,
which also spread to Tuscany, but Gregory ignored all
calls for reform.
In Italy, after the failure of several of Mazzini's
revolutionary conspiracies, several important writers
holding moderate liberal ideas emerged around the early
1840s'. These included activists such as Vincenzo
Gioberti and Carlo Farini, both former supporters of
Mazzini who had moved to more moderate liberal positions.
65 In 1843 Gioberti, who was Piedmontese, published a book
entitled Del primato morale e civile degli Italiani which
advanced the proposal that the Pope should become the
leader of a United Italy under a federal system. His
Priniato had considerable influence on other moderate
writers, such as d'Azeglio and Farini, and was also read
by Cardinal Mastai-Feretti, soon to become Pius IX. 66
Its effect on Farini was particularly significant,
because two years later he published the Manifesto di
Rimini. Farini came from the Roinagna and was to have an
important role in the Risorgimento both as an
intellectual and a politician; he eventually became Prime
Minister of Italy between 1862-63. Farini's initial
disillusion with revolution came after a series of
unsuccessful plots starting with the Moto di Savigno in
1843. Most of these insurrections were regarded as
directly or indirectly influenced by Mazzini's Young
Italy in Paris and London. The agitation in Malta in 1843
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spread to the turbulent regions of Calabria (in the
Kingdom of Naples), Romagna and Bologna, but none of
these insurrections were successful. 67 This was enough
to give a formidable impression of Youn g Italy's
activities to the Papal States and other European
monarchical states such as Austria and Britain, but to
some in the movement, such as Farini, the continuous
stream of failed revolutions suggested the need for a
different approach.
Surrounded by these unsuccessful revolutionary movements,
and against the background of yet another failed
insurrection, this time in Rimini, Farini suggested in
his Manifesto di Rimini in 1845 an alternative to
revolution.
He recommended a number of reforms for the Papal States,
some of which, close to the ideas suggested in the 1831
Memorandum, were a way of appealing to the five Great
Powers. The full title of the document was 'Nanifesto of
the inhabitants of the Roman states to the princes and
nations of Europe,' and proposed a reform programme
comprising an amnesty, administrative reforms in the
Papal States, and the creation of a Civic Guard. 68 In
essence, however, it was a bourgeois document and the
main elements contained within it were typical of the
constitutional changes demanded by the middle classes
throughout Europe, that is the introduction of a modern
civil and criminal code of law and the establishment of a
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representative assembly which would have control over the
collection of taxation. The Manifesto was inspired by
several Italian liberals, and included ideas from
Gioberti, d'Azeglio and Balbo. 69 The document attracted
the attention not only of the Italian states but also of
the European Powers. 70
Farini may have hoped that this manifesto would lead to
some progress, but it had no effect on Gregory XVI who
continued with the same reactionary policies. However,
pressure for reform continued to grow. In 1846 Lord
Holland, the British minister in Florence, forwarded to
the Foreign Office a copy of another address to the Pope
written by an anonymous Italian nationalist. This
document was particularly interesting in suggesting how
Britain was perceived a model for development, and
included the observation that:
A revolution costs too much for people to
plunge into it without most cogent reasons, and
these reasons wise rulers seek to remove. The
tendency of nations to one vast association of
interests became a rage throughout most of the
whole of Europe. Germany, Poland, Hungary,
Bohemians and Austria. Protestant government
has the right of knowledge and charity, and
respects in popular tumults, the right of him
who suffers sometimes to complain. What is
protestant England doing for unhappy Ireland:
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she furnished her instead with a medium of
communicating her beliefs with great order and
legality. Britain knows that the people agitate
with more tranquillity when it is ruled in
equity. 71
Although somewhat naive in its assessment of the Irish
situation, this passage is an interesting reflection of
Italian liberal views.
The uprising in Rimini inspired Farini's Manifesto and
posed a new problem for the Papal authorities - how to
deal with the several hundred people involved in the
insurrection and their leader, Pietro Renzi. In his book
Lo Stato Roinano dall'anno 1815-50 published in 1850,
Farini claimed that the Rimini revolution was virtually a
non-violent movement. As Farini described it:
The insurgents did not commit either violence
or wrong of any other kind; they took
possession, it is true, of the little cash that
was found in the public coffers, but this,
which the Government and its journals
afterwards denounced as a wicked robbery, was
considered by impartial men a necessary
consequence of political convulsion, and by no
means as an ordinary crime. 72
Under the influence of the reactionary Gregory XVI,
Cardinal Massimo, the Legate of Forll near Rimini,
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pressed the Grand Duke of Tuscany to hand over Renzi and
his followers who, after the failure of their revolt, had
fled to Florence. The Papal Chargé d'affaires had
demanded that Renzi should be given up to the Papal
Government in accordance with the treaty of extradition
between Tuscany and Rome on 21 January 1846. 	 As Farini
noted:
It had already made the most keen and urgent
representation, in order to obtain from the
Tuscan Government the delivery into its own
hands of Pietro Renzi who was the author of the
movement of Rimini, and who, first taking
refugee in France, afterwards secretly returned
to Florence, and was there discovered and
arrested.
The British government showed interest in these events
because it feared the negative consequences of Gregory's
policy, not only on the Papal States but possibly too on
Tuscany itself.
The British government's reaction was revealed by
Holland, who noted to Palmerston in a letter on 21
January 1846 that a number of political disturbances were
taking place in Tuscany, 'Frequent acts of
insubordination testify to the prevailing spirit of
disaffection throughout the country,..' and referred to
the assassination of the principal police officer in
Forll and the large number of political prisoners in
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Cività Castellani.	 He lamented in his letter to
Palmerston that 'the laws of humanity are outraged and
public opinion disregarded'. 76 In his report of an
incident in Cività Castellani, he concluded on 27
February 1846 'There are sufficient causes of discontent
to excite among the people of Romagna an abhorrence of
essential tyranny.'	 on 26 January 1846 Holland
reported a meeting between the Pope and the Legates of
Ancona, Forll and Bologna regarding administrative reform
and other matters, but he concluded that '... no measures
of real advantage and importance are likely to be
adopted'. 78 We can see from this that the political and
social situation in the Papal States had not changed
since 1831.
The Renzi affair heightened unrest in Tuscany. In January
1846 the fact that Renzi had returned to Florence
secretly, using a false name, was discovered by the Papal
and Austrian representatives in Rome and they started
putting pressure on the Tuscan government insisting that
Renzi should be handed over to the Papal government.
Holland reported on 11 February 1846:
Though perhaps the termination of this affair
as I have related can be supported and
justified by international law and the treaty
of extradition, it is by no means a wise
expedient for the tranquillity of the Roman
states.
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In spite of Holland's efforts and his collaboration with
the French minister in Florence, the Grand Duke of
Tuscany agreed to Renzi's extradition to the Papal
States. This surrender caused tremendous anger among the
people in Tuscany against the Grand Duke as well as the
Papal government, especially because a petition for
Renzi's release was not considered by the Tuscan
government. 80
It was also discovered that the minister who had
organized Renzi's arrest in Tuscany was a man who was
closely linked with the Jesuits. Holland reported to
Aberdeen in February that this had led to the minister
being castigated by the people. 81
This increased hostility against the Pope and the Jesuits
led to protests against plans to found a nunnery of the
Sacred Heart in Pisa. Holland was informed on 16 March
1846 that a petition signed by thirty-five of the forty
professors at Pisa University had been sent to the
governor of Pisa. This petition insisted that 'The
Sisters of the Sacred Heart be refused the permission to
found in Pisa a house for the education of girls.' 82 It
justified this opposition by observing that:
Instead of introducing a new religious
establishment for that purpose it would be
better to reform those already existing
according to the exigencies of the present
times. The House which it is wished to found in
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Pisa is evidently intended to become a centre
of Jesuitical activity in Tuscany. From the
close dependence of the sisters of the Sacre
Coeur on the company of Jesus, these nuns
would necessarily, ... imbue with a Jesuitical
spirit the minds of the girls they would
educate, and by them influence private families
and society in general. 83
Holland noted that the governor of Pisa had greeted this
petition with disdain and that he had denied that the
Tuscan government had the 'ultimate sinister intention,
namely the future return of the Jesuits'. 84
On top of the Tuscan government's treatment of Renzi,
this affair caused Holland to express his dissatisfaction
with the authorities and his sympathy for the protests
against the Sacred Heart project. He realized, however,
that the Tuscan government faced great difficulties in
this situation, and his concern became even greater in
March when a new crisis emerged.
On 15 March 1846 Holland was approached by an Italian 'of
high standing and reputation in his own country' and
asked to:
take some steps in favour of some refugees
from Roniagna still hidden in Tuscany, who had
recently become quite desperate and were
resolved to resist to the utmost any attempt to
arrest them, convinced as they were that the
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consequences of such an arrest must be their
future surrender to the Roman government. 85
These political exiles had entered Florence secretly, and
the place in which they were hiding had not yet been
discovered. However, within the last few days, the Tuscan
authorities had become increasingly concerned to find
them. Holland reported to London that he had heard the
men were desperate and ready to die resisting arrest
rather than return to the Papal States. 86
The Tuscan government was now in a difficult position,
and the Tuscan foreign minister, Monsignor Humbourg,
called upon the British minister to show that he shared
Holland's views on the political refugees. On 17 March,
Holland reported to Aberdeen that:
He assured me that he would facilitate in any
way the quiet departure of these refugees from
Tuscany, but the difficulty remained as to
where to send them to. Their resources do not
allow them to undertake distant and expensive
voyages to England or America, and all other
countries are shut upon them. The French
minister had declared some months ago that he
would send no more destitute refugees to France
where they become a heavy burden on the
government. However, after seeing the minister
for the foreign affairs, I had some
conversation with Monsr (sic) de la
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Rochefoucauld, and I have some reason to hope
that he will consent to visa the passports, I
have given these men for England and thus
enable them to remain at Marseille till they
can ascertain whether they may be received by
the Sardinian Government or not. 87
Holland also sent for Aberdeen's information a
confidential letter he had sent to the Tuscan minister on
15 March in which he informed Hambourg that he would be
willing to give the men passports to allow them to leave
Tuscany, as he had done at his previous post in Vienna in
1836 for Polish political refugees who had desired to
leave Austria. 88
Holland realized that such action might compromise the
Foreign Office and noted to Aberdeen that:
I trust that Your Lordship will not disapprove
of the step I have taken - I have been actuated
merely by the anxious desire of preventing any
effusion of blood, as well as by the hope of
assisting the Tuscan government out of
difficulty which must be painful and might
become very serious in the present state of
public feeling in the country. 89
Despite Holland's efforts to save the Tuscan government
from further embarrassment, their problems continued, and
their treatment of the refugees from Rimini even affected
their relations with Piedmont. When the moderate Italian
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nationalist Carlo d'Azeglio, who was in Tuscany to
propagate his liberal ideas, criticized the behaviour of
the Pope and his collaborator, the Grand Duke of Tuscany,
over the Renzi issue, he was asked by the Tuscan
authorities to leave Florence. Holland reported to
Aberdeen on 1 April 1846 that, despite protests from
Piedmont, d'Azeglio had been expelled due to his
authorship of a pamphlet which severely criticized the
Grand Duke's conduct in Renzi affair. Holland noted that:
The expulsion from Tuscany of a man whose works
are so popular - whose language and opinions
are not violent and who is so much looked up to
throughout Italy, has created considerable
sensation here.
This incident aroused anger among the people of Tuscany
as well as the other parts of Italy, because d'Azeglio
was, like Renzi, a moderate liberal rather than a
revolutionary. This distaste for the suppressive and
reactionary policies adopted by the Pope and the Grand
Duke of Tuscany was also reflected by the British
representatives in Florence. Although opposed to
revolution they were sympathetic towards the Italian
moderate liberals and were furious at the ultra-
conservative Pope's treatment of these supporters of
reform. They believed that the Pope's behaviour
threatened the internal security not only of the Papal
States but of Tuscany as well.
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Another sign of Gregory's reactionary attitude was the
invitation to the Russian emperor, Nicholas I, to visit
Rome in January 1846, despite Russia's brutal treatment
of Catholics in Poland. This caused consternation in the
Foreign Office and led The Times to express its anxiety
in an article on 26 January 1846:
if Russia's own government acquired a
footing in southern Europe, they would in
course of time become masters of the whole. In
truth, it is manifest that Europeans could not
in case of a war, fight the Russians on their
own ground.
The Times also noted that 'Let Catholics have at least
the same liberty in Russia that the Russians will enjoy
in Rome, and let us have a Nuncio in Petersburg.' 91
Any little hope that remained for the regime of the
present Pope was thus completely extinguished; neither
political reform nor any social improvement could be
expected. Both within and outside the Papal States there
was increasing hostility towards Papal authority, which
seemed to epitomize the backwardness of the social and
political situation in most parts of the Italian
peninsula until the end of May 1846.
Section IV: The Death of Gregory XVI and the election of
the new Pope
June 1846 opened with the death of Gregory XVI. Petre,
informed Holland on 1 June 1846:
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I regret to inf arm Your Lordship that His
Holiness Pope Gregory XVI died this morning
between 8 and 9 o'clock in the eighty-first
year of his age, and the sixteenth of his
pontificate. 92
His death brought various reactions from the British
government and British press. The British government had
two main concerns; one, the possibility of revolt, the
other, fear of Austrian military intervention.
The British Consul in Ancona, George Moore informed
Aberdeen on 7 June that:
every precautionary measure has been taken
by the Government to prevent any popular
movements, which it would appear had been
anticipated by the authorities.
Obviously it was feared that circumstances might be
similar to those in 1831, when the death of Pius VIII had
precipitated a revolution during the interregnum. Moore
also described his anxiety about Austrian movements,
stating that the Austrian frigate Bellona had appeared
off Ancona harbour.
A similar report was made by the Hon Peter Scarlett, the
British Secretary of Legation in Florence, to Aberdeen on
18 June. He observed that the Austrians had increased
their garrison at Ferrara and gathered a force at
Sinigaglia. 95 Regarding the people's movement, he noted:
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Since the Pope's death, great fermentation
prevails in the marches of Ancona, and
extending to Umbria: but no outbreak has
occurred, or any act of violence, since the
attempt on the life of Colonel Allegrini, who,
having been an active member of the Military
commission, was stabbed in the street. 96
He described his fear that insurrection might break out
in the future, noting that the likelihood of such an
event depended upon who became the new Pope and observed:
If the choice of a successor of Gregory XVI
should fall on a candidate not averse to reform
and to an amnesty of political off ences which
have filled the State prisons with victims,
there is a reasonable ground for hope that
Italy may be governed tranquilly; but if the
future Pope should show as little disposition
as his predecessor to adopt a system of
Government more in character with the progress
of the age and the wants of his people, no
military or naval precautions will long be able
to stifle public indignation.
Neither Scarlett nor the other British diplomats in the
Italian states publicly criticized Gregory's regime,
although the British government had been disappointed by
Gregory's attitude towards the Memorandum and his
policies, and strongly hoped for the better
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administration of the Papal States. However, The Times of
9 June, in an obituary for the late Pope, did clearly
express its disapproval of his policies:
he foresaw and would by concession have
obviated, the overwhelming storm, that cannot
otherwise be prevented bursting upon Rome at
least; but he was overborne by the Cardinals,
who to the repeated entreaties of France and
Austria, and it is said England, refused
concurrence in even the slightest amelioration
of the civic and political condition of His
Holiness ... but sooner or later and the latest
time is not far distant, the whole Italian
peninsula will be one flame of insurrection. 98
The British government and the press were both keenly
interested in the election of the new Pope.
It is surprising that the press seemed to be more keen on
finding out about the background to the Conclave than the
Foreign Office. Petre reported to Scarlett on 15 June all
the names of the candidate cardinals,	 but The Times
went much further in its reports to its readers and
described the background and political tendency of all
candidate cardinals in detail, which the government
correspondence did not mention.
The Conclave had always been a place where foreign
interests conflicted with each other: in particular,
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although most of the Cardinals in this period were
Italians, the Catholic great powers, France and Austria,
could exert influence upon the election of the Pope in
order to secure a pro-French or pro-Austrian candidate.
On this occasion Metternich put pressure on the Curia to
prevent it from electing a pro-French liberal Pope, and
tried to ensure that Lainbruschini, who as Secretary of
State had been Gregory's closest adviser, would be the
new Pope. On the another hand the French ambassador to
the Vatican, Pellegrino Rossi, who had been appointed a
few days before Gregory's death, tried to counteract
Austrian influence, and had instructions to act in a
liberal but anti-revolutionary manner and prevent the
election of any ally of the Jesuits and Austria. 100
On 16 June 1846 the Conclave announced its decision to
the world. The new Pope was Cardinal Mastai-Feretti, who
took the title of Pius IX. He was known to be a man of
moderate views and was considered to be pro-French.
Within a few days it became clear that his election had
been well received. On 21 June, Scarlett informed
Aberdeen that:
The favourable impression already produced by
the election of a Pope from whose moderate and
liberal character some improvement is expected
in governing the country, is further increased
by the hope of his conferring the post of
Foreign Minister on Cardinal Gizzi. 101
53
The Times on 6 July 1846 had a long article explaining
all the details about the background to the election, and
in particular the conflict between French and Austrian
interests, which were again absent from the Foreign
Office documents:
It appears that Cardinal Micara was the prelate
most popular with the lower orders, and that he
had to escape privately to the Vatican for the
purpose of avoiding being carried there in
triumph by the mob. But Micara had no chance of
carrying the Conclave as he might the people,
and the number of votes given him was very
small. Cardinal Altieri was the candidate of
the nobility; but, as in all Europe at the
present day, neither the high aristocracy nor
plebeian democracy are powerful, and these
candidates had to give way to the Juste Milieu
claims of Cardinal Gizzi and of the present
Pope. Cardinal Gizzi was at first certain of
his election, but as his opinions stray beyond
the bounds of the Juste Milieu, he was set
aside to make way for Cardinal Mastai Feretti,
who combined all the qualities possessed by the
other, with a temperament more subdued, and a
reputation for practical good sense. 102
The Times was pleased with the Conclave's choice, and
described Pius IX as 'an excellent man', and stated that
'In England these qualities will be duly estimated'. 103
54
It also noted with satisfaction that, despite the recent
visit of Tsar Nicholas to Rome, Russia had not influenced
the election of the new Pope and it took comfort from the
victory of the French candidate, although it feared that
Austria was 'working hard to regain her position, and
some people say that it is impossible for the new Pope
not to succumb'. 104
The role of the Catholic Great Powers in influencing the
result of the election led The Times to ask whether it
was now appropriate for Britain to establish formal
diplomatic relations with the Papacy. Its correspondent
observed on 6 July 1846 that:
It is much to be regretted that a British
ambassador is not officially appointed to the
Holy See and I cannot understand while we
accredit one to the Sultan we do not do so near
the Pope. ... I heard that the new Pope has
already expressed a wise opinion on this
subject and if popular feeling will allow the
nomination with us I am convinced it would be
acceptable here. At this moment the calm and
consistent advice of a British representative
having no interest in the intrigues which throw
suspicion over all the acts of the Austrian and
French embassies, would be most valuable;
not only must our position with regard to Irish
and Canadian Roman Catholics be strengthened,
but the sacred cause of constitutional liberty
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all over the world be ... advanced. The leaven
of prejudice is still at work in England and
the scarlet old lady has still her terrors for
our people. 105
Furthermore The Times noted that the temporal power of
the Papacy could not be ignored.
The Times's noticeably positive view of the election of
Pius contrasted with that of The Northern Star, the
Chartist and radical newspaper, which did not pay much
attention to the election because they were politically
opposed to the Roman Catholic Church authority. The
article in The Northern Star on 4 July 1846 explained the
history of the Pope's predecessors, and provided the
following statement:
Among the French Popes is found, in the
thirteenth century, the son of a poor cobbler
of Troyes in Champagne, Jacques Panteleon, who
took the name of Charles VI, and in the
fourteenth century the son of a baker, of the
country of Foix (now department of the Ariega),
Jacques Fourinier, known by the name of
Benedict XII. 106
It is quite amusing to see that The Northern Star,
because of its political stance, tried to put emphasis on
Popes who came from poor backgrounds.
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on 17 July 1846, a month after the election of Pius, he
granted an amnesty to political prisoners and exiles.
Hundreds of potential revolutionaries were freed
including Angelo Brunetti, called Ciceruacchio, a
Carbonaro and supporter of Mazzini who later became a
leader of the revolution in Rome, and Carlo Luciano
Bonaparte, Prince of Canino and the son of Napoleon's
brother Lucien, while a large number of exiles returned
to the Papal States, including Carlo Armellini who would
be one of the Triuinvirs of the Roman Republic in 1849. 107
The amnesty was greeted by popular demonstrations and
enthusiastic applause in Rome and in the cities of the
Legations and the Adriatic provinces where anti-Papal
feelings usually dominated. 108
Baron Cowley, the British ambassador to France, wrote to
Palmerston on 17 July 1846 about the Austrian reaction to
the amnesty:
Prince Metternich disapproves of the measure
granting a general amnesty to the disturbers of
the public peace in the Legations, and wishes
that the institutions which it is in
contemplation to grant to those districts
should be confined within the limits proposed
in a memorial which he caused to be presented
by the Austrian Ambassador at Rome to the
Pope's predecessor. 109
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The Pope, however, showed no sign of changing his policy.
This in turn led Metternich, who was 'strongly impressed
with the danger which may result from the too liberal
policy of the Pope', to ask the French government to instruct its
ambassador to Rome, Count Pellegrino Rossi, to put pressure on the
Pope. 110
In Britain the amnesty was greeted with enthusiasm. On 29
July 1846, The Times reported that a ceremony had taken
place in Rome and that a procession of 40,000 people had
marched with torches to the Quirinal palace, stating:
In fact, the joy of the people is sincere, the
amnesty is fuller than was expected, and there
is not this day in Rome a single discontented
person,.. reform in every department of state
and under examination, justice, taxation,
reduction of duties to prevent smuggling,
political prisoner and exiles restored. 111
Another article in The Times on 31 July 1846 mentioned
that Renzi was one of the liberated political prisoners,
and noted that 'The Pope was the idol of the people'. 112
Even The Northern Star on 9 August 1846 was quite in
favour of the amnesty:
The liberal policy of the new Pope seems to
have produced universal satisfaction among his
new subjects and rendered him extremely
popular. . .The amnesty was published on the 7th
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in the evening and the people contented
themselves that night with assembling before
the palace of Quirinal, cheering for His
Holiness and marching in procession through all
the principal streets ... Subscriptions were
opened in favour of the poor political
prisoners. 113
It appears from the above that both conservative and
radical public opinion in Britain was at least initially
impressed with the new Pope.
Palmerston was at first cautious in his response, since
he knew that Austria had tried to prevent the Pope from
issuing a full amnesty for political offenders and he
desired to know the French government's opinion. Replying
to Cowley's correspondence from Paris, Palinerston
declared to Count de Jarnac, the French ambassador in
London, on 21 July 1846 that:
if the French Government should be of
opinion that it would be wise and proper of the
Pope to signalise his accession to the Papal
Chair by an act of general grace, and also to
take measures for carrying into effect the
reforms which were recommended in 1831 by the
Representatives of the Five Powers in a
memorandum delivered by them in that year to
the Roman Government, I was sure that Her
Majesty's Government would be glad to co-
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operate with the French Government for so
benevolent a purpose in any way in which the
assistance of the British Government could
usefully and properly be given. 114
Palmerston declared that Britain's stance regarding the
amnesty was the same as it had been at the time of the
1831 Memorandum, and all that Britain wished to see was
the establishment of stable government in the Papal
States.
To understand Palmerston's views of the situation within
the Papal States and its relation to the general European
situation it is necessary to look at the letter which he
wrote to Lord John Russell, the Prime Minister, on 30
July 1846, just after the election of Pius, which
included a copy of the Memorandum of 1831. Palmerston
came to the heart of his concern when he observed:
Italy is the weak part of Europe and the next
war that breaks out in Europe will probably
arise out of Italian affairs. 115
He noted that during the reign of Gregory XVI there had
been no attempt at reform and that as a result the Papal
States were threatened by revolution; and if a revolution
broke out there was a possibility that it could lead to a
clash between Austria and France. Palmerston foresaw that
the French liberals would support a revolution in the
Papal States, and would very likely come to the aid of
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the rebels if Metternich should attempt or be invited to
suppress the rebellion:
France and Austria would then object to each
other in Italy and France would have all the
Italians on her side. But the war begun in
Italy would probably spread to Germany; and at
all events we can have no wish to see Austria
beaten down... 116
Palmerston concluded from the above that Britain could
only avoid these circumstances by adopting a firm policy.
The alternative, he noted to Russell, was that:
If these things should happen and they may not
be so distant as many may suppose, people will
naturally ask what the Whig government of 1846
was about and why they did not take advantage
of the liberal Institutions of the new Pope to
encourage and induce him to make reforms which
if then made might have prevented such events.
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Palinerston concluded that this would benefit the Papal
States as well as British interests, and noted:
I believe we shall be doing a thing
agreeable as well as useful to the Papacy and
shall strengthen and support him in effecting
reforms which every enlightened member of the
Roman government has long ... acknowledged to
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be necessary, if on the contrary we fail, and
if all four should refuse to do anything, we
shall at least stand justified, and shall be
able to show that we are wholly abstained from
the responsibility of any misfortunes which may
therefore arise from that question. 118
This memorandum was significant because it helped to
define the aims of British policy towards the Papacy for
the next five years.
The Pope's amnesty was supported by France but
disapproved of by Austria; it encouraged popular
expectations in the Papal States, in particular in
Ancona. The amnesty encouraged the hopes of nationalists
and led to a movement within the Papal States to drive
all foreign reactionary influence out of Italy. In Ancona
the people cried "Down with foreigners" about Austria and
Russia, while the French Consul was cheered. 119
Britain saw the growth of Italian nationalism as a means
to undermine Austrian and French influence over the
Italian peninsula. Consul Moore in Ancona first reported
anti-foreign agitation to Palinerston on 26 August 1846:
I have the honour of stating that the public
rejoicing for the amnesty has terminated
without any riot or public disturbance. Some
individuals, detested by the public for being
the too ready tools of government during the
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last reign prudently quitted this town before
the holidays. The Austrian and Russian Consular
Generals have taken umbrage at the spirit of
the inscriptions during the illumination: the
former considering that whether the
interference of the "foreigner" was alluded to
it pointed to his own country; and the latter
found fault with remarks made upon the Polish
nation, which is strongly recommended to His
Holiness's attention; he also was offended with
the cries uttered under his windows by the
populace of "Down with foreigners!" 120
On 2 September 1846, Sir George Hamilton, the new British
minister in Florence, repeated the information which had
been received from Moore to Palmerston and noted in
addition that, '... the Austrian Ambassador has been
hissed frequently at Rome'. Hamilton also expressed his
own support for this movement, which was remarkable
considering the level of foreign influence in the Papal
States. 121 British diplomats in the Papal States and
Florence could not help showing their enthusiasm. Petre
explained to Hamilton on 31 August 1846, a proposal to
establish a Civic Guard and the possibility of abolishing
the Swiss Guard. At the same time, Petre was more
realistic than the other two British diplomats:
The Cardinal reminds the delegates how foreign,
certain theories quite inapplicable to the
situation and nature of the States of the
63
Church, are to the notions of His Holiness, and
which might compromise that internal as well as
external tranquillity of which every Government
stands in need for the well-being of its
subjects. 122
On 14 November 1846, Hamilton informed Palmerston that a
Civic Guard in Bologna was already being organized by men
from the most respectable classes. 123
After the amnesty in July there was expectation of
reforms in other areas. On 18 July John Freeborn, the
Consul in Rome, reported that:
It has come to my knowledge and I have it from
unexceptionable authority, that His Holiness
proposes to make rational reforms, commercial
and other improvements, to such an extent as
the position of his Government and the spirit
of the times require; that the people who have
severely suffered under the late Pontificate
will become happy and contented. 124
In fact, in order to continue his reforms, Pius IX needed
somebody capable of assisting him, because the ultra-
conservative Zelanti were still powerful and opposed to
reform. 125 It had been expected that Cardinal
Lambruschini would be elected Secretary of State again,
but Pius needed to remove the ultra-conservatives from
the Curia. On 13 August 1846 Hamilton sent Palmerston the
good news which he had received from Petre in Rome that
64
Cardinal Gizzi had been appointed Secretary of State, and
that Cardinal Massimo had been made Prefect of the
Congregation of Rivers and Roads ("delle Acque e Strade
126
The appointments of Cardinal Gizzi and Cardinal Massinjo
were important for Britain as both were considered to be
liberals and in favour of reform. However, their taking
office did not mean that reform would follow immediately
and Gizzi had to act to dampen the people's expectations.
Petre reported to Hamilton on 31 August 1846 that a
circular had been issued by Gizzi to counter some of the
more extreme hopes expressed by the people. He noted:
The real intent of this circular is to
contradict the various rumours, not indeed of
reforms under consideration, but of organic
changes in the whole system of government; such
as the secularisation of nearly all the chief
offices, and the disbanding of the Swiss
troops. The better informed, and those who know
anything of the circumstances of this State and
of its component parts, have of course given
little credit to these reports; but they have
been eagerly received in the provinces, the
more so as foreign journals repeat them and
various others, on the faith of their
correspondence in Rome. The term of the service
of the Swiss troops will nof expire before
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1854, and his holiness will not be induced to
shorten it. 127
An example of the repetition of the rumours that were
circulating within the Papal States came in The Northern
Star which produced on 10 October 1846 a rather premature
announcement of a new constitution in the Papal States
(an event which did not happen until March 1848):
New constitution will be granted by the new
Pope in November. It will comprise of
provincial councils with the principle of
election, and a consultative senate to be
assembled at Rome every two years. 128
It also referred to a list of improvements including the
National Guard and stated 'A National Guard of 4000 will
be organized in Rome and re-established in the province
where it was ceased in 1832'. It also noted that the
secularisation of offices was a possibility and made
clear its approval of Gizzi's nomination as he was seen
to be 'favourable with new system'. 129 Apparently even
The Northern Star perceived Gizzi to be a liberal.
Petre who took a realistic view of the situation, was
supportive of the caution shown by Gizzi and the Pope,
and stated to Hamilton on 10 November that the reform
programme in the Papal States needed sufficient and
careful consideration before it would actually start
functioning:
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The political state is getting better. It is
not a great change, but His Holiness is fully
determined on effecting reforms in every branch
of the administration, and has already
appointed several commissions, reconuuending the
members of them to hasten on with their plans
as much as prudence and reflection on the
present state of things will allow. 130
Hamilton, however, believed that reform in the Papal
States was vital and urgent if the situation was to
remain under control and when he forwarded Petre's report
to London he warned:
The measures of reform so ardently desired will
not be delayed much longer nor can it be
expected that such delay can be prolonged
without danger, under present circumstance.
(Since the organization of a civic guard at
Bologna, under the direction of the Government,
though it is said this body of men is not
armed). On the 11th instant at Rome, a meeting
at dinner of 700 persons took place,
recommending in strong language the necessity
of reform. 131
Although Gizzi's liberal policies were as yet still only
intentions, they were enough for the new Pope to receive
applause from his subjects and sympathy from both the
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British government and public opinion of different
political tendencies (The Times and The Northern Star).
But while Britain was keen to applaud the first tentative
steps taken by Pius towards reform of the domestic
situation within the Papal States, another matter of more
immediate and direct interest was the plan for
constructing a railway in the States.
Since the Papal States occupied the central part of the
Italian peninsula no railway network from north to south
could be built without the permission of the Pope's
government. This was, however, a matter of some
importance for Britain, which was keen to encourage
railway-building in Italy which would benefit
Mediterranean trade and provide a useful link in the
communication route to India. The British government
favoured the idea of a railway starting from the port of
Brindisi in the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies that would
run along the Adriatic coast and finally reach Bologna.'32
A plan for railway development had been put forward
earlier in 1846, but no progress had been made as Gregory
XVI was firmly opposed to permitting any railways,
whether foreign or locally owned, to be built in the
Papal States. 133 As soon as Pius became the Pope British
interest was renewed, and there were soon signs that the
Papacy might agree to railway development. It was not
until 10 November 1846 that a concrete plan emerged;
Petre reported to Hamilton that Gizzi had announced:
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that the Government authorized the
execution of the four lines of railways which
appear to be of principal importance.
1. From Rome to Neapolitan frontier near
Ceprano.
2. Rome to Porto d'Anzio.
3. Rome to Civita Vecchia.
4. Line running through the most populous parts
of Umbria to Ancona and thence from Ancona to
Bologna, following the track of the Flaniinian
and Aemilian ways.
The contraction of these roads will be
entrusted to the private industry of companies
represented by Papal subjects. The Government
reserves for future consideration other lines
within the State, as well as those
communicating with the neighbouring
territories. 134
Petre noted, however, that it was a possibility that in
the future 'companies approved of by the Government'
would also be allowed to compete for railway contracts.
Discussions about this issue were held in Rome between
John Freeborn, the Consular agent in Rome, and the Papal
authorities. Freeborn explained in one of his letters how
Britain might directly benefit from the constructi pn of
railways in the Papal States, referring to his
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conversation with the Papal Treasurer, Cardinal
Antonelli, on 11 November 1846:
His Excellency the Treasurer Monsig. Antonelli
stated that he was well aware and perfectly
sensible of the advantage this country would
devise in the events of a rail road being
established at Brindisi and passing through the
Papal state, provided that the line was
selected for passing the Indian mail, ... and
you will recollect that H.E. stated that
although his position did not allow him to give
an official opinion without the commands of His
Holiness, still he had no objection to give his
private opinion, which was, that the Roman
government would place no obstacle in the way
of an English Engineer examining, and reporting
upon the practicability of the line decided
upon for the purpose of conveying the mail from
India; ..., this important rail road will be
soon laid down and the communication between
India and England be reduced in time by several
days compared with the transmits through France
and Germany. 135
This good news from the Papal States was mirrored by the
success of the representations made by the British
minister in Naples, Mr Waghorn, who had persuaded tb.
Neapolitan King of the benefit of a railway from
Brindisi. The only problem now was deciding whether to
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take the route from Bologna through Trieste or
Marseilles. The preference was for the Austrian route,
and on 11 December 1846 the British ambassador in Vienna
informed Metternich that Britain desired permission to
link the railway from Brindisi to the Austrian railway
system. 136
While the railway issue could not be completely solved
until the Austrian government had made its decision,
there was still relief in British circles that the Pope
had shown a more liberal attitude towards the railway
development. This more moderate approach was also in
evidence when, for the first time, the new Pope permitted
subjects of the Papal States to attend the Italian
Scientific Conference. Among the Papal subjects who went
to Genoa to participate in the conference was the nephew
of Napoleon I, the Prince of Canino, who sent his thanks
to the Pope after the successful conference. 137 This
moderate step, like his interest in the new railway
project, indicated the Pope's desire for the social and
economic improvement of the Papal States, in such fields
as the development of technology and science and the
reduction of unemployment. 138
In supporting the new reforms in the Papal States,
Britain found an ally in France. However, it was not easy
to co-operate since Britain had to contend with the
French desire to expand its political influence in both
the Italian and the Iberian peninsulas. In particular,
conflict over the 'Spanish Marriages issue' cooled
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relations between the two countries. Towards the end of
1846 Britain also experienced difficulties in its
relations with the other European Powers as a result of
Austria's intervention in Cracow, Austrian and French
intervention in the Swiss civil war, and the Irish
famine. There were already sufficient reasons for Britain
to support Italian nationalism and the new policies of
the Pope, but these international issues made British
interest in Italy even greater. The Spanish marriage
question in particular gave Britain an opportunity to
support the Papacy independently from France, making a
clear contrast with the period between July and August
1846 when Britain had been to keen to ascertain French
opinion about the Pope's new policies in order to decide
how Britain should react.
The declaration of the French Foreign Minister, Franois
Guizot, that he wanted to arrange marriages for the Queen
and her sister to fasten French influence upon Spain
caused a split between Britain and France. Aberdeen
agreed to the French initiative in Spain, as long as
France did not dictate to Spain on the marriage question.
In 1845 he agreed to the marriage of the Queen's sister
to the Duc de Montpensier, son of the King of France, but
only after the Queen had married and an heir was born.
However, in July 1846, when the Whig government came to
power under Russell and Paliuerston returned to the
Foreign Office, the latter was not prepared to accept
Aberdeen's assumption that France should have special
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influence over Spain. Palmerston insisted that Spain's
independence should be respected, and tried to undermine
French ambitions in Spain. Guizot realized that
Palmerston would not accept the agreement he had made
with Aberdeen over the Spanish marriages and decided to
move quickly to complete a double-marriage pact: the
Queen of Spain would marry a pro-French Spanish Bourbon
and her sister would marry the DUC de Montpensier.
Palmerston was furious that he had failed to prevent the
marriages and concluded that the English entente with
France had come to the end. 139 Although Palmerston
sought the eastern powers' assistance to undermine French
ambitions, it was Guizot who moved quickly to construct
good relations with Austria in order to avoid diplomatic
isolation in Europe. 140 This meant that Britain's
position became increasingly isolated, which was one of
the reasons for Britain's interest in the Italian
peninsula, and in particular, the Papal States.
Conclusion
The end of the diplomatic entente between Britain and
France due to the Spanish Marriage incident brought to a
conclusion the Anglo-French agreement about the need for
reform in the Papal States. Britain was thus obliged, in
trying to implement Palmerston's policy of encouraging
reform, to search for a way to influence the Papacy
directly rather than through any other European power
such as Austria and France. The logical way to achieve
this was to send a diplomatic mission to Rome. There were
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not only diplomatic reasons but also other motives which
led Britain to believe that it needed to influence the
Papacy directly. The most important of these was Ireland.
In spite of Peel's fairly successful policy of
reconciling the Irish, the Great Famine during the autumn
of 1845 and through 1846 and 1847 renewed the difficult
situation in Ireland, and once more made it imperative to
attempt through the Vatican to control the political
activities of the Irish priests. By the end of 1846 one
can see that Britain's foreign policy towards the Papacy
had begun to shift, and a door was opening that would
eventually lead to the arrival of Lord Minto in Rome in
November 1847.
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Chapter II
The Pope's liberal reforms and
the origins of the Minto mission in 1847
Introduction
In 1847 Pius IX expanded the reform programme he had
introduced the previous year, and in particular
concentrated on the reorganization of the Papal
administrative system. These new policies, including the
new press law of 15 May and the establishment of the
Civic Guard on 5 July, made Pius extremely popular,
associating him with the Italian nationalist movement.
There were public demonstrations of support with cries of
'Viva Pio Nono' in the streets. For many he was the
patriot Pope - 'Papa Angelico'. His popularity extended
beyond Italy to other Catholic and non-Catholic European
states such as France and Britain, even reaching
America.' In France sympathy with the Pope was expressed
by some liberal Catholics 2 : even in Britain statements
of support were made in the Parliament 	 However, within
the Austrian government Pius's reforms were seen as too
liberal and as potentially destabilizing, and led to the
Austrian occupation of Ferrara.
It is often held that the Austrian military intervention
in the Papal States provoked Italian nationalism and
encouraged the British government to express support for
the Pope.	 In particular, it is believed that the
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despatch of Lord Minto (father-in-law of Lord John
Russell) as British Special Envoy to Rome in 1847 was a
result of the Austrian action, and that Britain by this
move proved its support for Pius's liberal policy and
showed its particular interest in the Papacy. However,
Minto's mission was motivated not only by Britain's
political concerns over Italy but also by its domestic
religious preoccupations. The correspondence between Lord
Minto, Russell, Paliuerston, Shrewsbury and the Roman
Catholic Bishop Nicholas Wiseman clearly shows that
Minto's mission was intended to cover religious as well
as political and diplomatic issues.
Section I: British reactions to Pius IX'S reforms.
In the six months of Pius's reign after June 1846, his
reform programme took shape and excited an enthusiastic
response. To advance these liberal reforms it was
necessary to remove the old Gregorian elements from the
Curia and to appoint new liberal-minded ministers to the
Papal government. Britain's expectation of reform in the
Papal States was increased by the fall of Lambruschini,
the influential ultra-conservative and pro-Austrian
Secretary of State under the previous Pope, Gregory XVI,
and his replacement as the chief minister on 8 August
1846 by the more liberal Cardinal Gizzi. Gizzi was one of
the most important of Pius's advisers in regard to the
reform programme. He wanted to achieve administrative
reform through the creation of an advisory council of
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ministers, while acting to restrain over-enthusiastic
popular movements.
The replacement of the old ministries, including the
Secretary of State and other posts such as the Papal
Legates, was supported by British officials. The British
minister to Turin, Ralph Abercromby, was enthusiastic
about these changes. In a letter to Palinerston on 12
January 1847 he observed that the conduct of ministers
under the previous Pope had been a cause of Papal
maladministration. He noted with pleasure that:
The Roman government has ... acted wisely in
removing from their government those Cardinals
who have become identified with the system
followed by the late Pope in the administration
of the various Legations. 6
Furthermore, Abercromby was able to report that the
removal of the ultra-conservative elements from the
mainstream of Papal politics had been 'followed by the
adoption of a line of policy which proves the disposition
of the present Papal Government to be of a liberal
tendency.'
Although the replacement of the old Gregorian faction by
the liberal ministers made concrete administrative reform
possible, Abercromby realized that the extent of the
intended administrative reforms could lead to
difficulties. This was especially the case with the legal
reforms which aimed at preventing the abuse of
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ecclesiastical power and protecting the rights of the
Pope's secular subjects. Despite these problems
Abercromby was fairly optimistic, and observed to
Palmerston that:
There is much to be done to improve the
condition of the Papal states to restore the
finances and extend the resources of that
country; but the disposition which the present
Government of Rome have shown to effect a sound
and judicious reform of the crying abuses that
exist, has created a better spirit amongst the
subjects of His Holiness
He believed that as political instability and
insurrection were the result of bad administration,
administrative reform was the best way to quell social
disorder in the Papal States.
He informed the Foreign Office about the reforms
undertaken, described how effective they were, and told
Palmerston that a key element in Papal policy was the
introduction of consultation with well-informed members
of the populace in order to correct the most resented
abuses of power.
However, in his opinion administrative reform was more
urgent in the provinces than in the city of Rome, as the
abuse of power in the Legations was the most serious
threat to the stability of the Papal States. 10
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This was particularly the case in Bologna, where
political disorder was widespread and where improvement
was a matter of some urgency:
As Bologna has at all periods been the province
of the Papal States that has shown the greatest
unquietness and the strongest liberal
tendencies, ..., which justifies the hope that
they may abstain from insurrections and thus
afford the Papal Government sufficient time to
mature their reforms and to carry them into
execution. 11
However, he believed that the recent replacement of the
Cardinal Legate by the liberal Piedmontese Cardinal Amat
gave some hope that political reform would be effective,
as Amat was thought to be in favour of reform. 12
Abercromby perceived that the appointment of Bologna's
new Cardinal Legate might create a liberal political tie
between Sardinia and the Papal government which could be
crucial for the creation of a liberal Italy. He noted to
Palnierston on 12 January 1847 that:
The past year appears therefore to have been
marked, in the States of Sardinia and of the
Church by a desire on the part of the
Sovereigns of these two countries, to better
the condition of the people and to consult more
extensively their general interests; 13
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Furthermore, he observed, an alliance between the two
liberal states in Italy might contribute to the peace of
Europe and that:
• . . it is by a steady prosecution of such system
that Italy is gradually to be brought to assume
her proper influence amongst the other nations
of Europe. 14
The welcome given by British officials in Italy to the
Pope's policies was also shared by Palinerston. The
Foreign Secretary was optimistic about reform in the
Papal States and believed in the importance of the
political role of Papal authority in Italy as well as in
Europe, and persuaded the government to move towards
active support for the Papal States. On 25 March
Palmerston, after receiving a report from John Freeborn,
Consular in Rome, regarding a meeting between the Pope
and the prominent free-trade supporter, Richard Cobden,
noted:
Mr Freeborn and Mr Petre should take every fit
opportunity of complimenting the Pope on behalf
of the British govt upon each successive
improvement which he may from time to time
introduce into the system of administration. 15
This advice was promptly relayed to the representatives
in Rome and Freeborn took it upon himself to convey this
information immediately to Gizzi, despite the cautious
87
tone of Palmerston's original instructions. Freeborn's
initiative had an interesting result as Gizzi told the
Pope of Britain's approval of Papal reforms, and the Pope
duly offered his thanks to Freeborn in June. Palmerston
only learnt of these events in July and was rather
surprised but pleased at Freeborn's actions. 16
Although there is no clear evidence to prove it, one can
postulate that Freeborn's report to Gizzi of Palmerston's
support helped to spur a Papal initiative to Britain. On
19 April 1847 the Papal Nuncio in Paris, Cardinal
Raffaele Fornari, held a meeting with the Marquis of
Normanby, the British Ambassador to France, in which he
stated that the Pope wished to have closer relations with
England, as he was troubled by the 'jealous interference
of Austria' and the lack of support of France. Fornari
insisted to Normanby that British assistance would be of
'greatest possible service to the progress of social
iinprovenient in Italy'. 17 Palmerston in turn suggested to
Normanby on 27 April 1847 that he should reply to the
Papal Nuncio by asking:
his Excellency to explain more precisely
the way in which he thinks that the British
Government could give more active moral support
to the Pope; and you will state to the Nuncio
that Her Majesty's Government have every desire
to do whatever may properly be in their power
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to comply with any wishes which the Pope may
express. 18
Normanby met again with Fornari on 30 April, and told him
of Palmerston's views and enquired 'how could moral
support be given ? The Nuncio replied that it could not
be given effectively without direct communication.' 19
Furthermore Fornari stated that if a former diplomatic
representative could not be established in Rome, the Pope
would be willing to meet someone in confidence of the
British government. This exchange lay the origin of the
Minto mission.
To a large degree Palmerston's positive view of Pius was
influenced by the belief that his reforms would steer the
Papal States towards peaceful and gradual political
change rather than revolution. This was encouraged by the
apparent popularity of the Pope among his people.
Abercromby, for example, reported on 28 April 1847 that
six days before more than 20,000 people had marched to
the Quirinal Palace 'for the purpose of expressing their
gratitude to His Holiness the Pope and to his Eminence
the Cardinal Gizzi for this new boon 20 This view of
events was, however, too optimistic.
In reality the political situation in Rome was far more
volatile than the British officials in Italy perceived.
The period between January and April 1847 witnessed the
emergence of liberal political groups which would
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subsequently divide into radical and moderate factions,
working together with the objective of securing liberal
reform. For example, on 21 April Pietro Sterbini, who
became the radical party's leader, and Massinio D'Azeglio,
who became a representative of the moderates, organized a
political banquet. D'Azeglio, who originally came from a
Piedmontese noble family and who had come to the Papal
States to encourage links between the moderates in Rome
and Turin, was the principal orator and spoke with
eloquence about the ancient glories of Rome soon to be
renewed under Pius. Sterbini, one of the most influential
men in Rome through his presidency of the inflammatory
political club, the Circolo Popolare, also made a
patriotic speech. 21 Sterbini had had a long career as a
political radical. After joining the rebellion of 1830 he
had fled to Paris and became a member of Mazzini's
Giovine Italia. In 1846, as result of Pius's amnesty, he
and his colleagues were pardoned and returned to Rome. He
was a radical democrat, but in 1847 he viewed the first
concessions of Pius with apparent gratitude, and seemed
ready to accept the idea of a federated nation with the
Pope as president. 22
Sterbini also played an important part in the rise of
radical press and was the editor of a radical newspaper,
The Contemporaneo, which along with other journals
agitated for political reform and in particular an end to
censorship. 23 This call for press freedom met with a
positive response from the Papal government, which little
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realized that the relaxation of press censorship might
nourish revolutionary opinions among the Roman people. As
there had been too many restrictions on publishing any
kind of political and religious work, it was thought that
a change to the press laws would simply be regarded as a
measure to extend people's rights. 24
The Press Law
The press law of 15 March 1847 marked an important stage
in the birth of the 1848 revolution. After the relaxation
of censorship political newspapers burgeoned in Rome. 25
One of the most influential organs to benefit from this
reform was The Contemporaneo, which was initially
progressive but moderate and respected the fundamental
tenets of Papal government and the Catholic religion,
although it soon became increasingly hostile towards
Papal authority. The Bilancia was formed on 29 April,
partly as a reaction against the increasingly progressive
views of The Contemporaneo, and was followed soon after
by the Contra-Bilancia, which provided a platform for
liberals who were alarmed at the moderate view of the
Bilancia. 26
Initially, however, there were some problems that emerged
from the new legislation. On the Sunday following the
promulgation of the press law the Comtemporaneo was not
able to appear due to the high tax levied on newspapers.
The Papal administration quickly recognized this problem
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and the Pope decided on his own authority that the stamp
tax on newspapers should be reduced to a nominal amount.27
Petre believed that the press provided a reflection of
public opinion, and did not feel any kind of suspicion
that now that it had obtained this position it would be
able to organize the mass of the people and control their
political opinion. Instead, he felt that the press would
have a positive effect on the public administration. On
20 March he observed to Palmerston:
If we may judge by the way in which questions
concerning literature and history are treated
in The Contemporaneo, a weekly journal
established at the beginning of the year, and
by permission of the Roman authorities, and by
the frank advice offered touching reforms in
the public administration of affairs and in the
system of education, sufficient liberty will be
allowed in political discussion now for the
first time officially allowed by this edict on
periodical journals. 28
However, this was not an accurate reading of events.
Petre failed to understand the true nature and complexity
of the press reform issue. In fact, it is important to
realize that the press law of 15 March was largely a
consequence of popular pressure on the Papal government.
Gizzi responded to this pressure but remained cautious
and acted to ensure that the new press law should not be
92
abused by the liberal parties. 29 In fact, Vatican
Archive sources show that the new press law retained
considerable restrictions on publications about political
and religious subjects in the Papal states.
Under the new law a Council of Press Censorships was
established in Rome under the presidency of the Master of
the Sacred Place, to be composed of no more than five
members named by His Holiness. Also within each of the
Papal Legations and Delegations a local Council of press
censorship was set up. 30 These local Councils had to
subordinate themselves to the Council in Rome regarding
publishing on political as well as religious subjects. 31
Gizzi was very careful about selecting the members of the
Council in Rome, and intended to use the Council to
introduce a sophisticated administrative system to
concentrate local government power in the hands of the
Council in Rome, which was given a direct link with the
judiciary and the police. 32 Gizzi hoped to suppress any
abuses and illegal publishing, to control the
authorization of new publications, and also to check and
modify articles in Rome and the provinces.
The result was that the new press law was not so much an
exercise in liberalism as an attempt to rationalize the
Papal bureaucracy. Instead of appeasing the people it
marked the beginning of political conflict between the
authorities and several political journals and
publications.
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This conflict did not take long to reveal itself.
Although the Contenieporaneo was authorized under the
press law of 15 March, the supplement to its 26 April
issue (No.17) was banned and those attempting to sell it
threatened with arrest as a result of Austrian protests
about its content. This incident provoked popular
hostility towards Austria and the Council, and encouraged
more clandestine journals.	 In spite of Gizzi's effort
to centralize power into the hands of the Council in
Rome, the police force was not sufficiently effective to
inspect all political journals. 	 The new publications
succeeded in attracting the public's attention by
printing sensational nianifestos and radical political
propaganda.	 In response to the rise of radicalism, the
Bilancia, with support from moderates such as Professor•
Francesco Orioli, the lawyer Andrea Cattabeni, and the
ex-Jesuit Paolo Mazio, published on 7 May an article
deploring the political friction between the Pope's
liberal policy and the radical political movements. The
Bilancia was in turn criticized for being too moderate by
the radical party, largely because Cattabeni, who was one
of the editors of the journal, was an old friend of the
Pope and often went to see him. 36 Provoked by the
Bilancia's defence of the press law, the Contra-Bilancia,
which sympathized with the radicals, replied with a
severe criticism of the government's censorship of all
journals at the time they went to press. They especially
questioned the legitimacy of the Council, as it seemed
that the decisions made by its old and reactionary
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president were against the spirit of the new press law
introduced on 15 March.	 The Contra-Bilancia was also
directly critical of the Bilancia's moderate and
parochial tendencies, which was the first indication that
the liberal movement would soon divide into two opposing
moderate and radical factions, not only in the press but
also more generally. 38
In spite of the still relatively tight control over the
press and the friction between the censors and political
journals, the British government did not seem to
understand the situation well. Pius's relaxation of press
censorship was welcomed by Britain, a country that had
already enjoyed relative freedom of the press. Petre
believed that the relaxation of the press law was
evidence of the Pope's desire for reform, and he wrote
enthusiastically to Hamilton, the British Minister in
Florence, on 23 June 1847 that:
Perhaps one of the best proofs of the upright
honest intention of His Holiness to effect
improvement in his Government, is the liberty
with which reforms are discussed in the
newspapers; and I would mark for notice, among
others, an article on the late Motu-Proprio
published in The "Bilancia" of the 22.
But he seemed to be unaware that the press law was
leading to increasingly acrimonious debates in Rome that
in the long term would threaten Pius's reforms. 40
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Unfortunately Petre showed the same lack of understanding
in his reports on the other significant issue raised in
the summer of 1847, the establishment of the Civic Guard.
The Civic Guard
The campaign for the creation of the Civic Guard began in
Bologna in May 1847 and was organized by a moderate
faction concerned to maintain order. From Bologna young
men such as Marchese Luigi Tanari corresponded with those
in other Legations, advising supporters of the Guard to
orchestrate their efforts. In Rome Bologna's
representatives urged the Pope to consider with favour
the many petitions for the Guard flowing in from the
provinces. 41 As Bologna was the place where crime and
social disorder were most dominant in the Papal States,
it was argued that the Civic Guard was urgently required
to establish and maintain order. This was not altogether
convincing because as Hughes has pointed out 'the
Bolognese ... had already obtained the right to have
citizen patrols as a curb against crime'. 42 No sooner
had Bologna won its right to organize night-patrols and
to request a more organized Civic Guard than demands for
the same privileges were made in other towns: Ancona and
Ferrara demanded the right to set up a Guard, and soon
Foril sent a deputation to ask for one, and in the
beginning of March the Amnistiati were collecting
signatures for a petition to Pius.
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Two main groups were calling for the creation of a Civic
Guard. Many property-owners saw it as a protection
against crime and disorder, while the radicals regarded
an armed force as a political instrument.
	 While the
former wanted the Civic Guard to prevent disorder, the
latter saw it as a means to increase disorder and
encourage more radical political reform. Amongst them,
the Bologna group, whose organizer was Marco Minghetti,
was most influential. He and Massimo d'Azeglio worked
together to establish the Civic Guard.
Britain had a very positive view towards the
establishment of the Civic Guard in the Papal States. The
Foreign Office's underestimate of the Civic Guard's
revolutionary potential was influenced by its
unequivocally enthusiastic view of D'Azeglio, whose
political ideas and actions were indisputably those of a
moderate liberal. D'Azeglio's role was important, not
only because he personified the links between Roman and
Piedmontese moderate political factions, but also for
relations between Rome and Britain. An article written
by d'Azeglio appeared in the quarterly Review offering a
positive assessment of Pius's liberal policies for an
English audience.
There were three other reasons to explain why the British
government did not fully realize the danger inherent in
the Civic Guard: lack of information, support for the
liberal reforms, and anti-Austrian sentiment.
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The British government did not have enough knowledge
about the social context of or the background to the
Civic Guard. Its information was that the campaign for
its creation began in Bologna and was organized by a
moderate faction concerned to maintain law and order.
This was true in the beginning, because originally the
Civic Guard had been an extension of the civic night
patrols to protect property-owners: however, the
radicals' intention to use it as a revolutionary force
was not fully apparent to the British government.
Freeborn emphasized the need for a Civic Guard in the
Papal States to Palmerston on 5 July 1847:
The higher classes and people of property
amongst the middle classes could not look on
such proceedings without alarm; and it was
resolved that Prince Borghese, Count Piancinai
and others, should wait upon the Pope and state
to His Holiness the causes of discontent of the
people; and further to pray His Holiness to
take such measures as might protect the lives
and property of the inhabitants from the
possible violence of the irritated mobs, as the
military and police did not think it prudent to
interfere, and therefore this protection could
only be afforded by a powerful national guard,
and by the fulfilment of hopes raised and
promises given of reform and improvements. 46
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As Steven Hughes points out in his book, Crime. Disordr
and the Risorgimento, if Pius had been able to restrict
recruitment to the upper and middle classes he might have
recouped much of his popularity among the moderates while
augmenting the forces of law and order to deal with
popular disturbance. 	 The lower classes such as
braccianti were to be excluded, as they had a tendency to
associate with radical views which were growing in the
provinces. Although initial recruitment to the Civic
Guard was restricted to the upper and middle classes, the
situation began to change when Cardinal Amat, the Legate
in Bologna, personally started to argue for some artisans
to be admitted to the Guard. The moderates were, however,
determined to keep the masses unarmed and cowed; the core
of the new Civic Guard would come directly from the
existing citizen patrols. 48
The problem with this kind of exclusive recruitment was
that it created a relatively weak and ineffective Civic
Guard. In addition, democratic leaders such as Conte
Livio Zambeccari dreamed of opening the ranks of the
Guard to the lower class, hoping that they could be used
to fight for the regeneration of Italy as a whole. 	 In
September 1847 in Bologna, Zainbeccari took advantage of
disturbances by the lower classes to get himself and some
of the radicals commissions as junior officers. However,
despite the appointment of a few radicals the Civic Guard
remained largely an institution of the professional
classes. 50
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There were debates over how to use the Guards to fight
against crime and banditry without giving them the
capability of rising up against the authorities. As
Reinerman has argued, some dangers could have been
reduced by keeping the force under tight control; but
such apparatus was also "likely to kill the spontaneity
and enthusiasm which was their main strength, leaving
them merely an untrained rabble of little value." 51 In
effect the choice lay between an organization like the
volunteers, useful but dangerous, or one like the
reserves, safe but useless. However, the dangers of
recruiting members of the Civic Guard from the lower
class did not seem to be perceived by Britain. 52
As Britain was well informed about crime and brigands in
the Papal States, particularly in Bologna, it was thought
that establishment of the new forces (the Civic Guard)
could improve social stability and counter the radical
ideology stimulated by discord between the classes.
Although Britain always worried that these social
disturbances might cause revolution as in 1830, there was
also a belief that the radical tendencies were induced by
the people's discontent with Ultra-conservative
ecclesiastical politicians who were frequently associated
with the Jesuits.
Sympathy for popular discontent with Jesuit politics was
expressed by Freeborn to Palmerston on 5 July 1847:
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If the promises made by His Holiness to Prince
Borghese are fulfilled without delay, the
country will be placed in tranquillity; but if
not, the present state of anarchy will
increase, and violent measures will be adopted
by the malcontents, which may fall heavily upon
the Cardinals, Jesuits, and anti-Progressists,
long before Austrian intervention can save
them.
It was necessary to maintain law and order using
effective forces. However, the British officials in Italy
believed that the way to keep social order should not be
through suppression by the theocratic ecclesiastical
authority, but by the hands of those people, that is the
moderate elites, who were loyal to the Pope.
Politics also clouded the role of the police. As the
protectors of the old order, the police and the
Carabinieri could easily be supposed to be automatically
enemies of reform. Many people believed that the police
and the Carabinieri had given a free rein to criminals
and brigands to discredit the new liberal tendencies of
the government'	 and therefore that it was necessary to
establish forces separate from the Carabinieri. The Civic
Guard, therefore, played both ways: it guaranteed the
course of reform for moderate elites while tying them
even more tightly to the Papacy. The fear of crime and
anarchy thus formed a common political ground from which
order and progress could arise together. 56
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It was notable that the British representatives had no
concern about the Civic Guard's loyalty to the Pope and
no suspicion that they might be transformed into an
armed force for the revolutionary contingents in Rome.
Petre noted optimistically to Hamilton on 8 July 1847
that:
...the recent measures of the Pope,
establishing a civic guard at Rome and at
Bologna, have confirmed the people of those two
cities in their feelings of gratitude towards
their Sovereign by this fresh mark of his
confidence in their loyalty and attachment to
his person and government.
There was another obvious reason why Britain did not
realize the problems and dangers raised by the Civic
Guard: the British government was preoccupied with the
Austrian military intervention in the Papal States which
followed the establishment of the Guard.
Before the establishment of the Civic Guard, the Pope's
main defence was the Austrian army, which watched over
the Pope's policies and the political situation in the
Papal States. 58 The protection of the Pope, however, was
only a pretext; in reality the Austrian forces were there
to suppress Italian nationalist and anti-Austrian
sentiment in the Papal States. Indeed, when Austria
intervened, Viscount Ponsonby, the British Ambassador in
Vienna, informed Palmerston on 14 July in 1847:
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I can have no doubt of his [Metternich]
thinking intervention likely to be called for,
and that it is necessary for Austria to act at
any risk to oppose those who, he says, mean to
destroy the Roman Government. His Highness, in
speaking upon this subject, used the following
words twice or thrice,- "The Emperor has
determined not to lose his Italian
possessions".
Because Palmerston supported the Italian nationalist
movement, the British government was naturally on the
side of the newly established Civic Guard. It therefore
followed that Britain was anxious over Austrian military
intervention to stop the Pope's acceptance of the Civic
Guard, because the latter was an obvious challenge to
Austrian influence over the Papal States and even over
the Italian peninsula as a whole.
Due to this concentration upon Austrian intervention,
Britain failed to appreciate fully the actual and
potential danger posed by the Civic Guard to the internal
security of the Papal States.
It is not surprising that Britain did not realize the
potential danger of the Civic Guard, because neither did
the Pope himself. During the spring and early summer of
1847, he weighed the advantages and disadvantages of
establishing the Guard, and finally approved its
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establishment. Cardinal Gizzi was the liberal-minded
minister who clearly foresaw that the establishment of
the Guard brought a real threat of revolution in Rome.
Fearing that many people had overestimated the country's
capacity for change, on 22 June Gizzi issued a
proclamation affirming the Pope's special status as head
of the Church and warning that there were definite limits
to the extent of his liberal reforms. 60 The proclamation
generated much resentment and hostility, even among the
moderates, who nevertheless cheered the provisions of the
declaration since they agreed with the call for an end to
the popular assemblies and demonstrations in Rome. These
crowds became rather hostile following the proclamation,
making their dissolution all the more critical. 61
However, Gizzi could not stop the Pope's approval of the
Civic Guard on 5 July, and consequently, unable to stand
by as the Civic Guard became an armed revolutionary force
threatening the Papal authority, he resigned. As the
Secretary of State, his decision to do so was made
immediately after the Pope's acceptance of the Guard, as
Hamilton explained to Palmerston on 12 July 1847:
because he couldn't agree with the Pope's
recent determination to establish a national
guard both at Rome and in the provinces. 62
Great disappointment at Gizzi's resignation was expressed
by Lord Abercromby to Palmerston on 22 July 1847, saying
that 'i... His resignation was a great regret not only for
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Italy but also for Europe." 63 Gizzi's resignation brought
excitement and agitation to the Roman people, because it
was believed that he had been pressed to resign by the
ultra-conservative cardinals such as Lambruschini and
Corboli, opening up the possibility that the Pope's
liberal policies might be endangered.
Freeborn wrote to Palmerston on 5 July 1847.
my fears have been to a certain extent
realized, as during the whole of the week
masses of people paraded the streets in a most
menacing attitude, and cries were vociferated
of "Death to the C Lambruschini [ex secretary
of State], Monsignor Corboli [present Under-
secretary of State], and the Pope's evil
counsellors". 64
Whatever the reason for Gizzi's resignation, the British
government believed that it would be disadvantageous for
the Pope's liberal policy. Aberconthy had a similar
conviction to that of Freeborn, and reported to
Palinerston on 22 July 1847 that Gizzi's resignation
'increases most materially the difficulties of His
Holiness' position.' 65
In particular, he feared that the Pope's liberal policy,
which had been shaped by Gizzi, would now be more
difficult to pursue, and noted to Palmerston:
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His Holiness is thus deprived of the active and
recognized services of one whose statesmanlike
views, liberal opinions, knowledge of foreign
States, and steadiness of conduct, had
succeeded in inspiring throughout the
territories of the Church an affection and
respect for the Sovereign Pontiff and his
government... 66
The absence of Gizzi meant that the Pope was more likely
to be influenced by the ultra-conservatives whose corrupt
politics had already brought social and economic
backwardness and poverty to the Papal States.
Abercromby continued:
His Holiness, surrounded as he is by Princes of
the Church, many of whom unfortunately
entertain notions little in unison with the
necessities of their country or with the
prevailing opinions of the day, requires the
moral support and assistance of all who by
their knowledge, their wise and liberal
principles, can help him to overrule the
advocates of existing prejudices and the
retrograde notions of bygone days; and for such
an object the consuls and advice of Cardinal
Gizzi were pre-eminently useful. 67
While the ultra-conservative cardinals had neglected
their country's interests, considering only their own and
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thus creating a miserable social situation, the Pope had,
under Gizzi's influence, emerged as a national leader
acceptable to all. The British government thought that
Pius and Cardinal Gizzi were the real leaders of the
country who always considered their subjects. However,
the fact was that Gizzi was acting against the moderates,
warning Pius about the possible political consequence of
the Civic Guard. 68
Britain did not understand the real reason for or
significance of Gizzi's resignation, and still
anticipated further liberal policies after the
replacement of Gizzi by Cardinal Ferretti. 69 As
Abercomby stated on 22 July 1847: "... Cardinal Ferretti
should show by his acts, that he is animated by the same
wise and liberal principles as those of which Cardinal
Gizzi has given proof..." 70 There was little real
awareness of the widening political crisis facing the
Papacy.
Section II: Ferrara and Papal diplomacy
As tensions continued to rise in Rome a new crisis
emerged due to foreign intervention. The establishment
of the Civic Guard in Ferrara prompted Austrian military
action to prevent the Pope from continuing his liberal
policy. Ferrara was, after all, a garrison town where an
Austrian army was stationed, ostensibly to defend the
Pope' 71 In such a city the formation of the Civic Guard
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was a direct challenge to the Austrian power. But it also
gave the Austrians a good pretext to show that their army
was there to protect the Pope from revolutionary forces.
Since the Pope himself supported the Civic Guard, he
protested against Austrian "support".
Metternich had been alarmed by Pius's liberal policies,
such as the new press law and the amnesty, and had sent
several warnings to the Pope. 72 However, when Pius
confirmed the creation of the Civic Guard on 5 July, and
his concession was greeted with acclaim in Ferrara, this
proved to be the last straw for an Austrian government
which regarded the Civic Guard as a danger to their
interests throughout Italy.
	
As soon as the Austrian
Field Marshal, Joseph Radetzky, heard of the Edict of 15
July, he decided to reinforce his garrison in Ferrara,
and exploited the occasion to make a military
demonstration against the Pope. The entry of the Austrian
forces into Ferrara disturbed peace and order, and was
considered an insult to the Pope.	 Pius was justified
in taking a strong personal line, and when the Papal
States, which were supposed to be a neutral institution,
was attacked it was his duty to defend it. On 8 August
Count Auersperg, the Austrian Commandant, wrote to
Cardinal Ciacchi, Legate of Ferrara, to order the Civic
Guard not to put guards on the Piazza and the city gates
in Ferrara, otherwise his Austrian troops would increase
the strength of their detachments at those same posts. On
the following day, the Cardinal replied that His Holiness
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had every right to exercise his temporal power in his
town of Ferrara. 76
The Austrian military expedition to Ferrara had great
impact in Britain and led to hostility towards Austria.
This was a new direction for British foreign policy. As
Austria was the key to a set of alliances designed to
contain France and Russia, Britain's traditional policy
in Italy was to support Austria whenever possible as a
check to France and Russia. Consequently it was difficult
for Britain to act openly in support of those who
challenged the dynastic legitimate principle, in spite of
her parliamentary liberalism and entente with France. 78
In addition Britain followed a cautious policy as there
was always the possibility that the contagion of
revolution would spread, threatening the political
stability not only of the Italian peninsula but of the
whole of Europe.
Britain was also reluctant to take action due to the
possibility that it might encourage French intervention
in Italian affairs. Although Britain and France shared
similar liberal attitudes, the tradition of Anglo-French
rivalry was always in the British government's mind.
However, in 1847 the circumstances dictated a new policy.
One difference was that, in spite of Guizot's
parliamentary liberalism, the French government was
reluctant to take any prompt action against Austria's
military intervention in Ferrara. This was made clear in
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conversations between Palinerston and Normanby, the
British ambassador in Paris. 80
Another key difference was that Palrnerston thought well
of Pius. If Pius were to continue his reforms, albeit at
a slower pace, Britain would approve. Feeling that some
direct contact would be advantageous in these difficult
circumstances, a proposal was made to put the relations
between the two courts on a firmer basis.
On behalf of the Pope, Cardinal Ferretti, the new
Secretary of State, made a general appeal on 18 August to
the European powers: he wrote a formal note of complaint
to the Austrian ambassador in Rome, 81 and similar notes
and enclosures were addressed by the Papal government to
all the foreign embassies and representatives in Rome. 82
Given the hesitancy of France and Prussia the British
government saw an opportunity to strengthen its role in
the international affairs. It was quite exceptional to
voice clear opposition to Austria, considering that such
a move was bound to put strains on the Anglo-Austrian
relationship. Nevertheless the British government offered
its support.
One factor in Britain's pro-Papal policy was the
situation in Ferrara, which was rapidly deteriorating.
Abercromby noted to Palmerston on 19 August that the
conduct of the Austrian military authorities was
provoking opposition among the people in Ferrara. 83
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The Austrians had actually occupied the citadel of
Ferrara in the name of the Treaty of Vienna' and thus based
their case on their rights under international law. 84 To the
British government, however, Austria's actions were
imprudent. They feared that the Austrian intervention in
Ferrara would exacerbate the situation within the Papal
States, leading to the threat that reform might turn into
revolution. In such unstable circumstances there was a
danger that France may decide to intervene, bringing it
into a confrontation with Austria which could lead to a
new European war. 85
Evidence that the situation in the Papal States was
becoming more inflammable was shown in a letter from Sir
George Hamilton to Palmerston about an anti-Austrian
incident in Rome on 6 July, which noted that there were:
• • Contradicting reports of great agitation at
Rome, and of insults being offered to the
Austrian Ambassador in the persons of some of
his guests at a dinner on the 30th ultimo
(June). 86
The most important way in which Palmerston could aid the
Pope was to put pressure on the Austrian government to
withdraw from Ferrara. Metternich's position, as outlined
by the Austrian ambassador to London, Count
Dietrichstein, to Palinerston on 11 August, was that
Austria's action was in line with the Treaty of Vienna
and was necessary to prohibit the unlawful scheme put
111
forwards by some revolutionaries for the unification of
Italy. Palmerston refused to accept this argument. He
noted in a letter to Ponsonby, the British ambassador in
Vienna, on 12 August that he had no knowledge of any
scheme for Italian unification and that Britain had no
intention of allowing the territorial arrangement of
Italy to be altered. 87 With regard to the Treaty of
Vienna he refused to accept Metternich's interpretation
and noted that the Austrian action had been undertaken
without prior consultation with the other Concert Powers.
Most importantly Palmerston observed that
Britain would wish to observe that there is
another right beside that of self-defence and
self-maintenance, which is inherent in
independent sovereignty, and that is, the right
which belongs to the sovereign power in every
State, to make such reforms and internal
improvements as may be judged by such sovereign
power proper to be made, and conducive to the
well-being of the people whom it governs. 88
Furthermore he continued to comment that the Pope's
reforms would actually be of benefit to the Powers and
noted
it may be hoped that if the Pope is encouraged
and assisted by Austria and the other Four
Powers in removing the grievances of which his
subjects have long complained the discontent
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which those grievances have created will soon
die away. 89
Metternich, however, refused to accept this argument.
Consequently at the end of August Palmerston issued a
warning about unjustified Austrian action, 90 and on 21
September the British government published a
Parliamentary Sessional Paper entitled "Communication for
the Austrian Government as to the Territorial Arrangement
and Political Condition of Italy" which made its
disagreement with Austria public. 91
Metternich's intransigence was based on the belief that
diplomatic relations between the British and Austrian
governments would not be damaged in the long term; he
knew that, even if Palmerston criticized Austrian
intervention, the monarchical links between the Queen and
the Habsburgs Monarchy would not allow Anglo-Austrian
relations to be shaken. 92 To an extent his view was
justified, as Queen Victoria and Prince Albert did not
agree with Palinerston's reaction to the Austrian military
exercise in the Papal States. Both were convinced that it
should not jeopardize diplomatic relations between
Britain and Austria. Albert advised caution over
Britain's reaction and was anxious not to 'irritate'
Austria' and feared that supporting Papal liberal policy
might even raise the spectre of Jacobinism throughout
Europe.
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Palmerston, however, held very different views from the
Prince, and this led to a clash over a new issue; whether
Britain should send a special envoy to Rome. Palmerston
agreed with the view expressed by Abercromby, the British
minister in Turin, on 27 August that it would be
beneficial to send a representative to hold talks with
the Pope, and, in consultation with Lord John Russell,
decided that Lord Minto, the Prime Minister's father-in-
law, was the most suitable candidate.
Prince Albert disagreed with this plan and stated to Lord
Russell on 29 August that:
The probability is that Lord Minto will have
very little real influence and will be made
responsible for every act of a doubtful nature,
and of which he may have been totally ignorant.
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Russell, the Prime Minister, was obliged to persuade the
Queen, insisting that as the Austrian military
intervention had provoked social disorder, Britain must
act. Russell asserted to the Queen on 31 August that:
It is to be feared that before anything can be
done the rash and intemperate conduct of the
Court of Vienna may have set fire to the
inflammable matter in Italy. The only course by
which a convulsion can be prevented is by the
support given by England and if possible by
France to the Pope, the Duke of Tuscany and the
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King of Sardinia. These Sovereigns may thus
have the means of keeping in check the ardent
republicans of their states. 96
In the autumn of 1847 Minto was sent to the Courts of
Sardinia, Tuscany, and Rome. His brief was to advocate a
system of progressive administrative improvement to
reform obsolete institutions, and to convey the message
that any Government had the right to implement such a
policy without being molested by foreign Powers. 	 In
addition there was a further element to his agenda, as
the Ferrara issue had reopened the question of whether
Britain should open diplomatic relations with the
Vatican.
Anti-Austrian public opinion
The British government and the British public shared
similar opinions towards Austria, both opposing Austrian
absolutism and expressing some support for the Pope. So
far as the general public was concerned this represented
an interesting shift of opinion. In a cartoon in Punch,
on 25 September, Pius was depicted as a national leader
and hero of "rational liberty", giving the "Roman Punch"
to the Austrian Emperor of Despotism. 98 In another
edition Mr Punch was seen hanging the Austrian Emperor as
the Pope expelled the Austrian Eagle from his territory,
with Russell disguised as a cockerel supporting him from
behind while the British Lion was looking on with a
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smile.	 A column in Punch of 25 September scolded the
Austrian Emperor:
The last of your extremely reprehensible
proceedings is the occupation of Ferrara by
your troops - a gross insult to the Papal Crown
and a scandalous invasion of your neighbour's
property. You will perhaps throw the blame of
this outrage on your Minister, Metternich: but
as a despotic monarch, you are responsible for
your servants' acts. You are not a
constitutional sovereign and you not only can
do wrong, but a great deal of it, as your late
conduct has abundantly proved. 100
Punch displayed a remarkably positive attitude toward the
Pope going as far in a piece entitled 'Important
demonstrations at Madame Tussaud's' as to call the Pope,
'heroic':
Jenny Lind in the character of the Figlia del
Reggiinento, Edward VI, the benevolent Pope Pius
IX, Henry VII, and the heroes Hardinge and
Gough, the whole in new and magnificent dresses
got up for the present season, are the public
knows, now to be seen at Madame Tussaud's. The
public, however, may not know that an
interesting conversation took place the other
evening after the doors had been closed,
between those distinguished personates. The
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Swedish Nightingale told the Pope that she was
so charmed with him, that she would be happy to
sing his hymn any day. Edward VI. said that,
although a true Protestant, it was with great
pleasure that he found himself standing by the
Pope. Henry VII observed that he had the
pleasure of drubbing a tyrant; he alluded to
Richard III; and he trusted that Pius would
enjoy a similar triumph over a despot whose
policy was as utterly crooked as the back of
his own former antagonist. The heroes Hardinge
and Cough, in their heroic capacity, begged to
tender their best services to the Pope, whom
they recognised as one of themselves. The whole
company agreed that they would show the world
what they were made of, by sticking to the
cause of His Holiness like wax. 101
The Times also criticized the Austrian military
intervention and the latter was quoted in a letter from
Lord Shrewsbury, a Catholic politician, to Hamilton in
Florence which observed that The Times had said that 'to
drive the white uniform out of the street of Ferrara, the
Pope ought to be ready to violate his conscience and
betray his religion!' 102
To some extent the British public and government
(Palmerston, Russell and Minto, but not the Queen and
Prince) shared a similar hostility to Austria after its
intervention in Ferrara. This led the press to show some
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sympathy towards the government's policy. In fact Punch
declared its support for Palmerston's foreign policy if
he would defend the Pope against the Austrian
intervention, and noted in its open letter to the
Austrian Emperor:
You have no business in Ferrara whatever. I
therefore not only protest against your
occupation of that place, but request you to
get out of it without delay. If you do not, I
give you notice that I shall make arrangements
to smack you, independently of those which will
be entered into by Palmerston. I have made up
my mind to take Pius' part: so I tell you, you
had better leave him alone. 103
This support for Palmerston is interesting in that his
policy has been traditionally regarded as 'liberal abroad
and conservative at home'. However, A. Taylor, has
recently suggested that, with the demand for reform at
home blunted, Palmerston was able to pose as a radical by
defending constitutionalism abroad and championing the
rights of oppressed nationalities in Europe. 104 As a
result he had been able to win over many key working-
class radical figures. He would achieve considerable
popularity in radical circles for his refusal to
prosecute the Berkeley's draymen for their attack on the
Austrian General, Julius Van Haynau, on his visit to
London in 1850, as well as for the asylum he extended to
Lajos Kossuth in 1851. 105 In addition, Palmerston's
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radical tendencies proved amenable to Chartist demands on
a number of major issues.
Anti-Austrian sentiment amongst the British public can
partly be attributed to Mazzini's anti-Austrian
propaganda in England. Mazzini was convinced that public
opinion in London not only supported his idea of Italian
independence from Austria, but was even beginning to
consider Italian unification as a possibility. In England
Mazzini concentrated on working upon public opinion
through his International Leaque 106 As M.Finn has
shown: Mazzini's International League was keenly
supported by the Chartists and the British radicals. 107
Mazzini hoped to promote anti-Austrian sentiment among
public opinion and to encourage the government's foreign
policy to be favourable to Italian nationalism.
A surprising aspect of Mazzini's opinion at this time was
his favourable treatment of the Pope, which reflected the
general view. An important consequence of the Ferrara
incident was that the Pope had in 1847 become a symbol of
opposition to Austria. His quarrel with Austria over the
occupation of Ferrara and his bold stand against
Metternich, who was eventually forced to withdraw, fanned
the flames of Italian nationalism. 108
Although the situation would change in 1848, in 1847 the
idea that the Pope was a symbol of Italian nationalism
spread even to Britain. British public opinion, which
generally identified Papal politics with Austrian
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absolutism, warmed to Pius's liberal reform policy
because it was believed that Pius could lead the way in
eradicating Austrian influence from the Italian
peninsula.
The British public's unprecedented praise of the Pope was
partly inspired by Mazzini's recognition of Pius IX as a
national leader. On B September Mazzini wrote a long
open letter from London to the Pope, begging Pius to
unite Italy under Papal leadership. 'Unification would
come anyway, because it was part of God's providence, but
better if under Papal patronage with you at its head. Our
struggle will take on a religious aspect and liberate us
from the risks of reaction and civil war.' Mazzini
subsequently said that he had never had much hope that
this letter would produce results, but at the time he
confirmed in private that he was ready to recognize Pius
as life president of a united Italy. 109 The sincerity of
his admission was widely accepted, though he must have
known it would upset many of his supporters on the
radical and anti-clerical left.
Mazzini's open letter was sincere in its conviction that
the Pope was capable of achieving a great deal for the
Italian nation, and in its statement that Mazzini would
be glad to see Pius initiate a national revolution: 110
There is no man in Europe more powerful than
you. Europe is in a tremendous crisis of doubts
and of desires. Through the passage of time,
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aggravated by your predecessors and the exalted
hierarchy of the church, belief are dead:
Catholicism is lost in despotism, Protestantism
is losing itself in anarchy.
The letter continued:
To fulfil the mission which God entrusts to you
two things are necessary; to believe, and to
unify Italy. Without the first you will fall by
the wayside, abandoned by God and by men;
without the second you will not have that lever
with which, alone, you can achieve great, holy,
and enduring things.
The Pope was well aware that the support of radicals like
Mazzini and Giuseppe Garibaldi put him in a difficult
position. Even in his first encyclical, 'Qui pluribus',
he pointed out that he was in fundamental agreement with
his predecessor and had nothing in common with some of
the political and philosophical 'liberals.' However, it
became impossible for him to restrain popular enthusiasm.
As a result, the Pope was pushed towards the forces of
revolution, and every demonstration or insurrection
during 1847 claimed his support.
The position in the early autumn of 1847 was thus an
entirely novel one; Britain had forsaken its traditional
policy of supporting Austria in Italy and had opted to
back the Pope in Rome. Even more surprising was that this
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policy united Palinerston and the English radicals in a
common cause. It would be a mistake to assume, however,
that the British government's support for the Papacy and
the sending of Minto to Rome was merely a result of
concern for Italian affairs. An additional influence on
policy was the interplay between domestic issues and
Catholic religion.
Section III: Religious aspects of the diplomatic
negotiation with the Papal States.
The religious aspect of Minto's mission to Rome has not
been fully explored: it has, if anything, been considered
insignificant. As Prince Albert said at the time, 'it was
of very little influence', and even, 'criminal by the law
of England'. 112 However, a detailed study of the
diplomacy reveals that for both Britain and the Papacy
the religious concerns were important.
The first thing to note is that, although it is difficult
to demonstrate its direct influence on diplomacy, it is
important to understand that the state of British
politics made it necessary for Russell to treat Catholic
issues with some sympathy. His policy towards the
Catholics and other ecclesiastical matters was
complicated because religious issues, such as the
Maynooth Grant, the disestablishment of the Church of
England, and the future of state education, were at this
time matters of controversy. Indeed, all of these issues
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proved to be crucial in the election of July 1847, in
which Russell's government found itself under attack from
both the Dissenters and the ultra-Protestants.
The result of the election was the narrow return of
Russell's ministry. It was, however, a weak government
because it had to rely for support on such a broad
coalition, including radicals, Catholics and Dissenters.
113 Even Russell's Catholic supporters were divided among
themselves, and it was impossible for his policies to
please everyone. As Russell sincerely stated, 'I can not
please the Catholics and the Dissenters at the same
time.' 114 His relations with the Peelite ministers in
the Cabinet made the situation even more complicated, as
the need to keep them in the coalition made Russell's
Whig government even weaker than that of 1837-41. Russell
sometimes had to search for the Peelites' support not
only for commercial measures but also for ecclesiastical
matters. For example, Russell, for reasons of political
expediency, supported Peel's Maynooth Bill thus offending
his Dissenter supporters. 115 The result was that from
1847 Russell's policy towards ecclesiastical matters was
never clear-cut because of the heterogeneous nature of
his supporters. Machin explains that 'Under the pressure
of clerical demands and assertions, the Whigs were caught
between liberal and Erastian tendencies.' 116
There was, however, a recognition by Russell of the
importance of the Catholic vote. During the 1847
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election, Catholic voters in general supported Liberals
and Peelites, and Russell himself emerged at the head of
the poll in the City of London with the help of their
votes, supporting the Maynooth Bill, opposing immediate
disestablishment and championing State education. 117
There were strict limits to how far the government could
support Catholic causes, but within these boundaries the
administration realized the need to satisfy Catholic
opinion. This and other factors helped to influence
Britain's benevolent policy towards the Papacy.
In addition it is necessary to understand that other
important factors linked to religion came into play. For
Britain one key concern was the link between the Papacy
and Ireland, while for Pius an important aspect of his
policy towards Britain was the pressure being exerted by
Wiseman, the Pro-Vicar Apostolic in London, for the re-
establishment of the English Catholic Hierarchy. 118
The nature of Minto's political position in Rome was
widely discussed before and after his despatch both in
diplomatic correspondence and in Parliament. 119
Correspondence between a number of the key figures who
influenced British foreign policy towards the Papacy,
such as Lord Minto, Lord John Russell, Viscount
Palmerston, Lord Shrewsbury and Dr Wiseman, clearly
indicates that Minto's mission was intended to cover
religious as well as political and diplomatic issues. As
Russell wrote to the Queen on 1 September:
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When Lord Palinerston first proposed that Lord
Minto should be charged with this special duty,
he contemplated the internal advantage to be
derived from it still more than its effect on
our external relations. 120
The key to Britain's religious objectives regarding its
diplomatic negotiations with the Holy See is illustrated
by Dr Wiseman's involvement with Lord Minto's mission in
Rome. 121 Wiseman's effort came from two directions,
appealing both to London and to Rome in order to persuade
the British government and the Papacy of the advantages
which might be obtained through the establishment of a
direct communication channel. It was Wiseman's
contribution that paved the way for the political and
religious entente between London and Rome.
Wiseman's approach to London
Palmerston's letter to the Queen on 31 August insisting
on the importance of Minto's mission in Rome
significantly included a copy of a letter which had been
written by Wiseman on 8 August in Rome to the Catholic
politician, Lord Shrewsbury. Wiseman's letter illustrated
his intention to persuade the British government to
provide diplomatic support for the Papal States. In his
letter, he noted:
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The ambassadors of all the great powers are
working against its [the Papal government's]
measures, within and without. Austria and
France are only biding their time, to take
advantage of any disturbance to rush in. The
strong feeling on the part of the government
and its sincere friends is that the appearance
of an English envoy here, would both greatly
neutralize the intrigues of foreign parties,
would secure the Papal States from foreign
interference and would give strong moral
support and encouragement to the government in
its measure of reform. 122
Although Wiseman himself said that he was not concerned
with political matters - 'I have proceeded on a business
of a purely ecclesiastical nature' 123 - Wiseinan's
diplomatic involvement with the British government was
undeniable, and he made contact with both Russell and
Palmerston.
Wiseman set off from Rome on his journey to London on 24
August, and arrived on 11 September, 124 which was just a
week before Minto's departure. He lost no time in
bringing the Pope's argument for better relations before
the British government, and establishing his own
credentials as a reliable channel to the Papacy.
Wisenian very quickly made an impact upon the British
government. A memorandum which he presented to Russell on
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13 September reiterated the case which he had previously
stated to Shrewsbury about the importance of the Pope's
reforms, and again stressed the need for Britain to send
an 'unaccredited Agent' to Rome. Russell and Palmerston
agreed to this request and subsequently issued
instructions to Minto to visit Rome. His status had
already been settled he was, as Palmerston had informed
Queen Victoria on 31 August, to proceed to Rome 'simply
as a member of Your Majesty's government authorized to
communicate confidentially with the government of
Rome' 125
The letter to Russell of 13 September acts as an example
of the political arguments which Wiseman deployed to
persuade the British government of the wisdom of opening
relations with Rome. He began by describing the reform
programme undertaken by Pius IX, and asserted the
importance of British assistance to the Papacy,
emphasizing that Austria and France had deceived the
pope. Wiseinan continued to state that:
independently of such mere vague and
general impressions there are grounds of a much
higher and sounder character on which the Papal
government seems to have a just claim upon the
active co-operation of the English to remove
the obstacles at present thrown in the way of
its internal improvement and its enlightened
policy by the hostile movements and marked
opposition of Austria, and also, by diplomatic
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support and avowed encouragement, to
counterbalance and frustrate the embarrassment
which the Austrian policy causes in the
interior of the state. 126
He also insisted that direct diplomatic communication
with the Papacy was not illegal, as Britain had after all
taken part in the Five Powers Conference in Rome in 1831,
and he noted that
Whatever extent of communication with the Papal
government was then lawful, must be so still
nor could merely the degree of secrecy then
observed or the more open avowal now required
make a difference in the legality of the act.127
The law as it stood, he contended, had little to
recommend it, and indeed it bore the appearance almost of
panic legislation; there was little threat to the
Protestant Ascendancy from diplomatic exchanges, and an
exchange of views would be helpful to both sides. He also
noted that as long as there was no Papal Nuncio in
Britain, and therefore official diplomatic communication
had to be through the Papal Nuncio either in Paris or
Vienna, the situation was open to interference by the
Catholic powers, Austria and France. 128
After Wiseman argued that Britain's aid to the Papal
States would facilitate Italian unity, he noted in his
letter to Russell on 13 September.
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His Excellency added that a more active moral
support from England would be of the greatest
service to the progress of social improvement
in Italy. He was aware that the form of our
constitution had been supposed to place
considerable difficulties in the way of any
diplomatic communications between the two
States; but it was impossible that Her
Majesty's Government could do otherwise than
watch with anxious interest the progress of
administrative reforms which seemed to have
been undertaken with so much discrimination,
and conducted with so much temperate energy
amidst complicated difficulties of an
unexampled character. 129
These were obviously powerful arguments as far as
diplomatic relations were concerned, but there can be
little doubt that behind Wiseman's appeal to the
government in these terms, there was obviously a
religious motive, which was to obtain the government's
support to improve the status of the English Catholic
Church in Britain and of the English College in Rome. 130
To achieve this goal Wiseman was obliged to acknowledge
how useful it would be, and how advantageous it would be
to the government to have close and direct communication
with the Papacy.
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His ultimate religious objective was to obtain approval
for the restoration of the Catholic Hierarchy in England.
As soon as he became pro-Vicar Apostolic, negotiations
about restoring the English Catholic Hierarchy (the
Catholic Church's administrative status) had begun
between the English Catholic Church and the Vatican
through the Propaganda (Catholic Society for the
Propagation of the Faith). 131 He had already sent a
letter to the Pope directly in July 1847 entitled
'Condition of the Catholics in England', describing the
expansion of the Catholic population and the more
positive attitudes of the public towards Catholicism in
England. 132
Minto and Wiseman's missions,
and Wiseman's approach to Rome
To understand the nature of Wiseman's diplomacy, it is
also necessary to look at how he portrayed his diplomatic
efforts to the Pope. Wisenian's original involvement in
these matters began when the Pope, hoping that Minto's
visit to Rome could be linked to the plan to re-establish
the Catholic Hierarchy, ordered Wiseman to arrive in
London before Lord Minto's departure in order to
influence the British government. Wiseinan wanted to make
a success of this mission not only to influence the
British government to accept the Hierarchy but also to
create a favourable impression with the Pope.
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Wiseinan's correspondence with the Pope makes it clear
that he emphasized that he was in a good position to
mediate on Anglo-Roman matters, something which
underlines the linkage between Wiseinan's political and
religious objectives. 133
In the Vatican archives one can find a letter from
Wiseman to Pius IX about his meeting with Palmerston and
Russell in London on 24 September, in which he confessed
to the Pope that, although he had not indicated this to
the British ministers, it was his intention to improve
the Catholic status in England which lay behind his
advice to Palmerston and Russell. 134 In addition Wiseluan
in his correspondence with the Pope emphasized his own
contribution. In a letter to Pius on 9 October he
informed His Holiness that Palmerston had asked him
unofficially to go to Rome to support Minto's Mission,
and encouraged the Pope about the prospects for Anglo-
Vatican relations by mentioning Shrewsbury's letter to
Russell concerning the possibility of the Queen's
conducting direct diplomatic communications with the
Papacy. 135
Wiseinan also wanted to give the Pope a positive
impression of Palmerston and of Lord Minto's diplomatic
strengths, and stressed:
Palmerston seems to be the kind of person who
has encouraged a positive opinion about
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political events in the Papal states among the
other ministers in Parliament. 136
He also emphasized that he himself was fully trusted by
the British government:
but as they can be confident about my
position under your sovereign, they [Russell
and Palmerston] showed their confidence about
my suggestion. 137
Further to this, Wiseman also stated that he had been
able to show Russell and Palmerston the benefits which
Britain would receive through direct communications with
the Papacy, and informed the Pope that in order to
impress the British government '... I do not hesitate to
do anything but follow its exact suggestion' 138 He
emphasized that the British government actually referred
to his suggestions in the process of making a policy to
the Papal States, and therefore he believed that he could
influence the government on this issue. As far as Wiseman
was concerned, he informed the Pope, 'I really feel
satisfied with seeing my ideas so well reflected in those
of the government.' 139
Wisenian thus attempted to convey the British
government's, and especially Palmerston's, positive
perception of developments in the Papal States, and also
to demonstrate the tremendous confidence the British
government had in him. It is clear that his brief was to
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mediate between the two states, emphasizing the Pope's
intention of eliciting British support in order to
improve Anglo-Roman relations.
Wisenian's efforts to improve relations between Britain
and the Vatican were supported by Lord Shrewsbury in his
role as one of the key members of the Catholic
aristocracy. Shrewsbury lobbied the Cabinet, Minto and
other interested parties to be favourable to the Papacy,
stressing the common interests between London and Rome.
On 4 November, Shrewsbury noted to Hamilton in Florence
that:
As two great free and reforming Powers we shall
have a mutual interest in each other, and it
will be a splendid alliance between the first
spiritual and the first temporal sovereignty in
the world! If we go cordially and fairly
together, we shall command public opinion in
every State in Europe, and public opinion is
now an immense engine. 140
Shrewsbury's efforts can thus be seen to complement those
of Wiseinan. The contribution of the English Catholics was
therefore significant in paving the way for the Anglo-
Vatican entente. Wisenian's importance in this period was
that he provided a direct channel to the Pope, thus
avoiding the need to work through the Papal Nuncios in
Paris and Vienna, and that he facilitated the development
of mutual understanding. In the summer of 1847 the
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inconvenience of having no regular channel of
communication between England and Rome had been keenly
felt, however, by the autumn this problem had to a degree
been overcome. 141
The Irish issue
Beneath the surface of the improvement in Anglo-vatican
relations was another vital issue; the Irish Question.
This was not a factor which was discussed publicly, but
the private papers of those involved in the diplomatic
overture to the Papacy reveal the importance of the Irish
angle. This is particularly apparent in the
correspondence of the Earl of Clarendon, the Lord-
Lieutenant of Ireland. 142
Lord Clarendon was pleased with the news of Lord Minto's
mission to Rome, and immediately emphasized its Irish
dimension. In a memorandum to Lord Russell in September
1847 he enquired:
I should like to know in what form and to what
extent you mean to enaniour Irish subjects with
His Holiness. I believe he is under a good deal
of apprehension about the Colleges and the
political views of the government about them. I
believe also that the conduct of the priests in
interfering with politics and matters
unconnected with their calling has been
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represented to hini in a far too favourable and
religious light. 143
Clarendon's concern was not surprising, for at this time
the Irish situation was desperate.
It has been argued that the Irish issue was, in terms of
British foreign policy towards Italy, not of major
concern in the first half of the nineteenth century, and
that British policy was determined by international
interest in the Papacy and the Risorgimento. 144 However,
1847 was destined to be a watershed year in Irish
history, and therefore the British government could not
ignore the Irish Question in Anglo-Roman diplomatic
relations.
1847 was the worst year of the famine in Ireland
following the failure of the potato crop. The failure of
the potato harvest produced outbreaks of associated
illness. Poverty in Ireland was, of course, widespread
and heart-breaking. In a letter which Lord Shrewsbury
wrote to Minto on 20 December, he noted that a priest in
Gaiway had written to one of his acquaintances that:
The poor around us, in this district, are as
yet peaceable and quiet, but much worse off
than last winter. This winter they have no
employment, last they had. Fever and dysentery
are almost gone, but the poor are dying of
exhaustion for want of food & clothing. It is
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melancholy, it is heart rending even to
contemplate what I am obliged to daily, hourly
to witness. 145
Most informed observers realized that the root of the
problems lay in the distribution of land. Large tracts of
land were let at a fixed rent to a single individual on a
long lease, and he sub-let as he chose. 146 The result
was a land tenancy system which discriminated against the
tenant farmer, for even when crops failed or the market
was depressed rent still had to be paid.
The famine brought about a change in the attitude of the
British government towards Ireland. It was impossible any
longer to deny that something was dangerously wrong.
There was little to choose between the rebellious people
and the irresponsible landlords; as Russell remarked to
Clarendon on 18 December 1847 'The Irish landlords are
the most heartless wretches in creation!' 147
On 10 October Clarendon told Palmerston 'A great social
revolution is now going on in Ireland, the accumulated
evils of misgovernment and mismanagement are now coming
to a crisis' 148 Clarendon's alarm became particularly
acute during the autumn of 1847, just as Minto set of f
for Italy, when in a succession of assassinations, seven
landlords were shot in less than two months, six being
killed outright and the seventh horribly injured. Famine
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had suddenly brought the suppressed anger of centuries to
a head. 149
Poverty in Ireland, accelerated by an inadequate land
system, produced crime, disorder, and social instability.
on 29 November Sir George Grey, the Home Secretary,
introduced the Crime and Outrage (Ireland) Bill in the
House of Coininons. Under its terms the Lord-Lieutenant was
given power, at his discretion, to draft up to any number
of police into any district, such districts would be
punished by being required immediately to repay the cost
of the drafting. 150
There has been controversy over whether the peasants'
violence against the landlords was organized and
integrated into the mass revolutionary and Irish
nationalist movement or not. Woodhaiu-Sinith has asserted
that the popular rising which the British government
feared was not being planned, and that when a
revolutionary movement did come about it originated not
among the starving masses but with the intellectuals and
the middle class.' 5 ' However, there is an another
argument which contests his thesis that the murders which
horrified and alienated public opinion had no
insurrectionary significance and were not related to any
political conspiracy. 152
Whatever the fact was, it is clear that the British
government believed that such successive outbreaks of
violence against the landlords in Ireland were associated
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with the Irish nationalist movement. As Catholic priests
were involved with these insurrections, or at least
supported the poor peasants, it was also perceived that a
marriage had been organized between the Irish nationalist
movement and Catholic religion. 153
Lord Clarendon's memorandum of 1 October on the situation
in Ireland recognized the danger from this alliance and
made clear, the narrow distinctions between religion and
political affairs. He noted to Russell in this paper
that:
The Irish are essentially a religious people,
but of late years religion has for party
purposes and by party agencies been so mixed up
with politics that the completely distinctive
characters of the two are almost lost sight of,
and an Irishman loves his religion and the
Ministers of his church, not so much for their
own sake and his own spiritual welfare, as
because he is deeply impressed with the idea
that they are national. 154
He confirmed that acts of violence were not just an
expression of peasant dissatisfaction but were an
integral part of the Irish nationalist movement, and that
priests, recognizing that 'the spirit of nationality
burns strongly in an Irishman's breast', encouraged these
political feelings in order to maintain influence over
their congregations. 155 Furthermore, he emphasized that
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the insurrections were organized to forward the Repeal
movement, referring to an episode involving an anti-
Repeal priest:
During the late election at Dundalk, Dr Cloyne
the Parish Priest, one of the most exemplary
and respectable clergymen in Ireland, was
grossly insulted by the people and spat upon,
his life was in danger and his Chapel was
afterwards deserted because he gave his support
to a liberal candidate of great ability, but
who was unfriendly to Repeal, and opposed a
youth of American extraction, without character
station or fitness for Parliament but who was a
Repealer and supported by the Repeal party. 156
Irish priests who were involved with or showed sympathy
for this violence were mainly local priests who had
direct contact with the local poor, rather than figures
within the high levels of the Church Hierarchy. Indeed
the problem in Ireland was complicated by the fact that
the Church was not of one mind, two factions were
struggling against each other not only in Ireland itself
but also in Rome. This rivalry was based upon differences
within the Church over how to react to the growth of
Irish nationalism, but was also exacerbated by a division
of opinion over the British government's plans for the
establishment of nondenominational Queens Colleges in
Ireland. 157
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The Irish priests involved in violence against the
landlords and opposition to the colleges looked to John
MacHale, the Archbishop of Tuam, for support. MacHale was
the first prelate to be wholly educated in Ireland since
the Reformation; intensely nationalist, he felt deeply
the sufferings of the poor, became Daniel O'Connell's
most important clerical supporter, until the latter's
death in May 1847, and was always prepared to take an
independent line against his own hierarchy and also with
Rome.
Clarendon stated the danger of MacHale to Minto on 26
November:
MacHale is a dangerous demagogue whose
proceedings as a citizen, and irrespective of
their ecclesiastical indecorum, no government
in the world but our's would tolerate.
Political agitation, popular elections and
inflammatory publications are his favourite
pursuits. His object seems to be to set the
people against their rulers, and if he would
have his way their ignorance and their
turbulence would be perpetual, and throughout
his province those priests have the greatest
share of his favour who most promote his
sinister designs. 158
The fact that Irish priests such as MacHale supported the
violence of the poor Irish peasants and co-operated with
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O'Connell's nationalist movement prompted the British
government to discuss the situation of Ireland with the
Pope, not only because '... the Pope does not know what
is going on in Ireland', but also to prevent the Pope
from giving any favour to the Irish priests in Rome.
As Clarendon insisted to Russell on 1 October, accurate
information regarding Irish affairs was being distorted
by the Irish college in Rome in the process of informing
the Pope.
Information with respect to Ireland has
hitherto reached the Holy See through a
perverted channel. Even if facts be correctly
transmitted from Ireland (and the reverse is
often the case) they are metamorphosed in the
Irish College at Rome and the Pope is required
to exercise his judgement upon evidence either
one-sided, or garbled to meet the political
more frequently than the spiritual purposes of
the party in Ireland from which the Irish
College receives its inspirations. 159
Even more disturbing for the British government was its
concern that the Irish nationalist movement itself was
making a positive impression on the Pope, and that Pius
might be persuaded to support the Repeal movement. Minto
could hardly conceal his annoyance with Daniel
O'Connell's son John, who had inherited the leadership of
the Irish nationalist movement after his father's death,
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when the latter travelled to Rome for an interview with
the Pope, and then used this privilege to stir up Irish
nationalism. He noted to Shrewsbury on 28 October in
reference to a meeting that John O'Connell had held in
Dublin that O'Connell had informed the audience that he
was organizing an address to the Pope thanking him for
'his noble exertions to sustain the Catholic religion in
Ireland'. 160
This letter to Shrewsbury also included an article from
the Waterford Chronicle which attributed to the Pope a
sympathetic attitude towards Ireland. The article
entitled '1847 Approbation of O'Connell policy by the
Pope' declared:
Ireland owes the Holy Father many debts. She
owes him for this Encyclical letter, which
called forth the sympathy and assistance of all
the nations of the world for her children. She
owes him for the real honours which he paid to
the remains of our beloved Liberator, and the
adoption of O'Connell's political doctrines.
She owes him for the bold stand he has made
against the tyrants of the world, thereby
lifting up her own cause and making it powerful
against persecution. 161
It seemed that the Pope had taken a positive view of John
O'Connell, and in that case there was a danger that the
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violence organized by MacHale in Ireland would be
defended because he was one of O'Connell's principal
religious supporters. The fact that O'Connell was
supported by the Pope was a factor in driving the British
government to act over the Irish Question.
Clarendon's belief that the Pope was being duped into
backing the Irish clergy in their opposition to the
colleges led him to recommend that Minto should be
instructed to bring home to the Pope the real nature of
the conditions in Ireland and the real motives behind the
educational reforms. In his memorandum of 1 October he
observed:
It is rapidly becoming worse and demands the
remedy which the Pope alone can supply, as the
head of the Roman Catholic church, as a
Sovereign in alliance with Great Britain, and
above all as a man ardently desirous to promote
the well being of his fellow creatures, it
cannot be supposed that he would withhold his
aid towards a great religious and social
reform, if the necessity of such aid were
demonstrated and if his power to afford it were
clearly established. 162
He went on to explain that before the Pope made up his
mind over Ireland, it would be necessary to persuade him
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to interfere, although it is clear from the documents
that diplomatic guile was essential.
Assuming then that enough has been said to show
that the Pope is uninformed of what is passing
in Ireland, and that the state of things here
loudly calls for his spiritual interposition,
it remains to consider in what manner His
Holiness can interfere beneficially and
effectually. Nothing should be asked of the
Pope which had solely for its purpose to
further the interests of the political objects
of the British government in Ireland. 163
He also explained how to persuade the Pope using anti-
Irish propaganda. 164 He enclosed with his memorandum a
number of documents which Minto could use to demonstrate
to Pius the hostile nature of the Irish clergy. The
documents, Clarendon noted, provided:
..ample evidence of the inflammatory language
and the personal abuse in which the Clergy
freely indulge both in speeches and letters, of
the political purposes to which the palaces of
worship are perverted, and of the importance
attached by all classes of agitators to the
support of the priesthood and the sanction of
the Pope's authority. 165
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Clarendon concluded that it would be a mutually
advantageous quid pro quo if Britain intervened in Roman
affairs to support the Pope as an Italian national
leader, and the Pope intervened in Irish affairs to
tranquillize violence in order to undermine the Irish
nationalist movement:
The countervailing influence on the other hand,
will be very powerful and likely to prevail in
the long run if a firm and persevering course
be pursued by the Pope, and the British
government acting in concert. A popular outcry
will be raised at all events. Not only the
slightest interference on the part of the Pope
to aid the government, but the very appointment
even by England of an accredited agent at Rome
will be made a perpetual handle for agitators
to influence the popular mind with the notion
that the British Minister is interfering with
the Pope for the purpose of making him
subservient to the political projects of
England. 166
It also could be said that Britain intended to search for
similarities between the problems of Britain and those of
the Papal States.
The rise of the Irish problem was also a significant
factor for the involvement of English Catholics, such as
Wiseman and Shrewsbury, in the diplomatic process. In
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this context Wiseinan emerged once again in an important
role. Wiseman and Daniel O'connell had worked together
during the struggle for Catholic Emancipation in 1829,
founding the Dublin Review. However, Wiseman had warned
that the Dublin Review should not be used to promote the
political views of O'connell. Aside from his wish to
avoid topics that might divide Catholics, Wiseinan was
fully aware of the fact that Newman and his Catholic
fellows opposed the principles held by Daniel
O'connell.167
Wiseman understood how seriously divisive the questions
related to Ireland might become. Daniel O'Connell's
promotion of the repeal of the union of Ireland with
Britain was especially contentious. Hoping to avert
unnecessary bitterness, Wiseinan wrote to his friend and
supported Shrewsbury on 2 November, offering to serve 'as
mediator in any unkind feeling which might have sprung up
between your Lordship and [John] O'Connell'. 168 Wiseinan
was most worried that a lack of union among Catholics
could only weaken their power for doing good, and he
argued that there was no reason why they could not be
divided in politics, while 'being thoroughly united in
all points bearing upon the progress of religion, the
removal of its difficulties, and the interests of the
Catholic body'. Wisenian himself opposed repeal: 'I can
see no Catholicity in the repeal movement: I fear it is
thoroughly of this world'. 169
146
Most importantly, the disturbances in Ireland had
ramifications for the re-establishment of the English
Catholic Hierarchy. The strength of feeling which the
famine aroused made it even more likely that the Irish
College would attempt to use its influence in Rome to
torpedo the restoration of the Hierarchy. This was
particularly the case because Wiseman was regarded by the
Irish as unsympathetic to their cause. At the same time,
however, the British government's concern about Ireland
and its lack of influence at Rome strengthened the case
for the re-establishment of the English Catholic
Hierarchy.
Lord Shrewsbury raised these issues with Charles
Hamilton, the brother of the British minister in
Florence, on 4 November in a letter that he hoped would
be passed on to Minto. In it he deplored the inferior
position of the English Catholic College to the Irish
Catholic College, and noted to Hamilton, in regard to the
Pope's recent opposition to the Queen's Colleges, that:
now the Irish Party at Rome will endeavour,
I apprehend ... to gain the Pope over to their
views in other matters by applauding him for
his conduct in this, and this Irish influence
ought and must be counteracted. Drs Kirby and
Cullen of the Irish College, who represent it
at Rome, are both excellent men but thorough
Irish; whilst we have none of equal weight.
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The Irish are strong and active; we are weak
and idle. Dr Wiseman's appointment to the
Metropolitan See of Westminster will be the
struggle and the trial. He is presumed to be
anti-Irish and as such will be assailed, in all
probability by a host of clamorous
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Exposing his hostility to the Irish Catholics, he
asserted that Wiseman would be the only person who could
counter the influence of the Irish College and observed
that it was vital that Wiseman should be appointed to the
Metropolitan See of Westminster. He warned that:
If Wiseman be not appointed, the triumph of the
Irish party will be complete, the game they are
playing will be won by making it appear that
England is only a bigoted tyrant, and a
ruthless enemy of Catholicity. 171
He noted that the despatch of Minto to Rome while a
positive move could not entirely overcome Britain's
problem and emphasized that:
It is of the utmost importance that Rome should
be well and wisely informed on these points,
and yet I know not from whence the information
is to come. Lord Minto may be suspected of
partiality, of a one side view of the case as a
party man; still I hope he will prevail by
persevering assiduously in his Mission. 172
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Shrewsbury explained that only Wiseinan's appointment
could help Britain's cause, and noted that the only
alternative to Wiseinan as Archbishop of Westminster was
Bishop John Briggs, the pro-Irish Vicar-Apostolic of the
Yorkshire District. Shrewsbury explained that 'He
[Wiseman] is the only man we have fit to communicate with
government and who has any knowledge of the World and its
concerns.' He also stressed that Wiseman would be able to
compete with other priests in the European Catholic
states's colleges in Rome, especially the Irish
College.'73
Their concern over the Archbishopric made it imperative
to Wiseman and Shrewsbury that Britain should be seen to
take a sympathetic attitude towards the Papacy, and thus
heightened their determination to push for a
reconciliation between London and Rome. In addition, they
were keen to stress the importance of an end to
discrimination against Catholicism in Ireland. Lord
Shrewsbury, although a Catholic himself, had little
sympathy for the Irish Catholics, particularly if they
were involved in Irish nationalist propaganda, but noted
in his letter to Minto on 20 December that:
All that is degraded and criminal in Repeal -
all the falsehood and imposture upon which it
is based - all the vile passions and still
viler principles that were, or have been bonded
together in the support - all are traceable to
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this one cause, that we have made a forcible
separation between the religion of the people
and the political Institutions of the
country.'74
The concerns of the English Catholics over Ireland
complemented those of British government. Before his
arrival in Rome and during his stay there, Minto was
constantly reminded of the importance of the Irish issue.
Indeed, the necessity for Minto to persuade the Pope to
help Britain solve the Irish problem became ever more
central to Minto's mission. The scale of the problem
became even more apparent when in late October 1847, just
before Minto's arrival in Rome, the Pope, on the advice
of the Propaganda, issued a statement opposing the
British government's plan for non-denominational Queen's
Colleges to be established in Ireland. This confirmed
that in the competition between the English and Irish
Catholic Churches through the English and Irish Colleges
in Rome, the Irish were more successful and thus more
influential. Consequently on 27 October Russell informed
Minto that:
I hope you will move heaven and earth to
convince the Pope that he is misled by the
mischievous party in Ireland, that they aim at
rebellion and separation, that we do not object
to any measures he may take to secure his own
faith, but that he ought to discountenance the
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seditious and rebellious harangues of priests.
He ought to feel that we are his friends. 175
Palmerston was also keen to see the Pope aid Britain, and
in a letter to Minto on 29 October he noted that as there
were by this time indications that the Austrians were
keen to reduce tensions in Italy that:
The Pope ought to feel grateful to us for this;
and if he does so, he ought to give us some
tokens of his thankfulness. I send you a copy
of memorandum sent some little time ago by
Clarendon for your use. It is the main good.'76
This desire for Papal action was made all the more urgent
by the increase in Ireland of acts of violence and the
apparent complicity of the Irish clergy. On 21 November
Clarendon informed Palinerston that the situation was so
bad that 'sedition and murder are now all but openly
recommended by certain priests' and he insisted that the
Pope should be persuaded :
to put a stop to ... the practice, unheard
in any other Country, of denouncing people by
name from the altar or in other words issuing
their death warrant... 177
By the end of 1847 the Minto mission had become vital to
Britain for not only Italian affairs but also for the
peace of Ireland.
15].
Conclusion
By a curious combination of international politics and
religious circumstances, the British government had
become the defender of the Pope's temporal power in spite
of its traditional and historical anti-Catholicism and
anti-Papal feeling. Therefore in 1847 there was good
reason for the Pope to look for help from Britain.
Fortunately for the Vatican both Palmerston and the
British officials in Italy supported Pius's reform
programme and regarded it as an important step in the
development of the Papal States and Italian nationalism.
Although the new press law and Civic Guard were granted
because of the radicals' pressure upon the Pope, Britain
failed to appreciate fully the actual and potential
danger of these reforms. As has been pointed out,
Britain's naivety about the Civic Guard was in part due
to its hostile feelings towards Austria, which brought
the British government to support the Papacy after the
Ferrara incident in August. The despatch of Lord Minto to
Rome and other cities was motivated by the Ferrara issue
in order to support the Pope diplomatically and to
encourage his liberal policies. This was, however, not
the only issue at stake, for while diplomatic and
religious studies of Anglo-Roman relations have normally
been kept separate, it is evident that in fact political
and religious concerns were equally important and were
intricately interwoven in Britain's negotiations with the
Papacy. This is particularly the case in regard to the
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decision in August 1847 to send Lord Minto to Rome, which
was inspired by religious as well as political
considerations.
The extent of the link between the Minto mission and Dr
Wisenian has not hitherto been recognized by many
historians. 178 On the face of it, the two men were
negotiating over separate issues, but some collaboration
between the English government and Italian and British
religious bodies can be discovered in Minto's papers as
well as in the Vatican Archive. These documents reveal
that the British government and Dr Wiseman, as a
representative of the English Catholic Church, worked in
parallel in Britain's political and religious
negotiations with the Papacy, on the one side seeking to
establish formal diplomatic relations with Rome, and
aiming to solve the Irish Question, while on the other
hand, attempting to improve the status of the English
Catholic Church.
It was over the Irish question that the government sought
help from Wiseman. It was believed that the main problem
facing Lord Minto in Rome was the possibility that the
Irish College would attempt to sabotage his mission. Lord
Shrewsbury regarded Wiseman as anti-Irish, and hoped that
Wiseman would be able to counter the influence of the
Irish priests. The desire for a Diplomatic Bill with the
Papacy was not just for the improvement of Britain's
position in terms of international competition with
France and Austria, but also for solving the Irish
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question. Wiseman's relations with Daniel O'Connell,
before the latter's death, and his warning to O'Connell
that Catholicism should not be used to provoke Irish
nationalism in Ireland, proved his attempt to undermine
the Irish nationalist movement in the name of harmony
between the Catholic Church in England and that in
Ireland.
Since British fears about Austrian ambitions had begun to
subside by the time Minto arrived in Rome on 4 November,
it was the Irish issue that came increasingly to dominate
British policy. Towards the end of the year the situation
in Ireland was becoming a matter of great concern and
Britain looked to the Papacy for help, hoping that Pius
would bar the Irish Catholic Church from political
activities. In order to show its sincerity Britain began
work on a Diplomatic Bill to legitimatize the opening of
relations with Rome.
British optimism about the chances of an improvement in
relations with the Papacy was, however, based on a false
premise. The British government failed to see that in
fact the Pope was being pushed into reforms which created
dangerous expectations, both within the Papal States and
Italy as a whole, which he could not fulfil.
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Chapter III
Britain and the 1848 revolution in Rome
Introduction
By the end of 1847 the British foreign policy towards the
Papacy had a number of clear aims; to encourage further
liberal reforms, to counter Austrian influence, and to
win Papal approval of Britain's policy towards Ireland.
All of this was to be achieved by the mission of Lord
Minto; however, despite its good intentions, Britain's
timing was to prove disastrous.
Not only the Papal States, but almost all of the states
of the Italian peninsula were disturbed by revolutionary
and nationalist movements in 1848, and the pressures
these caused brought Piedmont into a war against Austria
and led to the expectation that other states would also
get involved. The war issue was to cause grave
difficulties for the Pope, for it raised the question of
whether Pius, as head of the Catholic Church as well as
an Italian sovereign, could sanction a war against
Austria. The issue of war with Austria was not the only
problem raised by events in the Italian peninsula. In
addition the political reforms introduced by most of the
Italian states brought pressure on the Papacy to go
beyond the measures which the Pope had already granted.
The question that faced Britain was how to deal with this
changing situation and how to achieve the goals laid down
in the autumn of 1847. It was not in British interests to
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see revolution in Rome, nor was there a wish to see a war
in Italy that might lead to an Austro-French
confrontation. Therefore British policy was to encourage
the Pope to pursue constitutional reform, and to attempt
to force mediation of the Austrian issue. In addition, in
order to show support for the Pope and to forward British
interests in Ireland it was decided to push forward with
the Diplomatic Bill. The problem that arose with this
policy was that in the revolutionary atmosphere of the
Italian peninsula it proved impossible for Britain to
control the course of events.
Section I: Pius IX and the establishment of a
constitution
The constitutional movement in Italy
Rome was not the first place in the Italian peninsula to
experience a movement for constitutional reform. In fact
Kingdom of the two Sicilies was in February 1848 the
first state in Italy to adopt a constitution. The triumph
of the Sicilian constitution led to the beginning of the
collapse of the concert of Europe, underlining the
failure of the Austrian system, which had loosely
controlled the Italian peninsula since the Congress of
Vienna. 1 Once Ferdinando, King of the two Sicilies,
granted a constitution, it became impossible for the Pope
and the Grand Duke of Tuscany not to follow suit, and
very difficult indeed for the King of Piedmont, Carlo
1berto.
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Even before Ferdinando's concession, political
expectations within the Papal States had begun to grow,
as the Pope's lead in liberal political reform had
awakened popular hopes for a constitution and encouraged
the rise of radical political movements.
The Pope, however, had at first no intention of going as
far as to grant a constitution; he saw the culmination of
his reforms as the introduction of the Consulta di Stato
on 14 October 1847. The Consulta, a consultative assembly
with no legislative powers, was composed of a cardinal as
president nominated by the Pope, a prelate as vice-
president, and twenty-four councillors from every part of
the state, all of whom had to be Papal subjects but none
of whom needed to be an ecclesiastic. There was also a
general secretary and a head of accounts. The creation of
the twenty-four councillors was based on the Pope's
liberal ideas, and opened up the possibility for lay
liberal contingents to have limited participation in the
Papal government. 2 Pius nominated Cardinal Antonelli to
be the head of this body and hoped that the Consulta
would work smoothly under his leadership.
Pius was soon to be disappointed, as the establishment of
the Consulta failed to satisfy the liberals and even the
councillors within the Consulta pressed for more powers.
On the advice of Antonelli the Pope made a further
reform; on 29 December he reorganized the Council of
Ministers, which had first been established in June 1847,
to allow it a greater role in the running of the state.
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The Council of Ministers was a committee of the nine
heads of department, the Ministers for Home Affairs,
Public Instruction, Pardon and Justice, Finance,
Commerce, Public Works, Arms, Police and finally the
Secretary of State, but initially it had limited
influence. Pius's reform was intended to give it more
powers and in particular the right to discuss all vital
matters of state before they were forwarded for his
approval.
The creation of the Consulta and the reform of the
Council of Ministers were both given a limited welcome by
the British government, which recognized them as a
development of liberal politics. 	 The idea of a
Consulta had after all been one of the British
recommendations contained in the reform programme of
1831. 6 The British hopes for the future were reflected
in the reports of Lord Minto, the British special envoy
to the Papacy, who had arrived in Rome on 4 November
1847.	 On 18 November Minto noted enthusiastically to
Lord John Russell, the British Prime Minister, that:
The opening of the deliberations of the
Consulta di Stato here is a great political
event, and if it starts well and in sufficient
harmony with the government I shall feel no
doubt of its success. Its members are perfectly
aware of the power which it is destined to
acquire, and are I believe generally disposed
to await the natural and gradual growth of that
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influence without aiming at direct legislative
authority, at least in the present condition of
Italy. 8
This was a somewhat misguided reading of the situation
within the Papal States. It presumed that the Pope
intended the Consulta as a body that could in time
acquire more power, whereas in fact Pius saw the Consulta
as having only a strictly limited role. Minto's optimism
was a reflection of his faith in the British model of
evolutionary political reform and his hope that this
could be applied to the Papal States. It was one of
Minto's weaknesses that he consistently believed that
reforms would necessarily strengthen the governments of
the Italian states. For example, he noted to Lord Napier,
the British minister in Naples, on 9 December that:
I can safely say as the result of my
observation from Turin to Rome, that the effect
of the popular reforms slight as they are,
spontaneously introduced in that great portion
of Italy, has been to rally round the
governments the great mass of sound and liberal
opinion, and to leave the restless faction of
the Young Italy in a helpless and discredited
minority incapable of evil.
Minto had clearly underestimated the forces of revolution
that were soon to break over Italy.
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Minto's optimism continued into late December when the
Pope introduced his reform of the Council of Ministers.
He noted to Palmerston on 28 December 1847 that it now
appeared that the Pope had broken with the advice of the
more reactionary elements within the Papal government and
put his trust in Antonelli's more moderate approach, and
he observed that:
I am happy to say... that there is the
appearance of returning confidence and of that
concert and good understanding between the
Government and the moderate party, which cannot
be interrupted without dangerS 10
Lord Minto, however, began to change his views early in
1848. He increasingly felt that the present reforms would
not suffice in themselves and was critical of the Pope
for his failure to do more. His doubts particularly
surfaced when in January the Pope refused to allow the
Consulta to make its proceedings public, On 16 January he
told Palmerston that the Pope was undermining his own
reforms by insisting on 'no diminution' of his own
authority. He also noted that:
the virtuous Pope is not of sufficient
calibre for his position, that is to say for
the position of a Sovereign who has little also
than fools and rogues to compose his
government, and who chooses to be his own Prime
Minister. 11
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Minto still hoped that, when events revealed that the
reforms did not go far enough, Pius would have the sense
to realize the need to go even further. On 16 January he
wrote to Lord John Russell explaining that:
I have good hope ... that a better government
will be formed. The newly established Council
of Ministers in which they now assemble and are
seen at one view presents such a ridiculous
exhibition of notorious incapacity that the
Pope must see the necessity for calling a few
men of sense to his aid. 12
As a result of Minto's despatches and the uncertainty
about the way in which events were unfolding in the Papal
States, the Foreign Office's, and subsequently the
government's, interest in Roman affairs increased.
The political parties in Rome
Minto was right to be cautious about the political
situation in the Papal States, as the Pope's reforms had
encouraged the political groups in Rome to become more
active.
Two different approaches were taken by the political
groups in Rome, one constitutional, the other
revolutionary. These approaches were based upon the two
main political parties, the Circolo Roinano, a moderate
liberal party, and the Circolo Popolare, a radical
revolutionary group. Both parties operated within the
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Papal States and also had links with broader national
political networks in Naples and Piedmont. 13
As we have discussed in Chapter One, liberal reform was
thought to be crucial by the Italian moderates as well as
the foreign powers. The moderate liberal circle in Italy
was originally formed around a number of Piedmontese
Albertists, a small but elite political group organized
by Marquis Massiino d'Azeglio, Dr Pantaleoni, the Marquis
Pareto, and later on General Giovanni Durando and the
Marquis Cassanova. Their idea was that Carlo Alberto
should become a constitutional monarch in Piedmont, and
that in the Papal States Pius Ix's political reforms
should be supported. They were opposed to the idea of a
republic and wished to preserve the existing social
order. 14 However, the greatest danger for the Pope was
that they desired to make war against Austria to free the
Italian peninsula from foreign occupation. The connection
between the moderate political parties in Rome and
Piedmont was one of the key factors in persuading the
Pope to establish a constitution in 1848 and in building
up the status of the Circolo Roinano. 15
The Circolo RoTnano's political ideas were based on
Gioberti's writings. These Giobertian Moderates, such as
Francesco Orioli and Marco Minghetti, wanted to preserve
the sovereign power of the Pope, but sought the
introduction of a modern enlightened government under
which the Pope would become a constitutional monarch; an
idea which some people termed "neo-Guelfisin". In their
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view the first step was that the people should gain
predominant power in the Papal government and that this
power would be used in turn to promote a federation of
the small states of Italy, which later would drive out
the Austrians. 16
There was also a radical and revolutionary group in the
Papal States which had existed since the Mazzinian
revolutions of 1831. Although some Mazzinians, such as
Farini, became moderate liberals, there were still a
number of revolutionaries, in particular those who had
been released from prison or had returned to the Papal
States after the 1846 amnesty by Pius IX. These included
figures such as Prince Canino (Napoleon's nephew), his
secretary Dr Luigi Masi, Dr Sterbini and Angelo Brunetti,
better known as Ciceruacchio. The most popular of these
radicals was Ciceruacchio, a faithful Mazzinian and a
working class hero in the Trastevere, who used his
popularity to become one of the leaders of the Circolo
Popolare. The radicals were federalists and believed in
the 'democratic universal republic' of Mazzini. They
sought to achieve this goal through encouraging street
demonstrations until finally a popular armed up rising
took place, which would, of course, mean the abolition of
Papal temporal power. 17 They were, however, sometimes
prepared to compromise, and during the early period of
Papal liberal reforms they had believed that if Pius was
successful as a liberal Pope, he might be able to save
the Papal States.
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1848 opened in Rome with widespread political
demonstrations by the Circolo Romano as they pressed the
Pope to make more meaningful political reforms. At this
stage it was this more moderate group among the Roman
political parties which had the greatest influence. 18
The existence of more radical parties such as Circolo
Popolare was, however, significant, making a sharp
contrast with the ultra-conservative ecclesiastical
rulers. These extreme political contrasts, the radical
and ultra-conservative, attracted Britain's attention to
Rome, 19 because the government considered that the Roman
people's dissatisfaction with ecclesiastical
maladministration could be a major cause of insurrections
provoked by the radical political parties.
The Romagna was, in fact, already a hotbed of political
discontent and insurrection within the Papal States;
especially in Bologna politically motivated crimes took
place frequently and heightened political tensions. 20
Within Rome too the political atmosphere was becoming
tense. Increasingly agitators organized by
representatives of the Civic Guard and Deputies of the
provinces in the Papal States demanded greater
secularization of the Council of the State. 21 Their
agitation threatened order in the city of Rome. On 13
January Minto wrote a report to Palmerston on the
demonstrations which had taken place over the new year,
noting that:
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it has been observed that a good deal of
active agitation of the ultra-Liberals on foot
among the lowest classes; that many strangers
had joined them; and the suspicion of some
early attempt to get up insurrectionary
movements has lately prevailed amongst the
well-informed. 22
In particular Ciceruacchio emerged as the leading orator
of the revolutionary cause and pressed persistently for
additional political changes in Rome. 23 Minto's initial
impression of Ciceruacchio was surprisingly positive. On
19 November in a letter to the Marquis of Lansdowne, Lord
President of the Council, (the Under-Secretary of State
for Foreign Affairs), he noted that:
in Rome and its neighbourhood Ciceruacchio
exercises his extraordinary influence with
the populace in aid of Plo Nono and for the
maintenance of order. This man of the class of
small tradesman has established his unbounded
authority with the people, whom he directs or
controls as he pleases. He is consulted, and
applied to for assistance, by the Pope, and by
the patriots, and with all this he has no
object of personal interest or ambition of his
own in view, but clings to his humble station
and business, though he stands second only to
Plo Nono in authority at Polite. I wish we had
such a man in Tuscany •• 	 24
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Ciceruacchio's high profile meant that he frequently
became a subject of criticism in the English press, such
as the Westminster Review and other journals. A
conservative periodical such as the quarterly Review
emphasized his humble origins.
This man in the dress of a peasant and with
shirt-sleeves turned over his elbow, was
admitted to the conciliabuluni of the clerical
and political conspirator, and even to the
table of the luscious noble. 25
On the other hand, an English traveller named Alexander
Baillie Cochrane, stressed Ciceruacchio's popularity, and
wrote of the following incident on 1 January 1848 when
the Pope ventured out of the Quirinal Palace
He [Ciceruacchio] jumped up behind the Pope's
carriage, unfolded a scroll, on which was
written, in large letters, "Have courage holy
father! the people are with you!" and amid the
discordant yells, the wild enthusiasm, the
licentious expression, which greeted this
triumphant insolence of Ciceruacchio, the Pope
fainted. 26
He also noted that "the next morning the republican
papers said he fainted for joy!!27
While disapproving of the Circolo Popolare's activities,
the British government on the other hand approved of the
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Circolo Roinano's political support for the Pope's liberal
policy. 28 Lord Minto made it a part of his mission to
associate with the moderate liberal faction. On 15
January he expressed to Palmerston, while discussing
another issue, his opinion of the moderates noting that
the Circolo Romano was 'a political society exercising
great influence here and having amongst its members those
who hold the highest station in rank or talent.' 29
Minto had thus noticed that the Circolo Romano was
beginning to influence the political agenda. This
influence was to grow in the early months of 1848 as the
issue of a constitution began to appear on the horizon.
The establishment of the Papal Constitution
The political events in the Papal States were not
happening in isolation, for much of the Italian peninsula
was in crisis. The most dramatic events were taking place
in Naples where a popular movement was demanding a new
constitution. These demands automatically raised the
question of how soon the Pope would be faced with a
similar situation and how he would react.
Minto raised the issue of the agitations in Naples with
Pius IX on 23 January. When Minto stated his opinion that
King Ferdinand should grant a constitution to Sicily but
only introduce liberal reforms in Naples, the Pope
expressed his agreement and told Minto that:
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he entirely agreed with me, that a
constitution erected at Naples would agitate
the whole of Italy; but that Sicily having
already been in the enjoyment of a
representative government, and having a claim
of right to urge for it, might receive her
insular constitution, with less danger of
excitement in the continental states; that the
constitution in Sicily, beside, seemed
inevitable, and what remained for them
therefore, was to endeavour to place the
Neapolitan institutions as nearly as might be
in harmony with those of adjoining states.3°
The Pope's hope that the granting of a constitution would
be limited to Sicily was soon dashed. On 7 February
Ferdinand gave way to the people's demands and
promulgated a constitution for the Kingdom of Naples.
The British government on the whole welcomed the
constitution in Naples as a positive development, which
widened the possibility of the establishment of a
constitution in Rome and the other Italian states. 31 On
3 February Palinerston expressed his opinion to Ninto
that:
If it was not for the fear of Austrian
interference I should say the sooner they all
get constitutions the better; and I have no
doubt that in many of the Italian states very
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fit men would be found for members of
Legislatures and for constitutional Ministers.32
The British public, however, unconditionally applauded
the constitutional revolution in Naples as well as later
on the revolution in Milan. The Northern Star, the
Chartist newspaper, on 12 February rejoiced at the news
of the revolution in Naples and Palerino:
..You can have no idea of the joy and
excitement threatened here. People go out for
miles to meet the courier on the Via Appia and
extraordinary supplements are issued hourly by
the newspapers. The grand feature of this
outburst is the possession of artillery on the
side of the patriots, over forty or fifty
pieces of ordnance having been secured by their
leaders, and they made prisoners in the onset
of over one hundred artillery men whom they
have put to work their guns. Long live the
Civic Guard, Long live the Pope, Long live the
men of Palermo.
Punch expressed a similar reaction to the revolution in
Milan and Naples.
We had very nearly pitched the whole of
Lombardy to the dustnien, and thrown Naples into
the hands of the buttermen by another sweeping
arrangement: but the accumulation of Revolution
is really so rapid, that we have no time to
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attend to them all.
English radicals displayed real excitement at the
revolutions that followed in France, Germany, Milan and
Venice, and their expectation and hope was that Rome
would have a revolution as had happened in France. This
revealed that the enthusiasm for Pius among the British
public was likely to be conditional on his continued
willingness to advance the cause of reform.
As might be expected the granting of the Neapolitan
constitution on 7 February was followed swiftly by
similar reforms in other Italian states. on 9 February
Charles Albert announced his intention to introduce a
constitution in Sardinia-Piedmont on the model of Louis-
Philippe and on 5 March it was proclaimed. In Tuscany the
Grand Duke Leopold II promised a Constitution which was
duly granted on 17 February.	 This left the question of
how the Pope would react.
It was clear that the constitutional revolution in Sicily
would have a tremendous influence upon the Papal States,
inspiring the people's enthusiasm for a constitution and
presenting the Pope with a choice between granting the
people's wishes or facing the possibility of revolution.
To Palinerston, the solution was obvious, and on 12
February he advised Minto, who was now in Naples, to
inform the Papal minister there:
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That it is better for a government to frame its
measures of improvement with timely
deliberation, and grant them with the grace of
spontaneous concession, than to be compelled to
adopt on the sudden changes, perhaps
insufficiently matured, and which being
extorted by the pressure of imperious
circumstances, invert the natural order of
things, and being somewhat of the nature of
capitulation of the Sovereign to the subject,
may not always be a sure foundation for
permanent harmony between the Crown and the
people. 36
This comment encapsulated the British view that political
evolution was the best means to achieve reform and avoid
revolution. However, at this time the British style of
political development was not applicable to the Papal
States, as events in Rome were moving too fast for
'timely deliberation'.
Even as Palmerston was writing this letter to Minto, the
political map of Rome was changing. Already in January
the situation in Rome had become more tense due to the
fear of the possibility of an Austrian expedition to
quell the revolution in Sicily. Despite the Austrian
withdrawal from Ferrara in December 1847, anti-Austrian
sentiment remained high, and when there was renewed
concern about Austrian intentions pressure mounted for
the reform of the Papal army. The Circolo Romano lobbied
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the Consulta to persuade the Pope to reinforce the army,
but the Council of Ministers in its new role rejected
this proposal.
It is hardly surprising, therefore, that in Rome the
people were extremely frustrated when the idea of
military reform, which was supported by the Consulta, was
rejected by the Ministers. The people realized that
clerical influence was behind the Council's decision. On
9 February Petre informed Hamilton that:
On the rumour spreading abroad that the council
of Ministers did not intend to pay any
attention to these proposals, crowds of people
began to assemble yesterday, calling out for
the arming of the reserve of the Civic Guard,-
that is, of servants, daily labourers,
journeymen, &c. "Down with the Ministers!" "No
more priests!" "No more moderation!" and the
like. After much noise and declamation, it was
resolved that a certain number should proceed
to the residence of Prince Corsini, the
Senator, and request him to represent the wants
and wishes of the Romans to His Holiness. 38
The Roman people's eagerness to see military reforms was
combined with their strong hostility to ecclesiastical
government, and their desire to obtain a constitution.
The ecclesiastical domination of politics had the
reputation for causing tremendous corruption and
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misgovernment, bringing social and economic backwardness
to the Papal States. 	 Now the people's hostility
against the clerical ministers was increasingly
exacerbated.
The Roman people's demand for further concessions by the
Pope was organized by the Circolo Popolare's leaders.
Ciceruacchio, supported by the dissatisfied elements
among the people, persuaded Senator Corsini to press the
Pope to authorize military reforms and accept more
secular members in his government. Petre informed
Hamilton that:
Before night-fall, thousands in regular order,
and amongst them hundreds of civic guards, not
in uniform, but wearing their military
greatcoats, began to collect on their way to
the Piazza del Popolo, where they said they
would await the answer of His Holiness, to be
delivered to them by the Senator. Ciceruacchio
here told them that if the answers were
unfavourable, they must take the affair into
their own hands. 40
In order to pacify the hostility of the people towards
the Papacy, Pius promised Corsini that he would consider
further reforms. Corsini then reported this to the
waiting crowd. Petre noted:
He was received with a very boisterous
enthusiasm by the impatient crowd; and
183
immediately announced that His Holiness had
already resolved on the secularizing of the
greater part of the Ministerial and other
offices; that it was, his intention to invite
to Rome some Italian officers of distinction;
and that he would propose treaties of defence
with other Italian States. 41
On 10 February Pius fulfilled his promise and issued a
declaration stating his support for military reform, his
acceptance of introducing more lay persons into the
Council of Ministers, and made an ambiguous comment about
his support for the Italian cause. His call for 'God to
bless Italy' has been a matter of debate ever since, some
observers believing that the Pope had given his
benediction to the cause of Italian nationalism, but it
needs to be understood that his wording was very
careful. 42
 it is important to see that when he discussed
the condition of Italy he stated that one of the greatest
benefits for Italy was that it had at its core the
Papacy, which meant that at times of trouble Italy could
look for its defence not only to the Italian people but
to Catholics world-wide. 	 He observed in his
proclamation:
A great gift of heaven is this amongst the many
by which it has favoured Italy; that hardly
three millions of our subjects should have two
hundred millions of brothers of every nation
and of every language. This was in far other
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times, and in the overthrow of the whole Roman
world, the safety of Rome. For this the ruin of
Italy was never total.
In other words the Pope's rhetoric was designed primarily
to emphasize the importance of Papal temporal and
spiritual power to Italy and to defend his own authority.
on ii February the Pope, in front of a large crowd in the
Piazza Quirinal, gave a vague hint that he might be
willing to consider further constitutional reform. The
next day he reformed his government by allowing three lay
ministers to take positions within the administration.
Advocate Sterbinetti was made the Minister of Public
Works, Count Pasolini, the Deputy of Ravenna, was made
the Minister of Commerce and, Don Michelangelo Gaetani,
Prince of Teano, was made the Minister of the Police.
There is a controversy about whether the Pope made these
concessions as part of his liberal policy, or whether he
was forced to do so. Berkeley considers that Pius's
liberal programme had already ended at the end of 1847,46
and that therefore the further concessions he made in
1848 were due to the pressure of events and the
increasing agitation in Rome. Coppa, however, paints a
picture in which it seems that the Pope and Antonelli
still held some of the political initiative. 	 Martina
goes even further and thinks that the Pope's
secularisation of the ministers was a genuine part of his
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reform process, because he was deeply influenced by
Gioberti and liberal Catholicism. 48
The view of the British government at the time very much
supports Berkeley's interpretation. There seems to have
been little belief in British circles that the Pope was
in control of events, although it was felt that he might
be wise enough to make sufficient reforms to avoid
revolution. Minto, who had now moved on to Naples, noted
to Palmerston on 19 February that:
I am very sorry to be absent from Rome at this
moment as the Pope stands in need of good
advice but my information on the whole leads me
to think that enough would be done by him (and
that is not a little) to secularize and
liberalize the constitution of his government
sufficiently to satisfy the country.
On 24 February Palmerston observed to Minto his fear that
the Pope was now out of his depth and wrote that:
As to the poor Pope I live in daily dread of
hearing of some misadventure having befallen
him. Events have gone too fast for such a slow
sailor as he is. I only hope he will not be
swamped by the swell in the wake of those who
have out stripped him, for this would perhaps
bring the Austrians into the Roman states and
then we should have a regular European row. 50
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It is interesting to note that once again Palmerston
mentioned his fear that the situation in Rome might lead
to a European war.
A detailed study of the events of early February would
support the conclusion that the Pope's actions were not
his own reforms but were in reality the accomplishment of
Ciceruacchio and his Circolo Popolare. Certainly Petre
felt that the demonstration of 8 February was the most
threatening that had yet taken place. 51 However, it does
seem that following this agitation the Pope and Antonelli
decided in mid-February that it was necessary to seize
back the initiative by convening a commission of
Cardinals to consider a constitution. Coppa notes that
the constitution that followed was largely the work of
Antonelli and that he considered that such a step was
essential if revolution were to be avoided. 52
The constitution was finally introduced in March. On 6
March Senator Corsini had an audience with the Pope and
asked for the establishment of a representative
government in the Papal States. Pius IX accepted this
demand, and ordered that all Papal Ministers should
resign and that a new administration should be formed to
oversee the promulgation of the constitution. 	 On 10
March Pius appointed Antonelli as the Secretary of State
and thus be became President of the Council of Ministers
and the head of the new government. This was a
significant choice. It iTldicated that Pius realized that
he needed safeguards t protect his position while at the
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same time satisfying the Roman people's request. He
therefore sought security by appointing a new government
which contained both ministers whom he could trust and
ministers who were popular among the Roman people. He
believed that Cardinal Antonelli, whose political skills
and loyalty to himself were beyond doubt, was vital to
the administration. Under Antonelli a ministry was formed
of seven laymen and three clergymen. 	 Moderate lay
figures took over many of the posts in the government:
Gaetano Recchi was selected as Minister of the Interior;
Luigi Carlo Farini, Deputy Minister of the Interior;
Marco Mingetti, Minister of Public Works; and Giuseppe
Pasolini, Minister of Commerce. In addition, Prince
Aldobrandini was named Minister of War, Giuseppe
Galletti, Minister of Police; Francesco Sterbinetti,
Minister of Justice; Cardinal Mezzofanti, Minister of
Public Instructions; and Monsignor Luigi Norichini,
Minister of Finance. Following this on 14 March the
constitution was officially promulgated.
The Pope had thus made a careful choice; he had
reinforced his own authority by appointing Antonelli, but
at the same time had gone some way to satisfy the people
by raising the number of secular ministers from three to
seven. There was, however, a danger in this for the
process of expanding the liberal parties' power inside
the Papal government led to increasing danger for the
Papal authority.
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Section II: The Roman Constitution and the crisis of
ecclesiastical power
It might seem at first sight that the constitution was
intended as a genuinely liberal gesture which was
designed to open a new chapter in the history of the
Papal States. To an extent this was the initial
impression given to both the Roman people and to the
British government. However, it was not long before the
Roman people and the British government realized its
limitations.
To assess the Pope's intentions in introducing the
constitution it is necessary to look at its terms. The
new constitution was a carefully contrived document which
was formulated in such a way as to protect much of the
Pope's power.
In a preamble to the constitution, the Pope declared that
he had abandoned his first idea of a consultative chamber
and, like neighbouring sovereigns, wished to grant a
meaningful legislature. Under the new constitution, there
were to be two Chambers, beside the College of Cardinals:
a High Council, whose members were to be nominated by the
Pope for life, and a Chamber of Deputies with one deputy
for every thirty thousand people. The franchise was
strictly limited to those with wealth or in the
professions. 56 Under this system, the College of
Cardinals was to be constituted as a Senate inseparable
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from the Pope, and would continue to advise him on
ecclesiastical matters. The two deliberative councils
were established to pass laws and deal with secular
affairs, such as budgetary issues and treaties of
commerce.	 They were, however, prohibited from
discussing any issue which encroached upon the Pope's
spiritual power. Article XXXVI of the constitution stated
that 'the councils can never propose any law, 1. which
regards ecclesiastical or mixed affairs, 2. which is
contrary to the canons or the discipline of the church,
3. which tends to vary or modify the present statute'. In
addition, Article XXXVIII stated 'All discussions on the
foreign diplomatico-religious relations of the Holy See
are prohibited in the two Councils.' In regard to "mixed
matter" the Councils would be consulted but were not
allowed to propose legislation. 58
In Rome the people's reaction towards the new
constitution was rather critical because of these
safeguards for the Pope and the restrictions binding the
secular ministers. These various safeguards were clearly
designed to prevent the Pope's concessions over his
temporal power from affecting his position as head of the
Church, and were thus a strong matter of contention which
in time would lead to major confrontation between the
people and the Pope.
	
The liberal parties were also
upset that under the constitution political rights were
given only to the Catholics and that complete freedom of
religion was not allowed. In short, the new constitution
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failed to satisfy those who wanted to see the Papal
States become a constitutional monarchy. 60
There was even a suspicion among the liberals in Rome
that the new Chamber of Deputies would remain very
exclusive, and would be dominated by ecclesiastical
interests. Petre observed to Hamilton on 22 March 1848:
The constitution which was well received at
first, has since been dissected at the clubs,
its defects exposed, and now the people demand
modification particularly of the article 36. 61
Petre did not, however, envisage that Roman
disappointment would necessarily lead to renewed
agitation, for as he noted to Hamilton on 20 March 'the
Romans are not so wild as the French and if the Pope
knows how to manage them we may go on quietly for a
while.' 62
Just as the Roman people could see the problems with the
constitution, its limitations were also apparent after
some reflection to some of the British representatives in
Italy. Minto, on hearing that the Pope had proclaimed a
constitution, was initially enthusiastic. He noted to
Palmerston on 21 March that:
I am very glad to see that the Pope has at
length announced his Constitution. I have not
had time to read it today but I hear it is well
taken at Rome; so that we may begin to cry Viva
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Pio IX again, which was rather getting out of
fashion. 63
However, when Minto travelled to Rome in mid-April for
his last meeting with the Pope his enthusiasm was
blunted. He found that the Pope was struggling to defend
his authority and was opposed to anything which might
threaten his spiritual power. Minto noted to Palmerston
on 13 April that:
the Pope, ... himself attaches wonderfully
little value to his temporal sovereignty,
except as it may serve his spiritual supremacy.
He is pleased and flattered by the extra-
ordinary personal influence he has acquired by
the collection of the Papal authority in his
hands which is with him an object of religious
solicitude - And it is his desire to be
recognized as supreme head of the catholic
church and not as sovereign - that is at the
bottom of all the difficulties he now makes. 64
Although the Pope could not separate his temporal power
from his independence as head of the Church, the British
Government did not sympathize with the distinction that
Pius was keen to make between the position of the Pope,
who was both a sovereign and a religious leader, and
other temporal princes. Minto had already indicated in an
earlier conversation with Pius on 23 January that 'the
separate interest of the Church' should not interfere
with civil administration or 'good government'. 65 Ninto
had on this occasion told the Pope that in Britain:
192
Ecclesiastical affairs are conducted by
ecclesiastics, and if the Queen interferes with
them ... , it is only as head of the Church.
Why should not same separation exist here, the
Pope retaining his position as Head of the
State? 66
Pius's protection of his own powers suggested, however,
that he had not followed Minto's advice and that he still
put the interests of the Church before the state.
Section III: Pressure on the Pope for War against Austria
The establishment of a constitution in the Papal States
coincided with dramatic events elsewhere. On 13 March
revolution had broken out in Vienna, and this was
followed on 18 March by the insurrection in Milan and
then by the revolt in Venice on 22 March. On 24 March
encouraged by this revolutionary atmosphere, Carlo
Alberto declared war against the Austrian Empire. Against
this background the constitution in Rome had implications
on both the international and domestic levels. On the
international level, Pius's granting of a constitution
meant that the Pope himself posed a challenge to Austrian
absolutism, and it was believed by many that he would now
be willing to be the leader of an Italian Federation in a
war against Austria. On the domestic level, the
constitution raised the important issue of whether the
Pope would be able to declare war against Austria or not.
This issue was over the coming months to divide the Papal
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government; the High Councils which consisted of
ecclesiastical ministers, consistently set its face
against the war, while the Council of Deputies, which
consisted of secular ministers, enthusiastically
supported the idea. 67
As noted above, the political situation within the Papal
States had already been influenced by the rise of anti-
Austrian sentiment, and Pius had hired some Piedmontese
officers to lead the army. In addition, events in the
early months of 1848 had led to the revival of an idea
for an Italian League or Federation formed from Tuscany,
Piedmont, the Papal States and Naples. As early as 3
November 1847, the first three of these states had agreed
to a Customs Union but in early March attention began to
be focused on a defensive alliance, which would also
include Naples. However, the Piedmontese declaration of
war against Austria changed the nature of the debate, as
it meant that if the Pope now agreed to the Federation it
would automatically lead him into conflict with Austria.68
After the victory of Piedmont against Austria at Goito on
8 April, the political movement for independence from
Austria gathered force in every Italian state,
particularly in the cities of Milan and Venice. 69
Britain's expectation was that Rome and Tuscany would
probably participate in the war against Austria which had
already been launched by the Piedmontese. However, for
the Pope to wage war against Austria was not as simple as
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Britain believed. Although there was now more unity among
the states for completing the Italian League, it was
difficult for Pius to provide military assistance to
Carlo Alberto, despite the fact that his ministers
pressed him to declare war, as did the Piedmontese
officers who controlled the army. On 23 March one of
these officers, General Giovanni Durando, was appointed
supreme commander; although Pius did not entirely approve
of him, Durando was supported by his Piemontesi albertini
colleagues in Rome and the Circolo Romano. 70
The issue of the Pope's participation in the war against
Austria was complicated by the existence of the moderate
liberal group in Rome, which had a direct link to the
pro-war faction in Piedmont. 71 As mentioned above, the
political activities of parties like the Circolo Romano
and the Circolo Popolare, were aimed at the achievement
of Italian independence from foreign domination as well
as the dissemination of liberal ideals in the Italian
peninsula. These groups were concentrated in Rome but
were connected with similar factions throughout Italy.
Therefore, the Piedmontese had no doubt that the Pope
could be persuaded to participate in the war against
Austria and collaborate with Piedmont. 72 In order to
pursue a successful war against Austria, the Piedmontese
needed Roman military forces and the Pope's support as a
spiritual leader.
The Pope was thus faced with a terrible dilemma. On 27
March Petre informed Hamilton that in his opinion:
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The" Die" is cast. His Holiness will be called
upon to proceed with energy in giving his
countenance and assistance to the "crusade" if
he does not the very existence of the
government will be placed in great jeopardy.
The outcome of the war policy clearly depended upon Pius:
if he tried to halt the army, there would be revolution
in Rome, but, if he proclaimed war he might encourage
revolution among his Catholic subjects throughout most of
Italy: as a temporal ruler sympathetic to an independent
Italy the Pope would seem to welcome the outbreak of a
war against Austria; on the other hand, as head of the
universal church he could not forget that his first
responsibility was to defend its independence and
preserve intact the powers of the Pontiff. He also could
not ignore the fact that Austria itself was a Catholic
country. For religious reasons, he hesitated to implicate
himself in a war which the Piedmontese had initiated and
whose course they largely controlled.
Matters came to a head when on 22 April Durando actually
crossed the frontier of Lombardy. Seven days later, on 29
April 1848, Pius issued his famous Allocution, which
stated that he could not declare war against the
Austrians. This came as a crushing blow to people
throughout Italy who considered that a war against
Austria, without the Pope's approval, was not practical.
His Allocution seemed to demonstrate that the Pope's
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major concern was to secure the unity of the Catholic
Church.
There is some controversy surrounding the Pope's refusal
to sanction the war. Coppa has argued that the Pope was
more enthusiastic for the Austrians to leave Italy in
1848 than is usually realized,
	
even though he would
not countenance the idea that he might himself go to war
with Austria. Martina argues that the Pope was in a
dilemma, 76 but still wanted to remain the Italian liberal
national leader. The year 1848 was one of nationalist
enthusiasm among Italians and that raised serious
problems for the heads of the various Italian states. The
attitude of the majority of Italian rulers was ambiguous
and dependent upon the degree to which they - the Pope,
the King of Naples and the Grand Duke of Tuscany - were
in the grip of revolutionary forces, or, as in the case
of Charles Albert, feared a revolution.
It is generally understood that the British government
did not want a general war between Austria and the
Italian states, as they feared that French intervention
might lead to a wider European conflict and wanted to
keep a strong Austria as the pivot of the balance of
power in Europe. 78 To this end, Palmerston hoped that
the Austrians would accept their defeat in Lombardy and
Venice and withdraw from Italian territory. 	 This would
avoid the possibility of France's entry and would allow
Austria to remain as a great power. On 28 March
Palmerston observed to Minto that:
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I consider the destiny of Lombardy and Venice
as decided. Northern Italy will henceforward be
Italian and the Austrian frontier will be at
the Tyrol. This will be no real loss to
Austria. If North Italy had been well affected,
if would have been an element of strength;
discontented as it was, it has proved a source
of weakness. 80
His hope for Italy was that a commercial and political
confederation could be formed similar to that which
existed in Germany. 81
However, the Pope's Allocution threatened this policy as
it seemed to abort the development of the Italian
nationalist movement and risked provoking the people's
anger thus creating the danger of further destabilizing
revolutions. This was certainly the opinion of Ralph
Abercromby, the British Minister in Turin, who warned
Palmerston on 4 May that:
This event is of great importance; it deals a
heavy blow at the unity of the Italian cause,
and seriously endangers its ultimate success.
It is to be feared that His Holiness will
persevere in the opinion he has promulgated,
and if so, there is great risk that in the
convulsion that will be produced, the temporal
as well as ecclesiastical power of the Pope
will be overthrown. 82
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As Britain feared and anticipated, Pius's Allocution
provoked a number of insurrections and disturbances by
the radical political factions in the city of Rome,
increasing the tension between the war party and the
Pope. The power of the clubs and political societies,
which were eager for a conflict with Austria, from this
point increased both outside and within the Roman
government. In particular the radical Circolo Popolare,
which had exercised significant pressure on the Pope to
grant liberal political concessions ever since the
beginning of 1848, grew even further in importance and
revolutionary fervour.
The political chaos that resulted from the Allocution was
first reported by Petre when he wrote to Hamilton on 29
April that:
How all this is to finish I know not. In the
clubs, many of the leading members talk still
more openly than hitherto, of the necessity of
appointing a Provisional Government to carry on
the war. The Civic Guard, who have lately shown
a better spirit in the maintenance of public
order, that is, when they think that their own
properties are more immediately in danger, are
much divided on what they deem mere political
questions; and I doubt the firmness and
resolution of any authority in Rome to resist
or to attempt to resist the schemes of the
199
clubs; I doubt the efficiency of these Guards;
I doubt their standing by their Sovereign. 83
In fact throughout the three days following the
Allocution, Rome was in a state of great agitation, and
the Papacy only just succeeded in avoiding a revolution.
The slide towards chaos began when the Antonelli ministry
resigned, observing that, given the public mood and
agitation produced by the Pope's Allocution, it could no
longer be responsible for maintaining public order. As
Petre noted to Hamilton on 4 May:
The sudden resignation of the Ministers, who
had indeed only resumed office provisionally,
but still with the hopes that they would be
permanently re-established, was owing to the
crisis and threats of the leaders of the clubs
against any further continuation of
ecclesiastics in the Government. Cardinal
Antonelli resigned, and as his colleagues would
not yield to the clamour, they equally
signified their resolution of retiring with
their chief. 84
The resignation of Antonelli was important in a number of
ways. One significant fact was that as Antonelli was the
head of the ecclesiastical ministers, his resignation
discouraged other ecclesiasticals from taking office, and
indeed, as Coppa notes, many Cardinals now fled from
Rome. 85
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Additionally, the fall of the Antonelli ministry had the
effect of exacerbating the tensions that already existed
in Rome following the Pope's Allocution. The people's
anger began to rise dangerously, threatening the security
of Rome.
On 1 May a meeting was held at the Palazzo Teodoli by the
Circolo Popolare, which called for the creation of a
provisional government and for the Pope to be deposed.
The following day the Circolo Popolare's campaign peaked,
when it and the Civic Guards, under the general
leadership of Ciceruacchio, took militant action
together. The whole city was caught up in revolutionary
violence, and the Civic Guard was turned into a political
body in order to establish a provisional government. Now
the Circolo Popolare was not a potential, but a real
revolutionary threat. The fear of a revolution was
expressed by Petre to Sir George Hamilton on 2 Nay:
The cardinals were watched and guarded in their
houses, and some were not permitted to proceed
to the Palace, when sent for by his holiness.
Those who were were hosted by the populace. The
Romans affixed notices early this morning on
many church doors. They referred to his late
allocution, and called upon his unguarded
subjects to return to their duty but they were
soon torn down. 86
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An extraordinary situation had now been reached; the
Cardinals were virtually hostages of the Civic Guard and
the Circolo Popolare, who threatened to exert their
influence over the secular and the ecclesiastical
ministers. The Circolo Popolare appeared to have power
within its sights, and it was clear that the result of
its leaders' seizure of power would be for the Pope to be
relegated to be a mere Bishop of Rome. Sterbini demanded
a government without Cardinals as ministers, the
consequence of which would be an erosion of the Pope's
power.
The only means by which revolution could now be avoided
was for the Pope to reach an accommodation with the
Circolo Romano, which still adhered to its original
position of advising the Pope to enter the war. In fact
the Circolo Romano on 1 May presented the Pope with its
own petition which merely asked Pius IX to enter the war
against Austria. This position was due to the influence
of Count Terenzio Mamiani, who had emerged as one of the
leaders of the moderate faction. The Pope finally
realized that he had little alternative but to invite
Mamiani to form a ministry and accepted his terms, which
were that the policy concerning Italian unification
should continue and that the Foreign Office should be
divided into two parts in order that secular and
ecclesiastical affairs could be dealt with separately,
the latter remaining in the hands of the Cardinals. On 4
May Nainiani formed a new ministry. 87
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The crisis in Rome was a matter of great concern to the
local British representatives. On 1 May Freeborn reported
to Lord Napier, the Chargé d'Affaires in Naples, that
Rome was in 'a most serious and alarming state' and
concluded that 'The Pope's temporal power is gone'.
Napier forwarded this letter to Admiral Sir William
Parker, the Commander in Chief of the Mediterranean
Fleet, and added that he had heard rumours that the Pope
intended to abdicate and had asked for sanctuary in
Naples. Parker was disturbed by this news and on his own
initiative ordered HNS Sidon to proceed to Civita Vecchia
where it was, if the Pope should flee Rome, 'to receive
under the protection of the British Flag His Holiness the
Pope and entertain him with that respect due to his
exalted office'. 88 Although this gesture in the end was
not needed, it was significant that the British
government's usual hospitality towards exiled monarchs
was extended to the Pope. This would be the first in a
series of politically motivated visits by British ships
to Civita Vecchia during 1848.
With the ending of the political crisis in Rome, Mainiani
agreed to take office as War Minister and Minister of the
Interior and most of the other ministries were also
filled by laymen, although the government was nominally
led by Cardinal Altieri. Petre informed Hamilton on 8
May:
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You will observe that in spite of the cry of
the clubs against ecciesiastics, which broke up
the late Ministry, the president of the council
is a Cardinal, but that contrary to the Moto-
Proprio of the 31st of last December, as
reported in the despatch of that date, the
Minister for Foreign Affairs is a layman, and
the secular will be separated from
ecclesiastical affairs. It is probable that the
president for the interim of the Council of
Ministers, Cardinal Orioli, will be named for
Ecclesiastical Affairs. 89
Apart from the Foreign Office, the Papal ministries were
occupied by lay members; Giovanni Marchetti assumed the
Ministry of secular Foreign Affairs and Guiseppe Galetti
remained as Minister of Police. 90
The ultra-liberal nature of these new appointments
brought the Pope's temporal power into question. On the
surface it appeared that Pius and Mamiani might work in
harmony to establish a new government in Rome. However, a
huge contradiction had already been created by the Pope
and Mamiani, whose political ideas were profoundly
different, and the new government came increasingly under
Mamiani's control. The political power of the College of
Cardinals was now under severe attack. Previously, the
Pope's approval had been necessary to conduct any
political proceeding under the name of his sovereignty.
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However, the new administration formed by political
parties and clubs, tended to act without the Pope's
consent. The Civic Guard was clearly out of the Pope's
control. The truth was that the Pope had lost control of
his ministers in the Assembly. From here on Pius appeared
to be a constitutional monarch, but it is worth noting
that while he had lost much of his temporal power his
spiritual power remained intact.
Pius was supported in his desire to retain his power by a
number of loyal followers, of whom the most important was
Cardinal Antonelli. As Coppa argues in his recent book,
Cardinal Giacomo Antonelli, after Antonelli's resignation
Pius still consulted the Cardinal, who was appointed to
head the Congregation for Extraordinary Ecclesiastical
Affairs. Although no longer part of the Government,
Antonelli remained in the confidence of Pius. Coppa
emphasizes that 'unexpectedly, Antonelli's position as
private counsellor made him more powerful than he had
been while head of constitutional ministry'. 91 Coppa
supports this view by stating that it seems that it was
Antonelli's suggestion that Mamiani replace him as
effective head of the Papal government on 3 May 1848.
Antonelli also played a significant role in encouraging
Pius to write on 3 May 1848 to the Austrian Emperor
calling upon him to recognize the national existence of
the Italian people and proposing that the Papacy mediate
a peace between Austria and Sardinia. 92 According to
Antonelli, the fact that the Pope found it difficult to
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participate in the war did not mean that Pius opposed
Italian aspirations. He noted that the Pope had called
upon Austria to give up its domination over northern
Italy, which was based ultimately on force. 	 But the
Pope could not support a lay minister who was eager to
fight Austria.
On reporting the Pope's mediation plan to Hamilton, Petre
observed that it was his belief that Pius intended to
negotiate with the Austrian Emperor in order to persuade
Austria to withdraw from northern Italy. However, this
move did little to appease the Italian people
The British government was not convinced that the Pope's
mediation would work. Abercromby's opinion was that the
political division between Pius and 'the Roman people'
was now so easily recognizable that the Pope could not
act as a serious mediator.	 Even if the Pope tried to
act as a neutral channel, the problem was that he could
not control the military activities of the Papal States.
Indeed, the situation in Rome was so bad that in late May
Count Lützow, the Austrian ambassador, decided to leave
and was given passage on the British ship, mis I,ocust.
As the British government believed that the Pope could
not succeed in its efforts to mediate, Palmerston decided
that it was necessary for Britain to take this role upon
itself. This was particularly important as by early May
the Foreign Secretary had evidence that French troops
were massing along the Alps. 96
206
Section IV: The Mamiani Administration
Relations between Pius and the lay ministry were strained
by the failure of the Pope's mediation with Austria,
while the lay ministry still pursued a policy of war
against Austria and rejected Pius's view that Italian
unity could not be achieved through war. In addition,
disagreements over the role of the Civic Guard increased
tension in Rome. Pius's position was becoming
increasingly untenable.
On taking office, Mamiani had insisted on nominating a
lay foreign minister for secular affairs, in addition to
the usual ecclesiastical foreign minister, who at that
period was to be Cardinal Soglia. Pius opposed the idea
that any authority over foreign policy should be
transferred to the lay foreign minister, as he was afraid
the latter might involve him in war. He was also against
any transfer because, in reality, the whole of the
Pontifical diplomatic service, the Nuncio, consisted of
cardinals or other churchmen, and nearly all its business
was related to ecclesiastical matters.	 The Catholic
Powers could not accept that the Nuncio would be taken
over by the lay officials of the Papal State, officials
who would have to deal with the accredited
representatives of the Catholic Church all over the
world.
In addition, the deep divide between Pius and Mamiani
over the function and influence of the High Council
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(ecclesiastical ministers) was soon revealed, and the
conflict between secular and ecclesiastical powers
created confusion in Rome. 98 Throughout the whole of the
Papal States, there was a breakdown of authority and a
rise in crimes of every sort. There was clearly a need
for strong leadership.
on 5 June, the day of the opening of the first
parliament, the confrontation between Mamiani and the
Pope came to the fore after Cardinal Altieri, who had
been sent as the Pope's representative, gave a speech to
open the parliament which made no mention of the
government's intentions or programme. Mainiani reacted to
this by drawing up his own speech, and with the Pope's
reluctant approval, he delivered this to the parliament
on 9 June. In his speech he referred to the Pope's proper
position in regard to the Italian cause as being that of
a mediator, but at the same time, as Hamilton noted to
Palmerston on 14 June, Mamiani
made a speech to the Deputies about the
nationality and the independence of Italy, and
the justice and right of carrying on the war as
long as a stranger shall occupy any portion of
the Italian soil.
This passage in his speech certainly did not reflect the
view of the Pope. In fact it seemed that the programme of
Italian independence, which was a justification for war,
was being advanced in the Pope's name but without the
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Pope's approval. 100 In parliament Sterbini and Canino,
the leaders of the Circolo Popolare, emerged as the
leading critics of Mamiani's ambivalent policy. In their
address to Pius, which was read to the Pope on 10 July,
they demanded that the constitution should be changed,
that the war should be pursued, and that the Civic Guard
should become the bulwark of the regime. 101 In addition,
the Deputies levelled a complaint against the conduct of
the ecclesiastical Minister of Foreign Affairs. 102
Rebutting the charges, the Pope dwelt in his reply to the
Deputies on 10 July upon the authority of the Pontiff and
his ecclesiastical ministers, and launched a strong
defence of his own position. 103 He also protested
against the destruction of Papal authority by political
parties. 104
This speech clearly demonstrated that conflict still
existed between the Pope, his cardinals and the secular
ministers on the war issue. Lord Normanby explained in a
letter to Palinerston on 21 July that the declaration made
by Pius was significant in two ways:
The reply of the Pope to the Roman Legislature
not only shows a wide misunderstanding between
His Holiness and that body upon home politics,
but furnishes an opportunity for distinct
declaration against any participation in the
war at present carrying on in the North of
Italy. 105
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Norxnanby concluded that the Pope's refusal to enter the
war in north Italy meant that this conflict had become
one solely between Piedmont and Austria and 'no longer
one for national independence'. He did, however, warn
that the situation could change and observed that:
Should the Romans, in consequence of this
declaration of the Pope, rise in rebellion
against his temporal authority, some volunteers
may still be added to the Italian army, but on
the other hand the moral influence of the head
of the Catholic Church would be transferred to
the other side. 106
In this fluid situation Normanby once again raised doubts
about the future course of French policy.
Normanby was right to be concerned, for the situation
within the Papal States became even more complex when on
17 July Austria began a brief reoccupation of Ferrara.
This event once more threw Rome into disarray. On 18 July
Pius tried to win back some support by issuing a formal
diplomatic protest to Vienna against the Austrian
occupation, which was also distributed to the other
European powers. Mamiani consented to this, but the
Pope's action angered the radical political parties in
Rome. In the Council of Deputies, Canino proposed a
threefold programme: the deputies should declare the
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state in danger, they should make their sittings
permanent, and they should call on the Pope to declare
war. 107
This action by Canino was not enough to satisfy the
Circolo Popolare, which on 19 July presented a petition
to the Lower House. This was not all, for on the same day
members of the Circolo Popolare, supported by the radical
members of the Civic Guard, broke into the Council of
Deputies' meeting. Petre reported to Hamilton on 22 July
that:
The president, in consequence of the clamour
and of the entry of some of the crowd into the
Chamber, declared the sitting dissolved, and
harangued the crowd from a balcony. In the
meantime the crowd, among which were members of
the civic guards in uniform, headed by
Ciceruacchio, demanded the delivery of the
Castle of Angelo and the town's gates into the
custody of the civic guard, and were on their
way to make the attempt. The sitting of the
Council was declared permanent, and some
Deputies were sent to gather information about
the situation returning with the Minister of
Police, to announce that there was no fear of
further disturbance. 108
The Northern Star emphasised 'revolution' rather than
'rebellion'.
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A revolution has taken place in Rome, the
people invaded the Chamber of Deputies on the
19th and demanded an immediate declaration of
war against Austria, the Pope persisted in
resisting that measure. 109
Faced with this disorder, Britain lost hope that Mainiani
could reconcile secular and ecclesiastical powers, or
maintain Papal authority even in name. It was clear that
Mamiani's ministry had failed to preserve order, and
Petre was forced to report in his letter of 22 July that:
In a country where there is not a remnant of
authority, nor of military discipline, it is
impossible to foresee what may happen from day
to day. 110
It was at this time, with Roman politics once more thrown
into crisis, that news arrived of the Piedmontese defeat
at the hands of Austria on 25 July at the battle of
Custoza. Shortly after this defeat, Pius wrote a letter
of sympathy to Charles Albert, 111 but this was not enough
to satisfy the radicals, who wanted action rather than
words. This was particularly the case in early August
when Austrian troops advanced to seize Bologna, and
subsequently the radicals urged Pius to commit himself to
war. The Pope's response, which was once again to appeal
to the Great Powers and to announce his reliance on
'Divine Justice', was once again an inadequate answer to
the calls of his people. His position was weakened even
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further after the final resignation of Mamiani and his
colleagues. The new administration led by Count Fabbri
was clearly little more than a caretaker government. The
Papal States looked increasingly unstable.
To prevent further Austrian advances in the Italian
Peninsula after the battle of Custoza, and to reconcile
Charles Albert with Pius IX, Palmerston suggested Anglo-
French mediation between Piedmont and Austria. He
believed that he could induce the Cabinet in Vienna to
accept such mediation of Great Britain and France, if the
British government would consent to adopt the line of the
Adige as the basis of the negotiation of a peace treaty
between King Charles Albert and Marshal Radetzky. 112
Palmerston's plan was adopted, and a shaky peace was
restored between Piedmont and Austria. The British
government had the optimistic view that the peace between
Piedmont and Austria would pacify the internal
disturbances, but in fact internal peace and order in
Rome remained a fundamental question. 113
Section V: The failure of the Diplomatic Bill with the
Papacy
The dramatic events that took place in the Italian
peninsula in the summer of 1848 meant that by the end of
July the political situation in the Papal States had come
to a turning point, with a choice between a more cautious
reform programme or a shift towards revolution. This
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crisis in Rome raises the question of how Britain reacted
to this situation and how it sought to defend its
interests and to encourage the path of reform.
It is of particular interest that it was in August 1848
that the British government pushed through the House of
Commons a Bill enabling the opening of diplomatic
relations with the Papacy. The motives for this and the
arguments that arose in discussion of this measure are an
important source on British perceptions of the Papal
States in 1848.
The issue of opening diplomatic relations with Rome had
its roots in the mission of Lord Mirito and Wiseman's
advice to the British government in the autumn of 1847.
The first public hint that this was being contemplated
came on 14 December 1847 in a speech by Lord Lansdowne in
the House of Lords during a discussion about the
activities of Lord Minto. 114 Following this a Diplomatic
Bill to restore formal relations with the Papacy was
introduced for the first time in the House of Lords on 7
February 1848 115
It was unusual for Parliament to pass legislation on the
opening of diplomatic relations as this was a royal
prerogative, but the government felt that in this case
the issue was potentially so controversial that it was
necessary to get Parliament's approval. The debates in
the House of Lords certainly saw the raising of some
important issues and objections, and the Bill finally
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passed on 28 February with two amendments attached. 116
The first amendment, introduced by the Duke of Wellington
with the government's approval, reconfirined the
sovereignty of the Queen and stipulated that Britain was
only opening relations with the 'Sovereign of the Roman
States'. In justifying this approach the Duke observed on
18 February that:
he had use [sic] the words "Sovereign of
the Roman States" purposely, because he
understood the Bill as being a Bill to regulate
the political relations with that Court
exclusively, and as not having any allusion
whatever to matters of a religious or
ecclesiastical nature. The only relation which
the Bill was to open was a political relation,
and therefore it was that he had used the words
"Sovereign of the Roman States," instead of
"sovereign Pontiff;" because, as it appeared to
him, the term "Sovereign Pontiff" related to
religion. 117
Wellington's amendment was acceptable to the government
and passed by a large majority.
This amendment, however, did not go far enough to satisfy
the opposition members of the House, and a further
amendment was proposed by Lord Eglintoun which would
prohibit the Pope from sending an ecclesiastical as his
diplomatic representative in London. 118 The motive
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behind this amendment was to ensure that the Pope would
only be able to send a lay diplomat rather than a Papal
Nuncio. On 18 February the former Foreign Secretary, Lord
Aberdeen, noted that the religious responsibilities and
pre-eminent diplomatic rank of a Papal Nuncio would cause
embarrassment. He explained that a Papal Nuncio:
must be an Archbishop, and as such has an
influence over the whole Catholic Church in the
country to which he is accredited. With the
power which he would possess, and that dignity,
rank, and precedence which we could not refuse
him, it would be by no means desirable to
receive him in this country. 119
The government did not accept this argument, but when put
to the vote the amendment passed by a narrow margin as
the House of Lords felt that it was necessary to reassure
the general public that there would be no danger to the
state. The government's opposition to this amendment is
interesting, as already in correspondence between Minto
and Palmerston it had been agreed that if the Pope sent a
representative to London he wouldhave to be a layman.
Indeed Palmerston had noted to Minto on 17 November 1847
that 'This would be a sine qua non with us'. 120 Why then
did the government oppose Eglintoun's amendment? It might
be that the amendment was unacceptable because it would
formally introduce restrictions on relations with the
Pope rather than leaving it as a matter for a private
diplomatic agreement, and thus would risk compromising
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the Pope and subsequently the success of the policy of
opening diplomatic relations.
Certainly after its passage through the House of Lords
the Bill in its amended form was put to one side, because
of the problem of whether the Bill would now be
acceptable to the Pope, with Eglintoun's amendment
attached to it. Britain was in a dilemma, as it was clear
that the opening of relations would be an important step
in the drive to use the Pope to control Ireland. Already
Minto's mission to Rome had achieved a small success for
British policy in Ireland. In January 1848 Minto had
persuaded Pius IX to pass a rescript to the Irish
Hierarchy which criticized their involvement in political
matters. The British government was much encouraged by
this move. On 9 February Lord Clarendon congratulated
Minto, noting:
The letter of enquiry which the Pope at your
suggestion addressed to the Archbishops is
excellent, and perfectly well suited to its
object. It was satisfactory to Drs Crolly and
Murray and a heavy blow and great
discouragement to MacHale and his
confederates.121
Following this on 26 February Minto, who was now in
Naples, urged Petre in Rome to keep up the pressure on
Pius IX over Ireland, 122 and subsequently on 5 March
Petre informed the Pope that the British government was
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very grateful for his action. 123 While there was a hope
that this development could be built upon, it was clear
that it would be difficult to achieve further progress
over Ireland and other issues if there were problems over
the Diplomatic Bill, on 24 March Russell expressed his
concern about the Bill to Minto and observed that:
If you return to Rome, it will be important
that you should ascertain in person how far the
Pope resents Lord Eglintoun's amendment. I have
told him [Eglintoun] that he [the Pope) would
not receive an English Minister if the bill
passed in its present shape. This seems very
unreasonable, but I must allow that the public
exception to Roman ecciesiastics as
representatives is offensive, and I believe
needlessly so. 124
He also noted that until the situation was clearer 'We
shall hang up the bill for the present'. In a further
letter to Minto on 28 March, Russell observed that if the
Pope did object to Eglintoun's amendment 'we may try to
alter it, but I have some doubts of our success.'125
Minto proceeded from Naples to Rome in mid-April and
discussed the Diplomatic Bill with the Pope on 12 April.
The conversation revealed that the Pope was totally
opposed to diplomatic relations being opened on the terms
stipulated by the Bill in its current state. Minto noted
in a letter to Palmerston on 13 April that:
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He [the Pope) said that ... the establishment
of diplomatic relations and missions either in
Rome or in London, was impossible on such
terms, that it was contrary to all usage that
one government should prescribe to another the
class of person from whom its representative
might or might not be selected - and that in
this case the exception taken was peculiarly
offensive and unreasonable. 126
Minto tried to placate the Pope by reminding Pius that in
previous conversations he, Minto, had made it perfectly
clear that Britain could not accept an ecclesiastical as
a representative, and that therefore Pius should not be
so sensitive about Eglintoun's amendment. The Pope
dismissed this argument and, in a comment that sheds
light on the anti-Irish intentions of the British
government, he stated that:
he repeated now as he had then observed to
me that the objects of our intercourse bearing
chiefly on religious interests he could only
confide them to Ecclesiastical hands. 127
Minto denied that this was Britain's sole purpose, and
replied that the opening of relations was necessary due
to the confused state of Europe. In regard to the future
Minto informed Paliuerston that:
I asked him whether in the event of our finding
it impossible to restore the Bill to its
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original shape, he would prefer that it should
be postponed or that it should be abandoned. He
said that he thought it would be better to
abandon the measure for the present. 128
After this conversation the future of the opening of
diplomatic relations was clearly in disarray, although
the government could not publicly admit this. When on 14
May Russell was asked in the House of Commons about the
Diplomatic Bill all he could reply officially was that it
was the government's intention to seek relations with the
Papacy, but that at this time the legislative load in the
House of Commons was too great to allow for the
discussion of such an important issue. 129 This excuse
might have had some truth in it, but it is difficult to
believe that the Pope's opposition was not the major
factor.
Despite the problems raised by the Pope's attitude, the
British government still desired to open diplomatic
relations, in large part due to the continued problems in
Ireland. In particular, there was concern about the
renewed efforts of MacHale to press the Pope not to
accept the British government's proposals for the Queen's
Colleges. 130 In this regard Clarendon, with the support
of Daniel Murray, the Catholic Archbishop of Dublin, had
decided to send to Rome Francis Nicholson, the Archbishop
of Corfu, who would present the government's case to the
Pope. The government in London took advantage of
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Nicholson's visit to Rome to assure the Pope of their
support. On 6 June Palmerston wrote to Nornianby that he
should pass the following information to Nicholson, who
at that point was still in Paris.
pray tell Dr.Nicholson that he may on his
arrival at Rome inform the Pope that the only
reason which has occasioned a delay in the
progress of the Bill for legalizing Diplomatic
relations with Rome is that we have other
measures of greater and more pressing
importance to our internal interests which we
are desirous of pressing forward in order that
they may pass in the course of this session.
But Dr Nicholson may tell the Pope that our
friendly sentiments toward him remain unchanged
and that we take as great an interest as ever
in the prosperity and welfare of his
government. We have seen with great pleasure
the success with which he has hitherto steered
the vessel of his State through the dangerous
passage which he has had to traverse, and we
trust that he will be able before long to come
to anchor in smoother water. 131
Nicholson was happy to pass this information on to the
Papal authorities. On 19 June he sent a letter to Lord
John Russell expressing his appreciation of the British
government's good intentions towards the Pope, and
221
informed Russell that he had told the Papal Nuncio in
Paris:
of the interest which the B. Govt [sic]
takes in the Independence of Italy, and of its
anxious desire for the permanent union of the
temporal and Spiritual Authority of the
Sovereign Pontiff. 132
The use of Nicholson as a channel for presenting
Britain's good intentions to the Pope was only really a
form of flattery. Palmerston's real view on the future of
the Diplomatic Bill was revealed in a letter to Russell
on 20 July. This letter was written in response to advice
from a number of moderate Catholics, presumably including
Wiseman and Shrewsbury, that the government should try to
change the Eglintoun Amendment. Palinerston noted to
Russell:
It seems to me that the progress of events has
determined the question as to the Eglinton
(sic) amendment; and that now that the Pope's
Government has been entirely secularized it
would be needless for us to fight a Battle in
Parliament to preserve its ecclesiastical
character.
The truth moreover is that all the arguments
used to induce us to try to reverse the
decision of the Lords are in diametrical
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contradiction with the arguments upon which we
propose the Bill. We ask Parliament to allow
diplomatic relations with a Temporal Sovereign;
and these Catholic correspondents say we must
have an ecclesiastic because the Pope will only
send us a Minister in his capacity of Head of
the Church. We cannot argue the matter on such
grounds, consistently either with our own
reasons, or with the oaths we have taken at the
Table. 133
This was a considerable shift from the government's
previous position and is interesting not only in
displaying optimism about the future of Anglo-Papal
relations but also in its reading of events in Rome.
What this passage reveals is that the British
government's enthusiasm about the development of a system
based around a liberal Pope, which had increased after
the establishment of a constitution in March, had led it
to underestimate how much Papal power still existed. The
British government failed to comprehend the limits of
secularization, 134 and in particular ignored the fact
that reform of the diplomatic apparatus of the Papal
States was strictly limited. The Pope had fought hard to
defend his original stance that no concession should be
made which in the slightest degree touched upon his
spiritual power, and that no change should be attempted
which transferred his powers to a secular authority. In
the eyes of the Pope, the foreign office could not be
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secularized since the functions of the Nuncios were not
only diplomatic but also religious. As the Pope's foreign
representative, a Nuncio could not divide his spiritual
and temporal roles. The people's demand for the
secularization of the foreign office was impossible in
the eyes of the Pope, 135 and therefore he rejected
anything resembling a policy-making function for the
secular council since this would have been a violation of
the rules of a spiritual power.
It seems, however, that Palmerston, basing his views on
the reports from Petre and Freeborn which stated that the
Pope's absolute temporal power had come to an end, failed
to realize that the Pope, in order to maintain his
spiritual power, had to defend his diplomatic
prerogatives. Regarding the status of the Pope, the
British government's belief was that the Pontiff now
acted as a constitutional monarch in Rome as well as the
spiritual leader of the Catholic Church, and that
political reform in the Papal States had led to the
secularization of the Papal administration. This was a
naive simplification that failed to recognize the true
nature of the crisis that was facing the Papal States,
that is that although the Pope could liberalize the
administration of the Papal States he could never go far
enough to satisfy the people without compromising his
paramount position, his leadership of the Catholic
Church. British hopes that the Pope's spiritual and
temporal powers could be separated ignored the point that
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any such separation would undermine Papal authority,
reducing the Pope to the ruler of a small provincial
state in Italy rather than of the entire Catholic world.
Indeed the fact that the Pope was so determined to
protect his spiritual power made it even more likely he
would reject the opening of relations with Britain on
latter's terms. This was not just an abstract argument,
as the problems that arose from the Pope's spiritual
authority had already been witnessed in the debate about
war with Austria. 136
The idea that Britain could open relations with the Pope
simply in terms of his position as a constitutional
monarch or 'Sovereign of the Roman States' was
misconceived in two ways - it misread the political
situation of the Papal States, and it intended to use the
Pope's spiritual power to help British interests. The
fact that the Pope had 200 million Catholic subjects all
over the world was an important element to consider for
the British government's foreign policy towards the
Papacy, 137 rather than regarding the Pope a ruler of the
small Papal states in the Italian Peninsula. For the
opening of relations to have any real benefit to Britain
it had to recognize Papal temporal and spiritual power,
which contradicted the idea that these two functions
could be separated.
The fact that the British government acted as if the Pope
were already a constitutional monarch was not only an
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interesting conunent on British perceptions of events
within the Papal States, but was also fatal to the
success of the policy of opening diplomatic relations.
Perhaps, however, it was understandable that in the
period of late July and early August, when Pius was being
challenged by both the radicals and the Austrian army,
Palinerston may have imagined that the Pope had no choice
but to accept the Diplomatic Bill.
It was not until 17 August that Lord Palmerston presented
the Bill to the House of Commons. As one might expect a
number of issues in Anglo-Papal relations that had been
aired over the last two years, were used to justify this
dramatic move. In his first speech, for example,
Palmerston noted that the opening of diplomatic relations
would benefit British commerce and referred specifically
to Britain's interest in developing a railway system that
would traverse the Papal States. This was not, as some
contemporaries noted and indeed later historians have
contended, an insignificant matter, and Palmerston
insisted to the House on 17 August that:
We have great interest in rapid communication
with our East Indian possessions. That
communication is daily becoming abridged by the
introduction of railways in different parts of
the continent of Europe. We cannot make use of
a railway passing through the territory of
another State without having with that State
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some arrangement by treaty with regard to the
transit of our mails through that country. 138
In addition it was a common understanding that the Bill
was, like Minto's mission to Rome, intended to help the
British government to use the Pope's authority to curb
the activities of the Irish clergy. Many backbenchers
referred to Ireland in the Commons debates and indeed
many Irish MPS opposed the Bill because they suspected
the government's intentions. The government, however,
never admitted officially that this motive existed,
although it was undeniably in the background.
Palmerston also justified the Bill by referring directly
to the contemporary situation within the Papal States. He
emphasized that it was the secularization of the Papal
administration in the summer of 1848 that had led the
government to accept Eglintoun's amendment. At the
committee stage of the Bill on 25 August Palmerston
observed to the House that:
It must be recollected ... that the government
of Rome was now constitutional and secularised.
He believed an ecclesiastic had now been
appointed to the office of Foreign Affairs, who
was, however, the only ecclesiastic in the
Administration. The Government of Rome was now
lay, responsible, and constitutional; and the
probability was, that the lay advisers of the
Pope would be desirous that some opportunity
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should be afforded of employing in diplomatic
relations the nobles of the Roman States. 139
The flaw in the British government's perception of the
Pope's position was recognized by all strands of Catholic
opinion. As early as February, when the Lords had debated
Eglintoun's amendment, Shrewsbury had warned that Britain
must not offend the Pope by insisting on the despatch of
a secular representative to London. Further to this he
published a pamphlet warning against the provision that
the Papal Nuncio to the Court of St James could not be an
ecclesiastic, although he stated that he did not object
to the Bill in its entirety. 140 Although Shrewsbury and
Wiseman disapproved of Eglintoun's amendment, they agreed
that it would be possible to support the legislation,
viewing it as at least a means of improving the status of
English Catholics. Their view of the Bill was supported
in August by some moderate Catholic MPs, such as Mr M.
Power and Sir H.W. Barron, who also argued against the
amendment although they were in the end willing to vote
for the Bill. Mr M. Power said on 24 August that:
He was himself a Roman Catholic, and he would
not hesitate to tell the Pope, that though he
owed him obedience in spiritual matters, he
would exercise independently the rights of
conscience on all civil questions. 141
The most significant warning came, however, from an Irish
member of the House of Commons, John O'Connell, the son
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of Daniel O'Connell, who had inherited the Irish Repeal
movement's leadership from his father. He said on 24
August, knowing that the British government intended to
control the Repeal movement through direct diplomatic
relations with the Papacy, that:
The Government, however, preferred attempting
to bribe the ruling power at Rome, in the hope
that by this means they might corrupt the Irish
clergy; but the Sovereign Pontiff would throw
back their Bill with contempt. 142
Opposition to the Bill not only came from the Catholics
who considered that it did not go far enough, there were
also a number of Protestant MPs who considered that, even
with the Eglintoun amendment, the Bill went much too far.
Some of the speeches in the debates revealed a
fundamental distrust of Papal motives and fear that the
very fabric of British society was at stake. For example,
Richard Spooner, the MP for Birmingham, told the House of
Commons on 25 August that Britain had for too long agreed
to make concessions to Popery and that:
he believed the blessing of the Almighty
had been most mercifully vouchsafed to this
nation so long as she adhered to the true
Christian faith, and steadily opposed what he
believed to be the delusions of Rome. ... He
wished now ... to protest against Parliament
being ... coerced ... to accept a Bill which he
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did not hesitate to describe as forming a
further and most dangerous step in dereliction
of the Protestant religion. 143
Despite the complaints of the anti-Papal faction and
O'Connell's warning that the Pope would not accept
relations on Britain's terms, the Diplomatic Bill passed
through the House of Commons with a healthy majority. The
future of diplomatic relations now rested with the Pope.
There is the possibility that Palmerston and Russell
hoped that the Pope would be willing to accept diplomatic
relations once Nicholson had assured him of Britain's
support. Nicholson arrived in Rome in late July and in a
meeting with the Pope he handed His Holiness a copy of
Palmerston's declaration of 11 June. 144 He learnt in his
talks with the Pope that the latter was deeply worried
about the situation of Rome and that Pius desired the
British to send a ship to Civita Vecchia in order to
guarantee his security.
On learning this information Nicholson sent off a letter
to the governor of Malta, Richard More O'Ferrall,
suggesting that Britain should meet the Pope's request.
He noted to O'Ferrall that:
The Pope cannot make such a request at least at
present but you may be quite sure that your
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complying with my request make him grateful to
the B. Government and to you. 145
O'Ferrall promptly sent a letter to Admiral Parker who
then on 21 August ordered HMS Bulldog to proceed
immediately to Civita Vecchia. Parker gave Commander A.
Cooper Key, the officer in charge of the ship,
instructions that the latter was 'to receive the Pope on
board for conveyance to any port in the Mediterranean,
should commotions occur which might make it advisable for
His Holiness to take refuge in one of Her Majesty's
ships'. 146
Key arrived at Civita Vecchia on 24 August and through
Nicholson's good offices it was arranged for him to have
an audience the next day with the Pope. In this meeting
Key emphasized Britain's regard for the Pope and stated
to Pius that Admiral Parker had 'sent the Bulldog with
the idea that the person of HH [His Holiness] - of such
importance to the peace of Europe - was in danger and
that she might afford him a refuge'. The interview went
very well and the Pope informed Key that he had only
asked unofficially for assistance as he was afraid that a
formal request through Petre would have aroused suspicion
in Rome. 147
News of Key's visit to Rome and his favourable reception
by the Pope might have encouraged the British government
to believe that the Pope would accept diplomatic
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relations on the lines of the Diplomatic Bill. If such a
hope existed it was misplaced. In reality, opposition in
Rome was strong in particular because of the strength of
the Irish lobby. MacHale had already in April travelled
to Rome with the Vicar Apostolic of Yorkshire, John
Briggs, to petition the Pope to reject Britain's
overtures. They stressed in particular that the British
terms for opening diplomatic relations were an insult to
the Pontiff and the Catholic Church. Pressure was
maintained on the Pope in the summer of 1848 by the
members of the Irish college. The result was that in
September 1848, the Pope rejected the British attempt to
open relations, as he was deeply offended by the fact
that the Papal Nuncio could not be an ecclesiastic.
The Pope's unilateral decision over this matter proved
conclusively that he had not become merely a
constitutional monarch, and that it was a misconception
to believe that his spiritual and temporal power could be
separated.
Even after this debacle Britain did not give up on its
policy of trying to use the Papacy to control Ireland.
Russell had in the summer of 1848 decided to put forward
a new policy towards Ireland under which the British
government would pay the wages of the Irish clergy and
provide funds for the maintenance of Church property.
This was a controversial move and was opposed by those
close to MacHale, who saw it as an attempt to silence and
pacify the anti-English priesthood. Once again it was
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felt by the British government that the Pope's assistance
could be useful. Russell prepared a memoranduxa for the
Pope which explained the benefits for the Church from
this new policy. The memorandum assured the Pope that 'No
interference with the spiritual independence, or
ecclesiastical arrangement of the Roman Catholic Church
is in contemplation'. It also explained that the measure
was being introduced because the government believed
that:
the poverty of the Roman Catholic clergy of
the south of Ireland, and the miserable
condition of their chapels make it desirable
that the state should interpose for relief of
the Clergy and the due maintenance of the
fabric of place of worship. 148
Once the wording had been agreed between Russell and
Palmerston the memorandum was translated with great care
by the Foreign Secretary into Italian, as Palmerston
believed that the Pope had little understanding of
English language. He proposed to Russell on 27 October
that the term 'memorandum' should not be used and that
instead it should be replaced by the word 'proposition'.
He also noted to the Prime Minister that it would be wise
to avoid leaving any copy of the British proposal with
the Vatican:
I should be inclined to think that it would be
best that the memorandum should be read to the
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Pope as often as he may think necessary to
engrave the contents on his memory, but that no
copy should be left with him. If given him it
might find its way back into the English
newspapers prematurely and do harm.. •149
Like the Diplomatic Bill, this ambitious plan failed to
achieve any positive result. Once again the British
government had overestimated its ability to influence the
Pope.
The failure of the attempt to open diplomatic relations
with the Papacy and the arguments within Britain over the
Diplomatic Bill also had a damaging effect on the desire
of Dr Wiseman and Lord Shrewsbury to improve the status
of the English Catholic Church. Despite the hopes
expressed by these two men in the autumn of 1847 and the
fact that Wisenian had made a major contribution to the
decision to send Minto it is clear that there were limits
to Wiseinan's influence. When in November 1847 Shrewsbury
tried to persuade the British government to support
Wiseman's appointment to the Archbishopric of Westminster
he found that the government showed little enthusiasm.
Palmerston wrote to Clarendon on 20 December 1847 that he
could see little advantage in the proposed appointment of
Wisenian and noted:
As for the idea that we could manage the Irish
priests by means of a Roman priest in London, I
am convinced that the presence of such a man
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[Wisenian] would only have given the Irish
priests an additional means of managing us.' 150
Minto also had little sympathy with the scheming of the
English Catholics, although through private channels he
came under pressure to take some action. In a letter to
Shrewsbury on 27 November he noted that the British
government would not interfere with the Pope's 'purely
ecclesiastical functions'. 151
The only time Minto did act was when in December 1847 he
received a letter from Shrewsbury's priest, Father
Conolly, criticizing Wiseman for his alleged link with
the 'highly objectionable' Catholic newspaper,
Tablet, and thus opposing his appointment to the See of
Westminster. In January Minto reluctantly passed this
information to Cardinal Ferretti, but made it clear that
this was only for the information of the Cardinal and
that he had no opinion on the subject. 152
The lack of support from the British government clearly
did not help the English Catholic cause, but the
prospects for Wiseman and Shrewsbury deteriorated even
further when the Diplomatic Bill was discussed in the
House of Commons. On 17 August 1848, when the Bill was
read for the second time, Sir Robert Inglis, a prominent
anti-Catholic, raised the issue of the Pope's
ecclesiastical intentions towards Britain, such as the
establishment of archbishoprics. Russell's reply was a
categorical rejection that the Bill would allow any Papal
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interference in Britain's affairs, and he informed the
House that:
I do not know that the Pope has authorised in
any way, by any authority he may have, the
creation of any archbishopric or bishopric with
dioceses in England; but certainly I have not
given my consent - nor should I give my consent
if we were asked to do so - to any such
formation of dioceses. 153
This statement made it clear that any hopes that the
English Catholics had in the British government were
misplaced.
The supporters of a move towards the creation of
archbishoprics did not face problems only in London, in
addition there were obstacles to their aims in Rome. In
part this was their own fault due to the divisions within
their own ranks, with Wiseman opposed by English
Catholics sympathetic to Ireland like Federick Lucas, the
editor of The Tablet, and Briggs. The other problem was
that Papacy had far more significant issues to deal with.
Section VI: The Pope's flight
Rossi's policy and his murder
After Mamiani's failure to pacify the people or to end
the conflict between ecclesiastical and lay power, the
radicals intensified their political attacks, and
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'Republicanism' began to emerge as a serious force. The
Pope, fearing that his authority might be overthrown, was
therefore obliged to nominate a new interior minister in
order to defend his authority. The new minister was to be
elected from the liberals, and the intention was to
choose a moderate who would protect the Papal and
ecclesiastical interests.
The man chosen by the Pope to fill this role was
Pellegrino Rossi, who was more conservative than Namiani.
Rossi saw his role as that of a minister defending Papal
temporal power. He had once supported the revolutionary
cause, but, after some years in exile, he had become
sceptical of radical and revolutionary rhetoric. When in
exile in France he had established a friendship with
Guizot, and this had led to his appointment as French
ambassador to Rome in 1845, but after the February
Revolution in Paris he had become persona non grata with
the French republican regime. 154 Once in Rome as French
ambassador, Rossi also acted as unofficial adviser to
Pius IX, who trusted his opinions.
On 22 September, when he took office as the Minister of
the Interior, Rossi announced that his policies would be
based on the existing constitution and that the
safeguards for the ecclesiastical ministers would be
preserved. In foreign affairs Rossi negotiated with
Piedmont over a new idea for a 'Confederation' which had
been proposed by the Abbé Antonio Rosmini Servati on 4
August. 155 The talks did not, however, go well, because
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Rossi's ideas on Italian national unification differed
from those proposed by Piedmont. He was opposed to war
with Austria and was suspicious of the idea of a
political league on Piedmont's terms, which would have
led to a military league of Tuscany, Piedmont and Rome.
Rossi's own views were ignored by opinion in Piedmont,
which condemned Pius and accused him of betraying the
League. 156 The majority of federal nationalists were
against Rossi's foreign policy, because his scheme said
nothing about nationality. Also people who were eager for
war to free Italy from foreign occupation hated Rossi,
because his policy was principally based upon peace.
In domestic affairs Rossi used his influence, especially
in financial and military matters, to preserve the
temporal power of the Papacy. In order to remove the
revolutionary element from the Roman Cabinet, he
abolished the Ministry of Police and placed it under the
Ministry of the Interior; this allowed him to get rid of
Galletti, the Minister of the Police and a radical
republican, and his two ex-Carbonari subordinates. 157
With Rossi in control it appeared that Pius had finally
found a figure who would be able to stabilize the
country. However, as Rossi's power increased so did the
opposition. Due to his programme of eliminating any
radicals and republicans from the Cabinet, and his
disagreement with Piedmont over the Confederation, Rossi
had only succeeded in antagonizing the secular political
opposition. In addition, his commitment to maintaining
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the Pope's liberal reforms meant that he was unable to
win the support of the ecclesiastical conservatives.
Rossi's political position as a moderate, suggested that
he might be able to reorganize the papal administration
along the lines of English constitutional government.
Britain hoped that Rossi would be able to reconcile Papal
authority with a liberal political system through reform.
In retrospect this was too optimistic, for as an English
traveller, Alexander Baillie Cochrane noted in his book,
Young Italy written in 1850:
Undoubtedly Mr Rossi's advice was too much in
favour of progress; he had not sufficiently
studied the characters of the Papal government
or of the Roman population; he excited the Pope
to grant a liberal constitution - "Le Papa,' he
wrote 'donnera sous peu la constitution; ii
s'en occupe sérieusement; il est dans la bonne
voie." Mr Rossi lived long enough to regret
this opinion, and yet he survived but a few.
months. 158
It seems that as far as Cochrane was concerned, Rossi's
ability and talent as a moderate minister might have
enabled him to achieve his liberal political reforms in a
secular state, but in the context of Roman politics,
where the secular existed alongside the ecclesiastical,
they were doomed to failure. 159
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On 8 October motivated by the revolutions in Vienna and
Hungary, Sterbini and his supporters called for North
Italy, Tuscany, Sicily, Rome and Naples to unite as a
national confederation to attack Austria. Pius, however,
with Rossi's support, disagreed not only with this idea
but also with war. As a result Sterbini and his
colleagues decided to bring about Rossi's fall from power
and began to renew their agitation. 160 On 12 November
Rossi was informed of a plot to take the Pope prisoner
and proclaim a republic, and he was thus forced to use
the Carabinieri to maintain order. However, there was a
growing air of expectation, and Petre wrote to Palinerston
on 16 November:
People so mad? ... It is said and perhaps with
reason that Rossi has been imprudent that he
has been trying to attain his object too
rapidly without calculating the difficulties
attended by sudden changes.
In the Roman Gazzetta of the 14th the enclosed
article from his pen appeared and it is said
that it sealed his doom, he talks of the
Indipendenza Italiana as an Episodio - this
article and his having addressed the
Carabinieri to the effect that they belonged to
no nation and had no right to take any pay as
Cittadini that when called upon they must obey
and do their duty to their Sovereign -
irritated the people much as they said that he
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was trying to bring troops and people into
collision. 161
on 15 November Rossi was murdered. The circumstances
which led to his death are still controversial,
particularly whether Sterbini was involved in the plot.
It is clear, however, that his death was a turning point.
There is extensive correspondence about the murder of
Rossi, in British official papers and in Palmerston's
private papers. Petre reported to Hamilton on the day of
the murder:
A most atrocious deed has just taken place. .
Rossi the prime minister has been assassinated
an hour ago. The camera were repented to day
and Rossi had gone there in his carriage and
was to have revealed his policy. There has been
malcontent for some time against him. 162
Petre had invested considerable hope in Rossi, who he
considered to be a realistic reformer, and therefore the
statement that his murder was committed by radical
parties in Rome was expressed with intensive hostility.
He blamed it on 'the liberal mad caps', and observed to
Hamilton on 16 November that:
It is quite evident that the murder has been
the act of a party and not of an individual. We
are now anxious to know what is to happen next.
In my opinion Rossi's death is an irreparable
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loss - he was the only man in Italy fit to
rescue [...] things to order both in government
and Finance - Talent is not wanting in Italy
but there is a total absence of [...]
experience. Rome is quiet and I do not think we
shall have any further disturbance - Rossi's
death seems to satisfy the liberal mad caps - I
forgot to say that during the last few days of
Rossi's rule many arrests were made and several
Neapolitans had been exiled. 163
There is no real evidence that Rossi was murdered by
Sterbini and his colleagues, but this rumour was spread
widely among the people of Rome and also the European
Powers. 164
Cochrane wrote in 1849 that he was convinced that Rossi's
murder was approved by Sterbini and the Council of
Deputies, because Rossi's policy was against their
radical ideas. He noted in regard to Rossi's savage death
that:
The seeds of the Christian religion were
nurtured with the blood of martyrs; the blood
of Rossi had left an indelible stain on the
city of the church; but we must hope that from
his blood may spring men fit and able to guide
its destinies. 165
In his opinion, this tragic and horrible incident should
not be forgotten, and represents one of the most
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dishonourable events in the history of Rome. Cochrane
exhorted his readers to remember Rossi:
At all events, Rossi has left to posterity a
bright example of self sacrifice, and his
memory must be cherished by all those who love
a Christian church, and would redeem the errors
of a Christian people. 166
Cochrane realized that Rossi was the last hope for a
compromise between the conflicting secular and
ecclesiastical interests. However, Rossi became a victim
of the radical Mazzinian party in Rome, whose political
idea was 'Violence could be used for the liberation of
the people' 167 Cochrane believed that these radical
political parties in the Papal States were nourished by
the Roman people's discontent with the corruption of the
ecclesiastical politics. Such an explanation only
reflected Britain's antagonism to the Pope's temporal
power as well as to the Catholic Church.
After Rossi's death, Pius was abandoned by all his
ministers, because without Rossi it was difficult to take
prompt action to stem the flood of revolution. Pius tried
vainly to keep his temporal power but he was now faced
with irresistible pressure from the Circolo Popolare, who
had the support of the Civic Guard. On 16 November the
Deputies demanded the formation of a new government that
would declare war against Austria. With the support of
the Swiss Guard the Pope tried to resist, but it was
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hopeless. On 17 November Pius was forced to accept a new
administration led by Rosmini Serbati, with Galletti, as
the Minister of the Interior. On the following day the
Swiss Guard, the traditional defenders of the Pope, was
disarmed and sent away, and the Civic Guard was put in
charge of security at the Quirinal Palace. 168 As the
city of Rome was placed under the control of the Circolo
Popolare, Pius no longer had any legal authority and the
government was in the hand of the radical party.
The British representatives in Italy were horrified by
these events, not only because of concern for the
position of the Pope who had lost his final defender, but
also because of the fear of the consequences for the
Italian peninsula. Parker's reaction to this 'atrocious
assassination' was on 19 November to once again send HNS
Bulldog to Civita Vecchia in order to provide the Pope
with refuge if this should be necessary. 169 Hamilton
reported to Palmerston on the same day that:
The effects of the catastrophe at Rome cannot
yet be appreciated, but they must be very
serious, and the consideration of them gives
rise to great apprehensions. There can be no
doubt however that the war cry will now be
greatly increased in Rome. I see no hopes that
it will be resisted by the new Roman
Government. Such a stimulus was not wanted to
fan the flame here, and the Roman war party
will be echoed in Tuscany. 170
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This fear of the prospect of further revolution and of
renewed war against Austria was mirrored by Abercromby in
Turin. He noted to Palmerston on 22 November that:
Every event tending to throw Italy into
additional confusion must I fear be regarded as
contributing so much the more to the chances of
war, and consequently as rendering more and
more difficult the position of Piedmont with
those forces and resources such war must
inevitably be made if once resumed. 171
Yet more dramatic events were to follow.
The Pope's flight and its impact
The Pope was now confined to the Quirinal Palace and
considered himself a prisoner. In this situation he felt
he could no longer remain in Rome. A ministry had emerged
against his wishes and sought to impose a programme of
which he did not approve. He was concerned that he would
be forced to agree to measures that conflicted with his
beliefs. The Pope also feared that the anti-Austrian
sentiments of the new government could provoke a schism
in the Church. In these conditions he realized that the
wisest plan was to leave Rome. Already several states had
offered him sanctuary, and he decided that the best
course of action was to cross the border into Naples, and
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set up his residence at Gaeta. He escaped from Rome on 24
November with the assistance of the French, Bavarian and
Spanish ambassadors, and some days later issued a
statement from Gaeta explaining his flight.
Within Britain the Pope's dramatic departure was widely
reported in the press with a number of different opinions
been expressed. The Times on 12 December reported thus:
I may explain that the Pope declares he left
the Roman territory because he was a close
prisoner in the Vatican, and his duties as head
of the church required free liberty of action,
to protest against the present government. 172
The Times was sympathetic with the Pope's situation, and
considered that his flight was a reasonable decision in
order to free him from his physical imprisonment and to
enable him to exercise the supreme power of the Holy See.
The Whig newspaper, The Examiner explained on 23 December
that:
The Pope is declared to have forfeited temporal
power. If the Pope does not approve of it, he
will be declared to have forfeited his temporal
power and a new form of government will be
established. M Sterbini declared that the Pope
could return to Rome as a bishop but not the
cardinal or prelates. 173
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The Examiner explained the gravity of the deprivation of
the Pope's temporal power, and the implications of the
idea that he would return to Rome as a bishop only. On
the other hand The Spirit of the Age, a radical weekly
newspaper, suggested a very different view on 16
December;
The revolutionary spirit is ready to burst out,
the first favourable opportunity. Unless the
Pope calls in Austrian aid, which we doubt
much, we see nothing but for him to accept the
revolution as an inevitable necessity and form
his temporal policy accordingly. He may depend
upon it, the day has gone, by when his
spiritual anathema, would be of any service in
arresting the progress of political change. 174
The Spirit of the Age had a decidedly radical opinion,
and believed that political change would inevitably
coincided with the reduction or deprivation of the Pope's
temporal power. From this it is clear that any residual
sympathy among radicals for the Pope had by this time
completely dissipated.
The British government was absolutely horrified by the
transfer of authority from the Pope to Sterbini. On 16
December Petre had informed Hamilton about the recent
course of events in Rome and noted:
Soon after dark a band of from 150 to 200
paraded the street with flags and torch,
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shouting out. "Italian independence! Death to
the Cardinals! Death to the Roman princes!
Blessed be the hand that struck him!" and going
round to various quarters of the military and
of the police, demanded, and authority seemed
to have ceased- no resistance, no remonstrance
by the officers and several of the men with
many Civic Guards in uniform, joined the
procession, which terminated without any
further branch of tranquillity, and dispersed
on reaching the Circolo Popolare, where the
flags were deposited. It is disgusting to read
the cold-blooded accounts of the events of
yesterday in the "Epoca" and "Contemporaneo"
journal of this morning. 175
The British Parliamentary papers, as well as the press,
contained extensive foreign correspondence with Rome
about the flight of the Pope. Undoubtedly British opinion
was interested in the flight of Pius IX, but its attitude
to the Pope was not always coherent, because the reaction
of the English differed according to their political
position. In spite of being fundamentally anti-Catholic,
the British government supported his retention of
temporal power within the context of a constitution for
diplomatic reasons, and they recognized that the
existence of the Pope was needed to maintain social order
in Rome. Some newspapers such as The Examiner accepted
this belief in the nominal temporal and political power
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of the Pope, while others like The Spirit of the Age
believed in the complete secularization of modern
society.
After the Pope's flight, although the Republicans had
seized power, they could not proclaim the Roman Republic
immediately, because they had first to suppress the
political disturbances and social disorders provoked by
an absence of the papal authority. The secularization of
the ministry in Rome was completed after the proclamation
of the Roman Republic.
Conclusion
1848 had begun both for the Papacy and Britain with great
hopes for the future, but by the end of the year this
optimism had ended in disaster. The Pope had fled from
Rome, and no notable advance had been made in relations
between Britain and the Papacy, despite the effort that
the British government had put into the passage of the
Diplomatic Bill.
To a degree Pius had helped to create the situation that
led to his flight. He had introduced a series of reforms
that suggested a genuine belief in liberal government and
on a number of occasions seemed to give his blessing to
the ideal of Italian unification. In so doing he raised
expectations that he was not able to fulfil. The
fundamental issue in 1848 was that as a temporal ruler he
might have been willing to make war, however, as the
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spiritual head of the Catholic Church he had to pursue
policies based on adherence to peace. This posed a
dilemma for Pius and also brought him into confrontation
with the Roman people and with Italian nationalism as a
whole. In the end this conflict over his two roles led to
his decision to flee from Rome.
The problem for British policy in this period was that it
overestimated the chances for a peaceful resolution of
the political situation in Rome. In particular, after the
promulgation of the constitution in March 1848 Britain's
expectation that the Papal States could work as a secular
constitutional state increased, and there was a failure
to realize the fundamental problems involved in a
constitution in a state in which the sovereign held both
spiritual and temporal positions which could not be
separated. This kind of perspective was also reflected in
the Diplomatic Bill when it was presented to the House of
Commons in August; Palmerston clearly stated his belief
that the administration of the Papal States had been
secularized and that therefore the Bill with the
Eglintoun Amendment was acceptable. This was a
misconceived reading of the true nature of Papal
government, which still in fact reserved considerable
power in the hands of the Pope. It was also
contradictory, for while Palinerston argued that a secular
administration would accept relations with Britain, it
was clear that the major motive in having a diplomatic
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representative in Rone was to use the Pope's spiritual
power to control the situation in Ireland.
To a degree it might be argued that it was the urgent
desire for Papal assistance in Ireland that blinded the
British government to the difficulty of opening
diplomatic relations with Rome on its own terms.
Ironically it was the fact that the Pope still had
spiritual power and that the Irish College was so
influential in ecclesiastical politics in Rome that led
to Britain's defeat.
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Chapter IV
Britain and the Roman Republic in 1849
Introduction
The Pope's flight from Rome was followed by a power
struggle between the moderate and radical political
parties over the form the new government should take and
who should provide its leadership. It took over two
months from the time of the Pope's flight on 23 November
1848 to proclaim the foundation of the Roman Republic on
9 February 1849.
The establishment of the Roman Republic presented Britain
with two sets of questions; first how to cope with the
diplomatic issues raised by the Pope's request for
foreign assistance, and second how to respond to several
problems that emerged from the policies of the Republic.
With regard to the international issue, the British
government became the object of pressure from the
Catholic Powers for some kind of interference in Rome, in
order to restore the Pope and to ensure social and
political order in the Papal States. Britain was
uncertain about the whole issue of intervention whether
diplomatic or military. Britain always hesitated between
a policy aimed at encouraging social tranquillity through
reform, or one of intervening to suppress internal
insurrection in order to avoid a general war in Europe. 1
Once again the British government faced the problem of
trying to find a way in which to avert any confrontation
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between France and Austria. This was a difficult task as
Britain's preferred policy was to restore the Pope but at
the same time to insist upon the necessity of
constitutional government in Rome.
One of the major issues raised by the establishment of
the Roman Republic was the loss of the Pope's temporal
power. In particular, after Mazzini entered the city of
Rome on 6 March, his political, social, financial and
religious reforms based on anti-clericalisin brought
forward a number of controversial issues, such as
nationalization of the property of the Catholic Church.
The problem for the British government was not just how
to react to these policies but also whether it should
take account of the sympathy for the Roman Republicans
anti-clerical policy among a significant section of the
British public.
Section I: British reactions to the proclamation of the
Roman Republic and its political reforms.
After his flight from the Vatican in November 1848, the
Pope launched a series of complaints against his enemies
in Rome, which culminated on 6 January 1849 in his
excommunication of all those had taken part in the
proceedings of 16 November and those who had taken any
part in the Roman constituent proceedings. This
declaration was signed by the Pope in his own handwriting
so that there might be no doubt of its authority. When
this became known in Rome there was a good deal of
visible excitement.
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John Freeborn, the British Consular Agent in Rome, wrote
to Lord Minto on 8 January;
Most people laugh at being excommunicated and
consider the Pope an old fool for having
recourse to such an expedient- at least they
pretend to do so, but I cannot help thinking
that they feel it more than they like to show.
I doubt however it is having any good effect it
will prevent any who have any feeling of
religion from voting and will thus throw the
election entirely into the hands of the violent
party. 2
Minto, because of his previous experience in Rome, was
sympathetic to the Pope's situation, but complained that
excommunication was not effective for Republicans, who
were indifferent to any religious imposition by the Pope
and Cardinals. As excommunication, which the Pope
considered the last attempt to restore his authority,
failed, the only remaining measure was to defend his
authority by relying on the Catholic Powers.
The Pope's attempt to overawe the new leaders in Rome was
not effective and the drive towards a new system of
government proceeded. The Roman Giunta proclaimed an
edict regulating the criteria for the forthcoming
elections to the Roman Constituent Assembly. This decree
stated that the Constituent Assembly should exercise full
power to settle and establish public affairs, and that
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the elections were to take place on 21 January by manhood
suffrage and secret ballot.3
At the same time increasing numbers of Republican
nationalists, not only from all over Italy but also from
other parts of Europe, such as Guiseppe Garibaldi, Enrico
Cernuschi, Del Bene, Caldesi, Giovanni La Cecilia and
many others, arrived in Rome, and effectively increased
the strength of the Republican movement. Republican
demonstrations became a daily occurrence, and it was
decided by the leaders to get rid of the existing
government, and to realize the aspirations of the Giovine
Italia.4
After being shocked by the flight of the Pope, the
British government was very curious to see what would
happen next and who would seize power. When they realized
that the republican party was prevailing and the
moderates were powerless, their anxiety about the
political consequences created by the absence of the
Papal authority, and their fear of republicanism, could
not be hidden.
Sir George Hamilton expressed his fear of the Mazzinian
party to Palmerston on 25 January 1849 when he noted
that:
Nazzini had been at Florence last week and is
now gone to Rome - In this latter city he will
no doubt continue his intrigue in form of
Republican principles, and it is possible that
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he may endeavour to excite Romans and Tuscans
to give each other a hand, and out of the two
states to form a large Republic in Central
Italy.
The British government's support for the Sardinian
government contributed to its hostility towards the
Republican and Mazzinian parties. Palmerston wrote to
Abercromby in Turin on 31 January:
We must encourage the government and the
moderate party together, to resist these
intrigues of the ultra liberal faction who in
fact are but the agents of the Republican and
disorderly policy of Mazzini, to enable the
government to oppose in the Chambers.6
In contrast to the British government, British radical
opinion was notably sympathetic towards the republican
movement in Rome, and carried enthusiastic reports on the
course of events. The Northern Star reported on 20
January under the headline 'Italy Roman State,
Magnificent Popular Demonstration' that:
A most imposing demonstration came off at Rome.
Towards evening the guards began to gather on
the Piazza Venezia with banners and music.
All the banners were ranged round the
equestrian statue of Marcus Aurelius, and amid
solemn silence and intense cold, all heads
being uncovered, the decree convoking the
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Constituent Assembly was read. Then up rose the
Abbate Rumbalidi, and said - Roman people! Your
father from this hill originated civilisation
amid barbarous Europe, and you have to begin
the work again this year of our Lord, to rescue
Italy from dark intrigues and brutal despots;
and I as a clergymen, call on you from the
Capital to vindicate your independence and your
right to self-government - principles whose
root is in the gospel.
The newspaper noted that these words were received with
enthusiastic applause and that the speech calmed and
satisfied the people.
On 21 January 1849 the elections were held and on 5
February the Roman Constituent Assembly met. The duty of
opening the Assembly fell on the elderly Minister of the
Interior, Carlo Armellini, but his speech failed to
provide any kind of lead. 8 Despite the fact that the
republicans had seized power, the Roman Republic was not
proclaimed immediately because there was a conflict
within the various radical parties. Sterbini was
concerned firstly to settle other matters that required
attention, such as the choice of a president, which
eventually fell on Galletti. After two days on 7 February
the debate on the constitution of the Roman State finally
opened.
266
In the debate Mainiani declared himself to be strongly in
favour of the suppression of the temporal power of the
Pope. He maintained that this should be the aim of the
people but that this did not mean that he wished for the
establishment of a republic. He concluded by arguing that
the best course was to await the convocation of an
Italian federal Assembly. His ideas did not, however, win
much sympathy and amid scenes of great excitement, the
Roman Constituent Assembly declared the establishment of
a Republic on 8 February 1849.
Once moderates, like Maniiani, had withdrawn, and the
ultra-conservative ecclesiastical ministers had been
excluded from the Assembly, the Republicans decided to
adopt the Mazzinian slogan 'God and the people', and to
give Mazzini citizenship. Mazzini, however, did not
appear in the Assembly immediately, but arrived in Rome
in March. 10
Freeborn informed Palinerston on 9 February that:
I have the honour to report to your Lordship
that after prolonged debate and not with
standing the opposition of about twenty of the
most talented Deputies of the National
assembly, the temporal power of the Pope has
been suppressed as per inclosed decree and
translation, by a majority of 138 out of 143
members and the Repubblica Romana declared by a
majority of 120 members out of 143 present.
267
The first act by the Roman Constituent Assembly after the
proclamation of the Republic was to reform the executive
power of the State; Armellini, Montecchi, and Antoine-
Christophe Saliceti were appointed members of an
Executive Committee. Its first task was to discuss
proposals for a new constitution, the matter then being
referred to a special committee. The general consensus
was that the question of the constitution of the state
demanded the urgent attention of the Ministry and the
Assembly. The financial position was also desperate. 12
There were, however, other more serious problems for the
new regime. The proclamation of the Republic in Rome
coincided with the flight from Florence of the Grand Duke
of Tuscany in late January 1849, which led to pressure
from Mazzini and the Giovine Italia to unify Tuscany and
the Roman State into the central nucleus of Italian
democracy. 13 In addition, the Roman Republic was pushed
to take an overt stance against Austria, as Piedmont
began to plan for a new war which began on 12 March when
Carlo Alberto denounced the armistice with Austria. 14
As the course of events in the Italian peninsula became
more heated on 5 March Mazzini entered the city of Rome.
The following day he was introduced to the Assembly by
Galletti and made a short speech, then on 29 March
Mazzini, along with Armellini and Aurelio Saffi, was made
one of the Triumvirate of the Roman Republic. 15
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These dramatic changes had serious implications for
Britain. Just after the proclamation of the Roman
Republic, the state of Anglo-Roman relations was still
undecided. As far as Armellini, a member of the Executive
Government at the National Assembly, was concerned, the
Roman Republic sought to maintain favourable relations
with Britain as well as with France and Piedmontese. As
Freeborn informed Hamilton, Armellini had told the
Assembly:
The relations with Great Britain are
satisfactory. We are in continual communication
with the only Representative in Rome, Consul
Freeborn. I repeat that the communications
which we have from the said Consular Agent in
Rome relating to the English Ministry are
always satisfactory, and we cannot but be
gratified with the light in which England
regards our Government and the movement of the
Roman States which preceded and prepared the
proclamation of the Republic. 16
This was an optimistic view of the British government's
attitude and indeed that of Britain as a whole. It was
rather the case that British opinion was confused and
divided about how to react to events in Rome. The trend
among conservative opinion was to support the
constitutional revolution, but to disapprove of the
overthrow of Papal authority, and this was the view that
dominated government thinking. On the other hand radical
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opinion regarded the expulsion of clerical power from
Rome as a necessary continuation of the constitutional
revolution.
The English Radicals and Mazzini and the Roman Republic
The attitude of British radicals towards the government
of the Roman Republic was expressed in a form which
praised Mazzini, and provided a clear contrast with the
British government's strong reservations over both the
creation of the Republic and Mazzini himself.
Mazzini was one of the most well known Italian
Risorgimento leaders in Britain. 17 His reputation as a
revolutionary had been sealed when in 1843 the British
government had, as noted above, spied on his political
activities and the Post Office on the orders of the Home
Secretary had intercepted his mail8
Mazzini, when an Italian republican exile in Britain, had
contacts with English intellectuals who supported the
Italian National movement through their journals and
periodicals. 19 In order to influence the foreign policy
of the country in Italy's favour, he pursued two major
aims- to appeal to public opinion in Britain, and to
enlist the support of the press.
Mazzini had forged links with the labour movement through
his English friend, Thomas Carlyle who was sympathetic
with the Chartist movement, and developed his political
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ideas on liberalism and democracy through his
observations of the political movement for the liberation
of the English people. 20 In 1847 Mazzini had founded The
People's International League, with the object of
enlisting sympathy for Italy. As Rudman notes 'It sought
to enlighten British public opinion on the political
condition and relations of foreign countries; to
disseminate the principles of national freedom and
progress; to excite public opinion in favour of the right
of all peoples to self-government and nationalism; and
finally to promote good relations between the people of
all countries.' The other organization formed in England
which supported Mazzini's political programme was The
Society of the Friends of Italy, whose activities
included public meetings, lectures, publications, and
particularly the promotion of published works on the
history of the Italian national movement. It promised to
use every available constitutional method of furthering
the cause of Italian independence in Parliament and
elsewhere. 21
Some scholars of Chartism, such as Henry Weisser, have
treated English radicalism and republicanism as a
reflection of continental republicanism, which had been
put into practice in the revolutions in France and Italy
in 1848. Gregory Claeys emphasizes that Mazzini was
important as 'a theoretician and founder of a new form of
anti-socialist republicanism in Britain'. 22 Margot Finn
has developed this point, stressing the links between
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English radical intellectuals and continental
revolutionary exiles in Britain. She argues 'that
international sympathies, born in the era of the first
French revolution, were consolidated by social and
political alliance with Polish and Italian exiles who had
sought refuge in England in the thirties and forties'.
The People's International League's membership, led by
Mazzini, the Polish nationalist Charles Stolzntan, and the
moderate Chartists Thomas Cooper and William. J. Linton,
emphasized 'the characteristic social and cultural
formations from which middle-class radical
internationalism drew its strength for decades'.23
Mazzini's relationships with John Stuart Mill, Thomas
Carlyle, and others provided him with introductions to a
variety of middle-class reformers. In addition, working-
class radicals also identified with his aims,
particularly after the cause of domestic reform began to
decline in the mid-1840's. A number of Chartists became
associated with Mazzini through their international
concerns. 24 Finn emphasizes the popularity of Mazzini
among the English middle class and affluent working
class, asserting 'that Mazzini's nationalist ideology
appealed powerfully to middle-class concerns by advancing
the nation's collective claims alongside those of the
individual, who figured in Mazzini's thinking less as an
autonomous agent than as a component of the
Commonwealth'. 25
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This support for Mazzini was reflected in the Chartist
newspapers, including the Northern Star, The Spirit of
the Age and Reynolds Newspaper 26 which tried to mobilize
support for Mazzini's Republic in 1849. The Spirit of the
on 3 March 1849, suggested that:
The proclamation of Roman Republic has startled
those who were consoling themselves with the
comfortable theory that revolution had run its
race, and that the star of kings and priests
was again in the ascendant' 27
Opposed to the conservative opinions of The Times and the
Morning Chronicle, The Spirit of the Ag asserted that
the constitution, political equality and the emancipation
of labour were important consequences of the revolution
in Rome and the establishment of a Republic:
trumpeters of reaction dread the march of
political Revolution, especially where it
develops itself in the Republic form, because
they know that a Commonwealth must prove fatal
to the barbarous and expensive class
distinction which constitutes the main element
of even the most advanced of what are called
constitutional systems, and because political
equality is but the first act of the drama,
whose denouement is social justice and the
emancipation of labour. The Republic is the
spontaneous act of the whole Roman people and
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as such ought to command the sympathy and
support of all liberal minded people. 28
English liberal opinion was reflected in the periodical
Punch, which was also supportive of Mazzini. It reacted
to the eventual demise of the Roman Republic by writing:
Though brutish force the game has won,
Triuinvir, thou haste nobly done;
Calm courage in a rightful cause
Gains thee a loftier world's applause;
And Rome's old heroes from their spheres
Shout, chiming in with British cheers,
Bravo. Mazzini 1 29
The Papacy, the Republic and the dilemma of the
British government
In contrast with radical public opinion, which
wholeheartedly supported Mazzini and his Roman Republic,
the British government had reservations about Mazzini's
political activities and his government. The British
government's perception of the Roman Republic was shaped
by the latter's two principal achievements - the
cessation of Papal temporal power, and Mazzini's
republicanism.
The British government's perception of these issues
raised a dilemma about how Britain should act, because
the government desired to see neither a return to the
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corruption of Papal temporal politics nor the continued
existence of Mazzini's republican state. The result was
that British foreign policy vacillated over the best
solution, although it was clear that a course of action
would eventually have to be chosen.
Palmerston's position was especially difficult because,
although he continued privately to sympathize with the
Italian liberals, he was forced to follow a policy of
restoring political order in Rome as his official foreign
policy. The problem, in particular, was that Mazzini
acted as an obstacle to Britain's possible support of the
Italian nationalist movement, because he was perceived as
a 'dangerous revolutionary' by the majority of the
British government. There was a risk for Palmerston, who
was the main pro-Italian minister in a Cabinet where a
majority of anti-Italian and pro-Austrian figures
dominated, that Mazzini could provide the Queen, who
sympathized with the majority, a pretext to suspend his
pro-Italian foreign policy. 30 Palinerston was, therefore,
obliged to justify his pro-Italian foreign policy in
terms of Britain's own direct interests in the
international political balance.
The editor of Punch sarcastically explained the
government's problem in a poem entitled 'The "True Blues"
Dilemma or the Pope or the Republic?':
275
How completely at sea, how confounded are we
By the Romans' affairs and invasion.
Quite put out of our way, We can't think what
to say,
With our Politics against our Persuasion.
Here's the Papacy down, and the Pope's triple
crown
Is the football of Roman's Population
Which you'd' think, in True Blue theological
view,
Would be a matter of high exultation.
Then, with bayonet and bombs, General Oudinot
comes,
To restore the dominion of Scarlet;
And of course you'd suppose, we should rail
through the nose,
At the wicked Papistical varlet.
But alas! We can't crow o'er the Pope's
overthrow,
And be joyful for Roman's Revolution:
For, in place of his throne, we should then
have to own
A Republic-abhorr'd institution!
Neither can we advance, 'gainst the movement
of France,
Half a word that on censure would border:
For though Babylon's reign she goes forth to
maintain,
We imagine her object is Order.
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So we're forced to be mum, like to dogs that
are dumb,
And to give wicked wits an occasion
Us to jeer and deride, thus remaining tongue-
tied
With our Politics 'gainst our Persuasion.31
This satirical attack may well have been prompted by
Punch's own anti-papal leanings.
The initial position taken by Palmerston was that the
differences between the Pope and the people of Rome were
a matter for those two parties to solve and that foreign
powers should not get involved. The best solution, he
foresaw, was for the Pope to agree to accept
constitutional reform. He noted to the British Ambassador
to Paris, Lord Normanby, on 5 January that it was
important to maintain the Pope as an independent
Sovereign, and that:
These circumstances would seem to render it the
more incumbent on the Pope to give to his
subjects the requisite securities for good
government, and these circumstances would also
appear to render it the less justifiable for
any foreign Powers to use armed interference in
order to assist the Pope in maintaining, if he
were so disposed, a bad system of Government. 32
These sentiments also influenced a letter which
Paimnerston drafted for the Queen to send to the Pope in
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response to a letter which Pius had sent in December 1848
asking for British assistance. The letter noted the
Queen's regret at the circumstances which had forced Pius
to flee from Rome and praised his efforts at reform, but
instead of promising British aid stressed the hope that
the Pope and the people in Rome could be reconciled.
In the face of the increasing likelihood that the Pope
and the people would not be able to achieve a
reconciliation by themselves, Palmerston came to the
conclusion that if the Powers had to intervene it should
be as mediators rather than as an armed force.
His fear of military intervention was not solely because
of his concern that the Pope would be restored as an
autocratic ruler. A more important consideration was the
risk that such intervention could lead to a confrontation
between France and Austria. In a letter to Viscount
Ponsonby, the British Ambassador in Vienna, on 1
February, Palmerston instructed the former to tell the
Austrian government that any move by the Austrian army
south of the River P0 would inevitably lead to either a
French force crossing the Alps or one landing at Cività
Vecchia, and that this would not only delay a solution to
the Roman problem but also that
It cannot moreover escape the discernment of
the Austrian Government that the entrance of a
French force into Italy as a counterbalance to
the advance of an Austrian force beyond the P0
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would necessarily tend to shake that confidence
in the maintenance of the peace of Europe which
it is so much the interest of all the Powers of
Europe at the present moment to strengthen and
confirm.
This policy, although well founded in its analysis, faced
one major problem, which was that Britain's influence
over the Roman issue was very limited. The chief
restriction on Britain was that it was not a Catholic
power and that therefore it could not persuade the Pope
to compromise and was excluded from the negotiations
between the Catholic states and the Papacy.
Britain was the country that was most eager to maintain
the status quo, social tranquillity, and a political
balance of power in Europe.
Section II: The Collapse of the Roman Republic and
foreign military intervention.
The French military expedition to Rome.
Unfortunately for Palmerston the proclamation and
establishment of the Roman Republic, after the Pope's
flight inevitably brought about foreign intervention, as
its foundation disturbed the existing order of the
international stage in Europe. Clearly the Catholic
Powers could not disregard the events in Rome, and sought
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to restore order. However, there were rivalries between
the Catholic Powers and differences over how to proceed.
The position of France was similar to that of Britain,
both agreed that the major cause of social disorder in
the Papal States was the misgovernment and
maladministration by the ecciesiastics. They therefore
strove to restore Papal temporal power on a
constitutional basis in order to achieve stability and
maintain a balance between the European Catholic states,
and thus avoid giving Austria any pretext for military
intervention. Although there was a consensus between
Britain and France on the best form of government in
Rome, there were differences over how this could be
achieved. One problem was that in December 1848 Louis-
Napoleon had been voted President of the French Republic.
Once in power he was determined to use the Roman issue to
enhance his position within France, and in particular to
appeal to French Catholics by strongly supporting the
Pope; he was also disposed to use force to raise French
military prestige. The use of French troops had been
contemplated in Paris even before Louis-Napoleon's
appointment, but once the latter was in power his
domestic political concerns made intervention even more
likely.
The conservative Cardinals, of whom since 1848 Cardinal
Antonelli was the most influential, were not enthusiastic
about co-operation with France, as they were opposed to
the French conditions for intervention. The French
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position was that they would only aid the Pope if he
agreed to accept constitutional government after his
restoration. The Cardinals had no intention of agreeing
to this, and instead favoured Austrian intervention to
restore the Pope as this caine without preconditions. 36
British Foreign Office documents relating to the Roman
affairs in 1849, show that events in Rome were closely
monitored. They contain details on the political
settlement and negotiations between France, Austria,
Britain, Spain, the Republican government in Rome and the
Papal government in Gaeta. Since the government of the
Roman state was split into two parts - the Republican
government in Rome, and the Papal Pontiff in Gaeta-
English correspondence with Rome was conducted through
the Consul in Rome, Mr Freeborn, while that with Gaeta
passed through the British ambassador in Naples, Hon. W.
Teinple
The first of the Catholic Powers to press for a united
response to aid the Pope was Spain, which in January 1849
called for a conference of the Catholic Powers in Madrid.
This plan was rejected by the Powers and the Pope, and an
alternative scheme for a conference in Naples was put
forward by Ferdinand to which all the Great Powers would
be invited. 38 Prince Castelcicala, the Neapolitan
Minister in London, informed Palmerston on 2 February
that King Ferdinand of the Two Sicilies was keen to see
Britain involved in any subsequent meeting of the Powers.
The Sicilian government's official note stated:
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His Sicilian Majesty has ... thought necessary,
and he formally demands, the participation of
England, in the congress; the presence of those
great powers being strongly demanded in a
discussion which beside the very important
object of religion may have powerful influence
on the political circumstances and on the
harmony of the Sicilies and of all Italy.
Palnierston was pleased to receive this invitation, but
noted in reply to the Prince that Britain did not feel
free to attend without a request from the Pope.
The British policy was not to take a direct role but to
use its influence to press the interested Powers to come
to a peaceful solution. After the Pope's call on 18
February for the Catholic Powers to come to his
assistance, Palmerston informed Normanby on 9 March that
he should inform the French government that:
Although Great Britain has not so direct an
interest as France has in the ecclesiastical
and political questions which arise out of the
present relations between the Pope and the
people of the Roman States, the British
government nevertheless cannot view those
matters with indifference, Great Britain is
indeed a Protestant State but we have many
millions of Catholic subjects; and the British
Government must therefore be desirous, with a
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view to British interests, that the Pope should
be placed in such a temporal position as to be
able to act with entire independence in the
exercise of his spiritual functions. 40
In the British government's view, Palmerston noted, the
road was not closed to mediation, and he noted to
Norinanby that:
Her Majesty's Government does not see even in
the recent occurrences at Rome any reason for
giving up the hope that the diplomatic
interposition of friendly Powers might still,
without any actual employment of military
force, bring about such a settlement of
differences as would enable the Pope to return
to Rome and to resume his temporal authority.4'
The Austrian government did not favour a policy of
mediation, as it wished to see the Pope restored to power
as an autocratic ruler and this could only be achieved
through military intervention. It was not prepared to
intervene unilaterally as it was already overstretched
due to its confrontation with Piedmont, but it was
prepared to intervene in conjunction with France, which
would diminish the chance of a general war, separate
France from Piedmont, and wreck Palmerston's hopes for
Anglo-French mediation in the affairs of Italy. In
addition, opposition to mediation by the foreign Powers
was expressed by Piedmont, which was keen to reopen the
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war with Austria, and hoped for support from the Roman
Republic. 42
The conflicting ambitions of Austria and Piedmont
complicated the situation and were a matter of concern to
the British government, as it might lead either to a
Franco-Austrian confrontation or possibly a combination
which would freeze Britain out of Italian affairs.
Events, however, were increasingly beyond Britain's
control. On 30 March a conference of the Catholic Powers
of Naples, Spain, Austria and France was held at Gaeta.
The first three of these Powers were sympathetic to the
call by Antonelli for immediate military intervention
against the Roman Republic. £ Pressure on France to
accept military intervention was heightened when the
Austrian Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, Prince
Felix Schwarzenburg, proposed to Louis-Napoleon that
France should intervene at Rome while the Austrians took
Bologna.
Britain was aware of the two sets of negotiations, those
between France and the Roman Republic, and those between
Austria and the Papal Council in Gaeta (including the
Pope and Cardinals), and remained interested in every
political movement which unfolded in Rome. Palinerston
still believed at this stage that the Roman people would
be happy if the Pope was restored in Rome because of his
liberal politics, but despite this he was still reluctant
to support any kind of military intervention.
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The British government's caution can to a degree be
explained by its concern over French attitudes towards
the Roman Republic and the fear that France meant to
enhance its own position in Rome and its status
throughout Italy. These suspicions were revealed in the
extensive correspondence between the Marquis of Normanby,
the British Ambassador in Paris and Palmerston, regarding
the negotiations between the Roman Republic and the
French government, and about the military activities of
French forces in the Roman States.
The French view of the Papal restoration
Louis-Napoleon was not averse to the idea of military
intervention, but he realized that if he did act to
restore Pius to Rome he had to ensure that the Pope would
still pursue constitutional reform, otherwise he would
lose the support of the French Assembly. It was for this
reason that Edouard Drouyn de Lhuys, the French Foreign
Minister, announced on 19 April that the French force
that would shortly land at Cività Vecchia was intended:
to maintain ... the balance of power, to
guarantee the independence of the Italian
States; to secure to the Roman people a liberal
and regular system of administration; and to
preserve them from the dangers of a blind
reaction, as well as from the frenzy of
anarchy.
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French intentions were, however, not those of the Pope,
who was opposed to any restrictions on his temporal
power. He wished to have full liberty in his relations
with foreign Powers, but his freedom of manoeuvre would
be worthless if the Powers were allowed to regulate his
relations with his subjects. It was this internal liberty
which he believed would be compromised by French
insistence on constitutional government. As early as 12
March this had been clear to the British government, as
Petre had reported from Gaeta that 'there was to be no
concession, no mitigations of ecclesiastical monopoly and
privilege', and that the Pope had declared that 'he will
return as absolute master or not at all'.
In his Allocution of 20 April 1849 the Pope went even
further, stating that the constitutional settlement which
he had proposed in December 1848, and even as late as
January 1849, was incompatible with his personal liberty
as head of the church. 46 The Allocution of April 1849
proved to be the turning point for the Pope, as far as
the constitutional issue was concerned.
Opposition to the French plans was not restricted to the
Pope. When an army led by General Nicolas Oudinot landed
in Cività Vecchia in May, Mazzini confronted the French
military commanders in Rome and asked them to explain
their motive and objectives in sending an armed force to
occupy the territory of the Republic. The French invasion
baffled the members of the Roman Republic, because they
had counted on French support. Mazzini, the most
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important Republican leader, had believed that France was
the model of the republican system. The reply received
from Oudinot, as reported by a British naval officer,
Lieutenant George Willes, was that:
the first motive was to preserve the Roman
State from an Austrian invasion which was then
being meditated and prepared; that the second
was to know precisely what the sentiment of the
people was as to the form of Government they
thought most suitable to them, and to seek to
promote a perfect reconciliation between Pius
IX and the Roman population.
This explanation failed to satisfy the Roman Assembly who
decided to resist the French, and on 30 April fighting
broke out. The French, however, were repulsed and
subsequently a new attempt at mediation with the Roman
Republic was begun led on the French side by the Viscount
Ferdinand de Lesseps.
Faced with the French fait accompli, Palmerston did not
protest against the intervention but stressed that it was
important that constitutional reforms should be
introduced. The Foreign Secretary worked to achieve this
aim by encouraging negotiations between the Roman
Republic and the French plenipotentiary, Ferdinand de
Lesseps. At the same time he put pressure on the Austrian
government to limit its occupation of the Legations in
order to avoid any Austro-French confrontation. 48
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Although Britain had already decided to connive at the
French military intervention in Rome, the government was,
however, still worried and suspicious about the
restoration of any Papal government, which might renew
the political and economic corruption in the Papal
States. From a number of sources there came reports of
the opposition within Rome to the return of the
Cardinals, although not to the restoration of the Pope
himself. Freeborn noted to Palmerston on 1 May that 'the
mass of the people are ill-disposed to the restoration of
the Ecclesiastical Government'.
Faced with these reports and uncertain of French
intentions the Foreign Secretary was put into a difficult
situation which became all the more challenging when the
de Lesseps mission collapsed in failure at the end of May
and Oudinot resumed his military campaign. On 12 June
Palmerston told Normanby that he should inform the French
that it was still Britain's hope that the French intended
to:
maintain substantially the Representative
Constitution which he [the Pope] granted last
year to his States, and that there should be a
real and effectual separation between the
temporal and spiritual power of the Pope as
Sovereign of the Roman States. 50
The French sought to reassure the British government, and
on 3 July Normanby informed Palmerston that:
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Whatever difference of opinion there may have
existed between Her Majesty's Government and
that of the Republic as to the best means of
effecting a conunon object, they only desire
such a solution of the Roman Question as has
been counselled at various periods and to
different parties by Her Majesty's Government,
namely, the restoration of the Government of
the Pope with Constitutional guarantees. 51
On the same day the issue of the future of Rome became
much more urgent, as it was on this day that forces of
General Oudinot entered the city. The question was now
raised of when the Pope would return to the Vatican and
what sort of government he would erect.
Palinerston was under pressure from public opinion to make
the British voice heard. The Times suggested that it was
necessary for British influence to be felt. Its
correspondent in Cività Vecchia noted on 11 July:
The case is full of difficulties, and it is to
be hoped that England will, by an immediate
recognition of the temporal sovereignty of the
Pope, be entitled to bring her sage counsels to
the common board of European nations. The
weight of Great Britain is great; her
statesmen, acting on sound principles, are
almost omnipotent; and however opposed I have
been to Lord Palmerston's vagaries elsewhere, I
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shall be too happy to support a wise and
enlightened policy here. 52
Palmerston realized that the prestige of Britain could be
used to try to effect a reasonable compromise between the
Pope and his people. It was clear by the summer of 1849
that France held little sway over Pius, and that a more
effective channel would be to use influence of the
Austrian government. On 13 July Palmerston informed
Ponsonby in Vienna that he should insist to Schwarzenberg
that:
now that the Romans have been free from the
evils of their former Government, a return to
those evils would produce infinitely greater
discontent than that which has up to this time
existed. It is evident, therefore, that in such
a case, tranquillity would last only as long as
the presence of a sufficient foreign force kept
down the discontents of the people, and that
whenever that foreign force was removed,
renewed disturbances would break out; and such
a state of things would not be productive of
that tranquillity which the Austrian Government
must naturally wish to see established in
Italy.
Palnierston then noted that:
For these reasons Her Majesty's Government are
desirous of engaging the Austrian Government to
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exert that influence which it is known to
possess over the Papal Councils in order to
persuade the Pope to maintain the
Constitutional concessions which he made to his
subjects last year, and thus to pave the way
for his resumption of the Papal throne.
Palinerston was, however, being too optimistic. On 16 July
Normanby observed to Palinerston that it was unlikely that
Austria would accept these conditions, and also noted
that as the French were moving away from insistence on a
constitution the French government was anxious to end the
occupation of Rome. He therefore proposed that Palnierston
should be satisfied with a return to the Consulta which
had been established in October 1847.	 The situation
was in fact even worse than Norinanby imagined. On 27 July
Schwarzenberg responded to Palinerston's proposal. He
noted sarcastically that two years before Palinerston had
asked Metternich to agree to the encouragement of reform
in Italy and observed that since then:
Those princes who were the first to grant to
their country Constitutional guarantees have
been the first victims of the vicissitudes of
popularity. 56
In the light of this Austria could not accept the need
for the constitution in Rome and they would only go as
far as to recommend to the Pope that he should introduce
the reforms recommended in the 1831 Memorandum of the
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five Great Powers; the maintenance of municipal councils,
the creation of provincial councils and the establishment
of a central junta in Rome. To the Foreign Secretary's
dismay it was not just Austria that proposed this course
of action. In early August Drouyn de Lhuys, who was now
the French Ambassador in London, stated that the French
policy was to recommend the 1831 Memorandum to the Pope.
In reply to this news Palmerston protested that:
as the British Government has not yet
established diplomatic relations with the
government of Rome, we have no means at present
of tendering advice on such matters to the
Pope, but that I much feared that such a
limited arrangement as that described in the
despatch which he had read to me, would fall
short of the necessities of the case, and would
not lay the foundation for contentment among
the Roman people, and for permanent harmony
between them and their Sovereign.
British efforts to halt this retreat were ignored. By
August it was clear that the policy that Palmerston had
pursued since January was in trouble. The news from Rome
also confirmed that a return to constitutional government
was unlikely. Commander Key, the commander of HNS
Bulldog, reported to Admiral Parker on 22 August that:
The Triumvirate of Cardinals who now execute
the temporal functions of the Pope, have shown
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so decided a tendency to return even to the
system of Government which existed before the
present Pope's election, that the Roman people
are beginning to look on the French as their
hope, and their intercourse with them is
gradually becoming more cordial. 58
On 6 September the Pope came to Naples and celebrated
mass at the cathedral, after which he gave his
benediction to the people assembled in front of the
church. The following day, the Pope received at Portici
the members of the Diplomatic Corps accredited to the
Court of Rome.
The Pope, however, showed no desire to return immediately
to Rome. This was largely due to continued disagreement
with the French. In French eyes, stable government could
only be obtained if the Papal government was to be based
upon the principles of the general amnesty,
secularization of the administration, the application of
the Code Napoleon, and liberal institutions. Despite this
pressure from Paris, Pius declared that a general amnesty
was impossible, refused to base his laws on the Code
Napoleon, and opposed the secularization of the
administration. 60 The Pope had already concluded in
April that constitutionalism was incompatible with his
personal liberty as head of the church; he now broadened
his opposition and condemned freedom of the press and
constitutional government as intrinsically evil. By
September he had further clarified his position, stating
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that liberalism tended to mislead the masses in those
countries in which it held sway. 61
The Motu Proprio of September 12 1849, written by
Antonelli, promised administrative and judicial reforms
in line with the 1831 Memorandum, but it said little
about specific political liberties and failed to mention
the constitution of 1848. 62 In addition, Pius granted a
limited amnesty to those who had taken a minor role in
the revolution. It was the reactionary policy of the
Cardinals which shaped this policy and in particular
Antonelli was the main influence. As Sir George Hamilton
wrote to Palmerston on 6 October:
This is a melancholy prospect of the future. No
immediate remedy seems at hand. The Pope is now
undoubtedly swayed by entirely opposite
principles to those formerly entertained by
him. From being too hasty and energetic a
reformer he is supposed to have become opposed
to any changes, and to countenance the ancient
hierarchical absolutism. 63
Hamilton's perspective on the Pope's political
inclinations was pessimistic. There seemed to be no
chance of constitutional government returning. 64
The British government's effort to shape the nature of
the Papal restoration in Rome thus came to an end in an
ignominious fashion which revealed the lack of British
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influence over Papal affairs. Palmerston's frustration at
the course of events was evident in a letter he wrote to
Normanby on 3 September in which he discussed the recent
attacks on French policy in the British press. He noted
to Normanby that the weight of public opinion was against
France and observed:
The Times. Chronicle and Daily News ... are in
no way under my control. If I could influence
them I should begin by stopping their attacks
on myself, and as I have no means of doing that
you cannot suppose I can gag them about the
French Govt. But the fact is that every body
here thought and thinks that the French
government have made and are still making a
series of mistakes about Rome. 65
The French government, however, still influenced by Louis
Napoleon's desire to appeal to French Catholics continued
to try to reach agreement with the Papacy on the system
of government in Rome and turned its back on the need for
a liberal administrative system. The discussions over
this question took a long time and the Pope would not, in
fact, return to Rome until April 1850.
Section III: Anti-clericalism and the Roman Republic
One of the most important issues raised by the
establishment of the Roman Republic was the anti-clerical
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and to some degree anti-Catholic, policies followed by
the government in Rome. Despite the fact that Britain was
not a Catholic country it could not remain indifferent to
this policy as British Catholic subjects owned property
in Rome and it was therefore on occasion forced to take
action to defend its interests.
There had been a strong desire among the Roman people for
lay participation and control of the temporal government
of the Papal States even before the declaration of the
Roman Republic. Once in power Mazzini insisted that his
government was based upon this desire, and that his
authority rested upon the will of the people who had
elected the Constituent Assembly and not of the Pope and
the Cardinals. The Roman Republic, therefore, deposed the
Papal government, and announced that the new Constituent
Assembly would create a new regime.
The clash between the government and the Catholic Church
was reflected in the decree of 8 February proclaiming the
Roman Republic which declared:
1. The temporal power of the Popedom is
suppressed de facto and de jure in the Roman
States.
2. The Roman Pontiff will have all the
necessary guarantees in the independent
exercise of the spiritual power. 66
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This very important decree went on in articles three and
four to proclaim the virtues of democratic, secular
government and its support for a united Italy.
The Constituent Assembly built on this basis when on 21
February it declared 'That our glorious Repubblica Romana
declared that all ecclesiastical riches are nationalized,
and now become state property'. 67
 The intention behind
these reforms was to redistribute wealth and liberate
economic activity. In order to achieve this a major part
of the public debt was guaranteed by the mortgaging of
ecclesiastic property, but the enormous amounts of
property involved proved difficult to administer. The
state assumed the administration of clerical property,
and allowed clergy in the employ of the state to be the
temporal administrators of this property. As a
consequence of this policy, the government introduced its
system of salaried clergy. 68
In the days of the Triumvirate, during the period of the
Roman Republic, further serious attacks were made upon
the Church by the revolutionary government in Rome.
Mazzini, Garibaldi and ardent Mazzinian republicans
really wanted to see the end of Papal Rome. The
expropriation of ecclesiastical property was complemented
in this period by agrarian reform. Although the Roman
Republic emerged as a liberal-bourgeois regime, its
agrarian policy was more radical so far as the peasantry
was concerned than in any of the other Italian states in
1848-9, and the major plank in the agrarian reforms was
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the transfer of ecclesiastical land from the Church to
the peasantry. Given the short life of the Republic the
reforms could not be completed, and therefore it was
impossible to say whether the distribution of national
property in the Roman States would have been different
from that in the Mezzogiorno under the Napoleonic period,
but it is evident that this measure was popular as there
was no mass peasant rebellion in 1849. 69
In addition, anti-clerical hostility was displayed by
agitators outside the Roman government. On the whole
rioting and in particular attacks upon the clergy, were
more widespread in the provinces than in the city of
Rome. Among the most notorious were the murders carried
out by the Congregate d'Inferno at Sinigaglia, and the
feud between the Republicans and the Centurions at
Ancona. The latter reached such proportions that Mazzini
was obliged to send his follower Felice Orsini to restore
order. 70
Obviously such policies and incidents provoked
difficulties in and outside Italy. The policy towards
ecclesiastical property was in particular one of the most
controversial political reforms executed by the
Republican government, and caused a hostile reaction from
the European powers as well as the other Italian states.
This was not just true for the Catholic powers, but was
also the case in Britain, particularly among English
Catholics.
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The Catholic periodical The Rambler on 14 March informed
its readers that:
The government have, of course, been very busy
with the Church; declared all its property to
be the property of the State, and undertaken to
provide a fitting maintenance for the ministers
of religion, from the Pope down to the parish
priest. They called upon all religious
establishments to send in an inventory of their
property, their goods and chattels of every
description, and upon the Presidents of the
different Priori to verify these inventories,
where made, and to make them themselves,
wherever the clergy refuse. 71
The Rambler criticized the Roman Republic's policy
towards ecclesiastical matters, and expressing its
sympathy with a number of priests who had been
unreasonably treated by the Republicans:
The two fathers (Cesarini and Concha) were
locked up in the Inquisition, which these
gentlemen, having abolished as a prison for
ecciesiastics condemned by the Pope and
Cardinals, seem now disposed to turn into a
prison for ecciesiasticals condemned by
themselves. There were two prisoners; one, the
Bishop of Memphis, whose history appeared in
the Rambler, copied from Mr. Whiteside's book,
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some time ago, and another, a man who had
forged letters of ordination and passed himself
off for a priest somewhere in the Kingdom of
Naples. 72
The correspondence on the Roman Republic in TheRambler
also reveals how the Roman Republic seized ecclesiastical
property, for example the bells of basi].icas and of
religious houses. The whole experience, TheRambler
noted, had the effect of alienating Catholics, although
this did not necessarily lead to sympathy with the Pope:
not all who are disgusted with their
experience of a Republic have returned to the
Pope; a very large proportion of what might be
otherwise called the Papal party are yet
opposed to Plo Nono personally; they attributed
all the comiuencement of troubles to the
amnesty, and the continuation of them to the
Pope's weakness and indecision.
Already by this date the British government has had cause
to be concerned about the Roman government's designs on
British ecclesiastical property. As a result of the
Pope's flight from Rome, Dr Wiseman had as early as
December 1848 written to Palmerston asking for the
protection of the property of British Catholic
establishments in Rome, and particularly those devoted to
education under exclusively British administration.
Wiseman stressed that the government should issue
300
instructions to its agents in Rome, stating that the
property of the English College was the property of
British subjects and that it was guaranteed by the
protection of the British Crown. He noted that Catholic
subjects in England had fears that the revolutionary
government would 'lose little time in laying heavy
imposts, perhaps confiscating, ecclesiastical property.74
Wiseman received assurances from the Foreign Office that
British establishments in Rome, belonging to the English
Catholic church, would be given 'the same privileges in
regard to property held by them as are allowed to similar
establishments at Rome belonging to the subjects of other
countries'.
Wiseman realized that if he brought this issue to the
government's attention the latter was bound to take
action, as the sanctity of property was a fundamental
principle of the British government. Britain did not act
to defend only English Catholic property but also to
protect British commercial holdings. This was
particularly the case when in mid-February the Roman
Republic called on all property-owners to contribute to a
forced loan. On 24 February Freeborn informed Palmerston
that he had discussed the application of this order to
British property-holders with government officials
including the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Signor Carlo
Busconi, and that :
After waiting some time, Sig. Borgatti
accompanied by Sig. Carlo Busconi, Minister for
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Foreign Affairs of present government, appeared
and informed me that he only considered British
subjects holding landed property as liable,
which so far is satisfactory. 76
The threat to Church property was, however, complicated
by the existence in Rome of holdings belonging to the
Irish College. Freeborn noted to Palmerston on 10
February that John Ennis, the head of a group of Irish
Augustinian monks, had asked for the British government
to protect all Church land whether it belonged to the
English or Irish Catholic Church. Ennis's letter noted:
In bringing the cause of the Establishment of
the Irish Augustinians to your notice, I have
to remark that, as this (Irish) Establishment
like other British Roman Catholic Religious
Establishments at Rome and in its States, is
the property of British subjects, and is
devoted to the education of such, under
exclusively British Administrators, it may be
considered in the light of national property,
at least to the same extent as commercial and
other private property, and that as such it may
claim the same protection from the British
Crown which similar Establishments of other
nations, and specifically the Establishments
belonging to France and Spain have claimed, and
it is alleged, have successfully claimed from
their respective Government.
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Due to the principle of the sanctity of property the
British government had no choice but to comply with this
request for protection, even though the Irish College in
Rome was seen as an enemy of Britain's Irish policy.78
The British protection of the Irish Church was not the
only irony caused by the Roman Republic's anti-
clericalisin, for the whole issue of Church property led
the British government to exhibit an inconsistent
attitude towards the ecclesiastical issue. The basic
position of the British government was that it supported
the secularization of ecclesiastical offices but at the
same time rejected the secularization of ecclesiastical
property in the Papal States. British problems over
property were exacerbated by the fact that the Roman
government found it difficult to control the anti-
clerical activities of the people. On 10 July, after the
fall of the Republic, Petre noted to Palmerston that the
number of seizures of British property had been high
because:
the government had no real authority and
was not able to protect the seals against the
people and their leaders who did not understand
the difference between public and private
property in this case and to construe the
affixing of the English seals into an act to
protect the property of the Neapolitan
government as the English were then becoming
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very unpopular on account of its protection of
French subjects and of the supposed countenance
given by the English government to the French
intervention.
While it would be an exaggeration to say that concern for
property, both conunercial and ecclesiastical, dominated
British diplomacy towards the Roman Republic, clearly the
seizure of British holdings in Rome contributed to the
desire to see the Republic overthrown and law and order
restored.
Papal property and papal temporal power
The issue of ecclesiastical property, especially landed
property, was related to the issue of the Pope's temporal
power. When his temporal power was under attack from
Britain, he emphasized in his encyclicals, in his
allocution to the Sacred College of Cardinals, and in his
public audiences, that the property of the Church was a
patrimony held in trust from St Peter. Its function was
to render the Pope independent of other Powers in order
that he might exercise his spiritual power free of
interference. Pius IX therefore believed that the
property of the church was not his to relinquish; his
duty was to preserve the patrimony and convey it to the
next Vicar of Christ.
There was no doubt that the Pope and his cardinals could
not accept the principle of the nationalization of
ecclesiastical property, because the Vatican could not be
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indifferent to the abandoning of the property and estates
of the Church. The Pope was determined to be restored to
his throne in Rome, in part because of the threat to the
possessions of the Catholic Church, but also because of
the challenge to his unlimited authority. These two
motives were, in fact, inseparable, and touched upon the
issue of the spiritual and physical prerogatives of the
Church. Ecclesiastical property was one of the
fundamental bases of the Pope's temporal authority. If
the Republicans had not tried to take ecclesiastical
property from the Pope, the Pope would not have required
foreign military intervention as promptly as he did. 80
Catholic subjects in Britain agreed with the Pope's
argument. In April 1849 an article in the The Rambler
asserted that all Catholics conceded that the Pope's
temporal power as ruler of Rome was inseparable from his
spiritual power as Bishop of Rome, 81 and stated it was
impossible to modify this position. This meant that it
was impossible for the Pope to act as a constitutional
monarch:
For what is a constitutional sovereign, such as
the Queen of the British Empire? In very truth,
a constitutional monarch is no independent
monarch at all. The sovereign of a free people
is that branch of the legislature which has the
control of the revenues of the state, and thus
also of its army, and of its powers of making
peace and war. The Queen of England, ... is
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(sic) but the highest administrator of the will
of the assembly which represents the people.
Compare now the position and duties of the
Sovereign Pontiff. A mere glance at his
spiritual office convinces us that his
circumstances are totally unlike those of any
other temporal ruler upon earth. He has
relations with the rest of the nations of
mankind which are unknown to the merely secular
potentate. 82
This argument, by comparing the status of the Queen in
Britain with that of the Pope, made a mockery of the
contention that if Pius followed the advice of the
British government he would still be an independent
sovereign. It noted that in fact the status of the Pope
was that of an independent sovereign, superior to any
other temporal monarchy on earth and thus any compromise
of his power was impossible. In the eyes of The Rambler,
the exile of Pius IX to Gaeta was a result of the
circumstances in 1848 that had led him to become a
limited sovereign. He had given power to the popular
assembly which was then determined to go to war with
Austria and violate the treaties of Europe:
And what is there to prevent the recurrence of
the same conflict between the spiritual duties
of the Pope and the necessity under which he
will lie to obey the mandates of the Roman
Chambers, so long as those chambers possessed
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the real power of the sword, by possessing the
power of the purse, and the power of driving
any ministry from the helm of government? The
Roman revolutions are vile enough, in truth;
but it is not the singular and rare vileness of
the individuals who proclaimed the republic
which makes the existence of modern
constitutionalism incompatible with that of the
temporal power of the Papacy. 83
The article expressed antagonism towards the Roman
Republic, claiming that the existence of a modern
constitutional government was incompatible with the
temporal power of the Papacy. Although The Rambler
emphasized the independence and superiority of the Pope,
it realized that the Papacy was at a critical juncture
and that it had to adapt to the current political
situation.
On the other hand, The Times underlined its strong
antipathy towards clericalism, and argued for a policy
that was close to that of the British government. An
article on 16 June noted:
I fear the European Catholic powers have been
acting all this time on false data, and have
been confounding two things that are
essentially different. I mean the return of the
Pope himself, and the restitution of the
Government of Cardinals. The one is still
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possible, though the French expedition and the
loss of life at Rome could convert the love of
people for the person of the Pope into a
feeling of a very opposite character, but the
other is quite impossible, and the sooner the
great powers understand that fact the better it
will be for the welfare not only of the Roman
Catholic religion, but of Christianity in
general. At such a moment as the present we
must not be deaf and blind, and I am convinced
that church government, as it existed, cannot
be restored at Rome. 84
When The Times referred to the issue of the separation of
Papal temporal and spiritual power it entered into an
area of much controversy for English public opinion. The
moderate stand taken by The Times, and put into practice
by the British government, was not enough to satisfy the
increasing calls among the public for the Pope to be
deprived of all temporal power. The establishment of the
Roman Republic and the Pope's rejection of his former
liberal policies meant that British public opinion had
sympathy with the anti-clerical policies espoused by
Mazzini and that it became overtly hostile to Pius IX.
The call for the British government to push for the end
of the Pope's temporal power became louder after the
collapse of the Roman Republic and the arrival of many
Republican exiles in Britain.
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The Roman Question and political refugees in Britain.
One of the subjects arising from the Roman Republic which
has attracted little attention, despite available
documentation, is the arrival in Britain of Roman
political refugees after the collapse of the Roman
Republic in July 1849. At the time this became a major
topic of interest in British newspapers and periodicals,
and can also be seen in contemporary private
correspondence.
The British government was concerned about the political
influence which the refugees from the Roman Republic,
particularly revolutionaries and republicans, might have
over the British public, because, as we have seen above,
many Chartists already looked to Mazzini for support.
Despite this concern, Britain, as a liberal state, could
not reject refugees. In fact Britain already had accepted
Mazzini and the other Italian political exiles after the
1830 Revolution in Italy, although Mazzini was treated
with some suspicion. 85
The arrival, soon after the fall of the Republic, of
large numbers of Mazzinian refugees in England, among
them Orsini, Alessadro Gavazzi, Spola, Aurelio Saffi, and
before long Mazzini himself, had the effect of spreading
their opinions to Brighton and Bristol, to London and
Liverpool, and as far north as Edinburgh. 86
The escape of these individuals was made possible by the
British Consular Agent at Rome, John Freeborn, who issued
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on his own initiative, some five hundred passports to
revolutionaries who were trying to escape. Palmerston
reproved Freeborn for granting these passports, and
informed the latter on 23 July that 'You were not
authorized by your instructions to grant such
passports'. 87
 Palmerston continued his reprimand by
observing:
In the present case it does not appear what
imminent or great personal danger threatened
those 500 persons to whom you gave passports. I
cannot therefore approve of your having without
any necessity ... encouraged and aided 500
foreigners to come to England, where they will
probably on their arrival be destitute of any
means of subsistence. 88
Responding to Palmerston on 5 August, Freeborn regretted
that he had earned the Foreign Secretary's disapproval.
Freeborn asserted that, as Rome was in a state of
confusion following the occupation of the French army,
there were a number of Roman people who were in danger
and sought safety. He wrote to Palmerston that:
I must therefore beg of your Lordship to rely
on the veracity of my assertion that such were
their verbal declarations, and I at the time
considered them in imminent peril. I take the
liberty of stating that I have declined
receiving any fee of office on the passports
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above alluded to, and I afforded pecuniary aid
to several distressed refugees from a
charitable fund made up by me and by some of my
personal friends. 89
Freeborn also estimated that the actual number of
political refugees to land in England, would be fewer
than five hundred individuals, and emphasized that Roman
political refugees were not poor immigrants, but were
political exiles belonging to Italian noble families. 90
In reply, Palmerston emphasized that discretion was
required when issuing a passport, even for British
subjects. He alluded to Freeborn's imprudence in a letter
to Consul Moore in Ancona.
The consul will, as a matter of cause, not take
upon himself to grant Passports. If however the
Regulation of the place at which he may be
stationed should require that British Subjects
shall be provided with Passport from the
British Consul, he will consider himself
authorized, with proper caution, to grant such
Passport; or if the local Regulations require
that the Consul should countersign Passports
already granted to British subjects, or that he
should furnish certificates to British subjects
to enable them to obtain Passports from other
specified Authorities, he will, with due
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discretion, affair (affix) his counter-
signature or grant such Certificate. 91
Freeborn's actions were also criticized as an abuse of
privilege in The Times in an article on 6 August which
observed:
I know not whether the profuse liberality with
which British passports have been issued here
be considered in England as an abuse of
consular privileges, but I hear that it has led
to more than one unpleasant difficulty with
foreign Legations. All these passports were
given without signature, to persons evidently
not British subjects. I know a diplomatist who
has refused to visa them, and I am told that
beyond Rome they are often treated as so much
waste paper. it is much to be regretted that a
British passport should be exposed to doubt, or
to dishonour, for every man who has travelled
as much as I have done must have found it was
better to him than a coat of mail. 92
Freeborn wrote a private letter to Lord Minto, concerning
Palinerston's criticism and the press's accusation
regarding his action over the issue of passports to
Italian political refugees. Following completion of his
special mission to Rome in March 1848, Lord Minto
continued to be preoccupied with Italian affairs. In
public his involvement had led to his resignation from
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the Cabinet because his political enemies were anti-
Italian and pro-Austrian, but in private he continued to
write letters and keep diaries relating to Roman affairs.
It might therefore be presumed that Freeborn intended to
obtain Minto's favour concerning the Italian refugees
affair, hoping that Minto would have some influence with
Russell and palinerston.
If Freeborn hoped that Minto could assist him he was
mistaken, for the latter was widely seen as having failed
in his mission of 1847-48. The Times on 6 August
criticized Minto for failing in his endeavours to move
the Italian people towards constitutional liberalism.
The Right Hon. Mr Gladstone passed through Rome
a few days since on his way to Naples, and you
have no idea how rejoiced those who knew of his
arrival were, in the hope of his giving aid in
the settlement of Roman affairs, and how
disappointed they now are on learning that he
had no mission at all. I do not say that the
people any longer entertain the extravagant
ideas inspired by Lord Minto's pilgrimage and
public declaration; what they want to hear is
that constitutional England has assisted in the
settlement of their affairs.
The problem of Roman political refugees even surfaced in
Malta, where the Governor was an Irishman, Richard More
O'Ferrall. O'Ferrall caused controversy when he refused
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to accept the validity of the British passports of some
Roman exiles. This incident was reported in widely
differing ways within the British press. Punch, which had
already expressed its sympathy for the Roman Republic and
for anti-clericalism, led the charge against O'Ferrall:
Turn we now to England's hope and
representative at Malta, Mr Moore O'Ferrall.
Two hundred Roman refugees, with English
passports visaed by the English Consul at
Cività Vecchia, arrived at Malta in the French
steamer Lycurgue, and a vessel called the
Robin. They sailed in the fullest belief of the
protection of the English passport; for many
might have departed in the Lombardo for Genoa.
But no; they had a religious confidence in the
faith of England. Among these emigrants were
men and women; the sick and the wounded. Well
the Governor of Malta, contemptuous of the
British passport, would not permit the landing
of the sufferers. One fifth of the two hundred
refugees found means to sail in the Pipon, for
England; the remainder, by the last accounts,
were still in the Mediterranean.
The Times, referring to the same incident, took the
opposite view. It noted in an article on 6 August that
one personage among the Roman political refugees was a
dangerous revolutionary, 96 and that despite this fact, a
314
British consul had provided a passport for him.
The passport was, the article noted, made out under a
false name, that of an English noble, which raised the
question of whether the Consul himself was aware of this
falsehood.
But what I want to know is by whose order did
he receive a British passport; and was it not
under the iimnediate cognizance of the agent who
gave it to him that he was then, and since
then, employed in hatching rebellion against
his own Sovereign, and helping by every means
in his power the Republican Government of
Rome?98
As far as the argument of the article was concerned, for
a British diplomat to act on behalf of Roman Republicans
implied collaboration with the rebellion against the
Papal Sovereign. The article not only condemned the
person who ordered the issue of the passport as a
disgrace to the British Government, but also raised the
question of whether or not he had acted alone.
I have no doubt the British Agent acted by
superior orders, as, though his good-nature may
be surprised into issuing some hundred
passports under the peculiar exigency of the
other day, he is not a man to be humbugged into
granting his seal and signature, in defiance of
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all legality, as long ago as the 6th of April
last. I have taken some pains to establish the
facts of this case, and as they are very
peculiar, I submit them to your consideration.99
This was not totally speculation, for although the
British government had officially opposed the Roman
Republic, there were constituencies within the government
which personally sympathized with the Republican
political exiles after the collapse of the Roman
Republic. The Quarterly Review, a conservative
periodical, went as far as to suggest in September that
Palmerston himself would take pleasure from the presence
of the radical exiles in Britain, and that Mazzini would
benefit as the latter would:
now have the advantage of a personal
communication with Lord Palinerston, who will
have the best opportunity of ascertaining the
views of leading republicans from the fountain-
head, and of communicating to them in return
the intentions of Her Majesty's Cabinet. 100
It can be seen from the Malta incident and the wider
issue of the Roman refugees that the aim of British
foreign policy towards Rome, to destroy the Roman
Republic through co-operation with French military
intervention in Rome, had provoked a widening gap between
the conservative and radical elements in British public
opinion. English radical intellectuals who had political
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links with Mazzini and other Italian republican exiles in
his circle, supported the Roman Republic. However, not
only within public opinion but also within government
circles there were public officials, such as Freeborn,
who sympathized with some Roman republicans. That is why
Palmerston was obliged to justify military intervention
in Rome in the press, explaining that Britain should play
an active role on the international scene.
British Public opinion and Italian nationalism
Although the British government recommended the
secularization of the Papal administration and the
separation of Papal spiritual and temporal power, it
still felt that it was necessary to have the Pope as a
temporal sovereign. However, a large segment of the
British public, which traditionally held anti-Catholic
sentiments, was favourable to the Roman Republic's anti-
clerical stance. After the fall of the Republic this
group within society welcomed the Republican exiles to
Britain and were in turn influenced by their views. There
was a consensus between the Republicans and the English
radicals that Italian liberal nationalism could not
coexist with ecclesiastical politics and Papal temporal
power. They agreed that Italian independence could only
be achieved after the expulsion of Papal authority from
Rome. 101
Since the French Revolution, ideas of revolution and the
freedom of Europe had often been discussed in the context
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of liberation from Catholic despotism. Within Britain the
radicals and middle-class intellectuals were attracted to
revolutionary causes in continental Europe, simply
because of their traditional opposition to Catholic
absolutism. This applied as much to the events of 1848
and 1849 as it had to earlier revolutions such as that in
Belgium in 1830. 102
The Italian revolutions, in particular, provided
inspiration to and provoked the admiration of English
radicals. 103 Support for the republican cause in Italy
was particularly strong among Dissenters and
Nonconformists, who were already a key element in
Chartist-affiliated groups like Mazzini 's International
League and The Friends of Ital y . The most vocal of the
Protestant groups involved in support of the republican
and anti-Papal cause was The Evan gelical Alliance. The
Evangelical Alliance was a radical Protestant group,
which held countless public meetings, lectures and
sermons on the evils of Popery. Its anti-Catholic
position was also developed in printed sources, most
notably the pages of The Record, an Evangelical journal.
The Evangelical Alliance was different from other
Protestant groups in the fact that it was more well-
connected both domestically and internationally, and was
able to put pressure on governments to listen to its
views. 104
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The Achilli affair
The growing strength of anti-clerical opinion and the
central role of The Evan gelical Alliance was particularly
important in the events surrounding the arrest and
subsequent release of Dr Giacomo Achilli. Achilli was a
former Dominican priest who had converted to
Protestantism, and was involved as a republican in Rome
in speaking out against the corruption of the Catholic
Church.
After his conversion to Protestantism in 1842 Achilli had
eventually settled in Britain, and in the summer of 1848
he had joined The Evangelical Alliance. However, in
January 1849, inspired by the Pope's flight, he returned
to Rome to take part in the Republican government. 105 He
was very enthusiastic about what he saw in Rome and wrote
on 7 February to Sir Culling Eardley who was one of the
executive members of The Evan gelical Alliance, that:
Yesterday there was a great festival to
celebrate the opening of the Constituent
Assembly. I have never seen so much joy among
the people as on this occasion. The few
malcontents did not show themselves. To judge
from these good appearances, it may be frankly
said, that the Romans desired no more Pope and
no more Popery. Let God protect us and we shall
advance in his truth. 106
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Achilli regarded the Roman Constituent Assembly as a
fulfilment of the no-Popery movement, and was pleased to
find that his anti-clerical ideas were similar to those
proposed by the Circolo Popolare. He became involved in
forwarding his opinions to the press and wrote to
Eardsley on 7 April:
Today I have sent a second [letter ?J to the
press, which is somewhat more full and copious,
and I purpose having a series of addresses,
which will be published weekly on the truths of
Christianity, and against the opposite errors
of the Papal system. 107
He also observed to Eardsley that the fall of Papal
authority had revealed the true character of the Catholic
Church's despotism, as visitors to the Papal prisons had
witnessed.
the horrid dungeons, where the victims of
the Papacy have been incarcerated. It seems
that the inquisitors in hopes of an
intervention to bring back the Pope and
Cardinals to Rome, did not take sufficient care
to remove certain objects which might betray
their cruelty to the people. 108
Achilli was still in Rome when it fell to the forces of
General Oudinot, and was subsequently arrested in late
July and held in detention by the French army. No sooner
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had the news of Achilli's arrest arrived in England on 2
August than members of The Evangelical Alliance took
prompt measures, in France as well as in Britain, to
obtain his release. The statement circulated by the
leadership of the Alliance to its members noted:
Dr Achilli was arrested on the 29 July two days
before General Oudinot ceded his authority to
the Cardinal Vicars of Rome and his agents,
and it was under the escort of French soldiers
that Dr Achilli, converted to Protestantism
seven years since, was conducted and
incarcerated within the wall of the
Inquisition. 109
The conunittee of the British branch of the Alliance
decided to lobby Palmerston, and, in addition, the
Committee of the Italian Society of London had an
interview with Drouyn de Lhuys, the French Ambassador to
Britain. 110
The British branch of The Evan gelical Alliance, which
held its annual meeting at Glasgow from 12 to 14 October,
adopted a resolution in which British Christians
expressed their sympathy with Dr Achilli. They agreed to
condemn the conduct of the Inquisition for bringing
accusations against a prisoner without allowing him to
communicate with his friends, or with any evidence being
heard in his defence.	 There was among them
confidence, that the French government would regard
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Achilli's liberation as justice. To put pressure on
France it was decided to send a deputation to Paris,
which if necessary would go even to Rome. Lord Wriothesly
Russell, the half-brother of the Prime Minister, and the
Rev Edward Bickersteth, both members of the Evangelical
Alliance, were chosen to form a part of this deputation.
Eardley recorded in an account of the Achilli affair
published in 1850 that:
We started for Paris the week which followed
that of the conference. We bless God for the
brotherly reception which the Protestants of
Paris have given us, as well as for the cordial
co-operation which we have met with in the
committee of the French section of the
Alliance; the British ambassador also took this
affair to heart, the Duke de Broglie, to whom
they were presented received them with the
greatest kindness, and interposed in our behalf
with the Minister of Foreign Affairs. 112
In defending Achilli from the charges against him
Eardsley observed that:
Though he [Achilli] naturally sympathised with
the political aspiration of republicans, and
availed himself of their hostility to tyranny
to excite their attention to the corruptions of
the Romish Church, yet he refrained from any
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participation in secular politics. It would be
well if the Roman Catholic priests in Ireland
could say as much! The reader in perusing these
letters will make allowance of the position of
the Christian man in the so-called "State of
the Church".
It was impossible for such a person not to
rejoice in the overthrow of the most hateful
Government in Christendom. 113
Even Petre, who as a Catholic might have been expected to
sympathize with Achilli's arrest, observed in a letter to
Palmerston the danger of any vindictive proceedings
against a man so generally known, and whose case was
taken up by thousands. On 25 September Petre informed
Palinerston:
That when Protestant writers and speakers
accused the church of Rome of holding
persecuting tenets, they were always met by the
assertion that religious persecution had been
the sin of imperfect civilisation and
enlightenment, and that nothing of the sort was
or could be, practised now. If Achillj lost his
liberty, and perhaps his life for conscience
sake what would the world say ? 114
As it turned out Achilli's case did not deteriorate into
a grave issue concerning political relations between
Britain, France and Rome, partly because Achilli himself
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was not a leading figure in the Roman Republic, and also
because France did not regard Achilli's detention as a
major issue. However, it appears that Britain took his
case seriously, because Achilli provoked a political and
religious controversy in Britain regarding the Roman
affair which touched on the issue of Papal temporal and
spiritual power.
There were still by the end of 1849 a few with sympathies
for the exiled Pope within the British government
including the Queen, but the majority of English people
regularly exhibited anti-Papal feeling. After Achilli's
appearance in front of the English public in 1850,
revealing the maliciousness and corruption of the
Catholic Church, and the publication of Eardley's account
of Achilli's incarceration, this sentiment grew apace and
English people, incited by the establishment of the
English Catholic Hierarchy, confirmed their hostility
towards the Pope. The shift of English public opinion
against the Pope from 1849 to 1850 was significant, and
can be explained in part, by Achilli's activity in
Britain. Thus in 1849 Achilli began to lay the ground
that would lead eventually to the anti-Papal movement in
1850.
Conclusion
Although the British government was very reluctant to get
involved with military intervention against the Roman
Republic, it eventually had to agree to the French
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expedition. It was discovered during the crisis that
Britain could do little itself to prevent a clash between
France and Austria, which was avoided simply due to an
Austrian retreat and not because of Britain's diplomatic
contribution.
In addition, Palmerston's hope that, despite the use of
military power, the French would still favour the
installation of the Pope as a constitutional monarch, was
disappointed. In the April Allocution of 1849 Pius IX
declared that the adoption of a constitution and liberal
politics in the Papal States was impossible, because of
the difficulty of co-ordinating Papal spiritual power
with constitutional liberalism. Ultimately he clarified
his anti-constitutional inclination in public in
September after the collapse of the Roman Republic.
Neither the British nor the French governments could
persuade the Pope to compromise.
The Roman Republic's declaration of the end of Papal
temporal power brought divergent reactions from the
British government and radical public opinion. The
British government was faced with a difficult situation.
It was restricted by its inability to do anything but
support the restoration of the Pope as the legitimate
sovereign ruler of the Papal States; to have followed a
different policy would have been to break with the order
established under the Concert of Europe which would set a
dangerous precedent. In addition, the Roman Republic's
radical and anti-clerical policy such as the
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nationalization of Catholic Church property, was not
acceptable to the British government, because this policy
directly affected the interests of British subjects,
including that of the English and Irish Catholic Church.
There were therefore a number of pressures that forced
the British government to follow an essentially cautious
policy, even though Palinerston had his doubts about
French policy and the possibility that Pius would turn
his back on his previous reforms.
At the same time an important segment of the British
public increasingly expressed anti-Catholic sentiments
and supported the abolition of the temporal power of the
Papacy. The British radical public identified the power
of the Catholic Church with despotism, and expressed
admiration for Mazzini's republicanism which was based
upon their support for the goal of a liberal and
democratic society. These ideas were transferred to
Britain after the Republican exiles who landed in Britain
exacerbated the English public's anti-Catholic
prejudices. The stage was thus set for a confrontation
between the government and the public over policy towards
Rome which would reach a climax in 1850.
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Chapter V
British reactions to the restoration of Papal authority
in Rome and the restoration of the English Catholic
Hierarchy, 1850-52
Introduction
The restoration of Papal authority in Rome in 1850 has
always been discussed in a negative context, particularly
in terms of the Vatican's relations with Britain. As is
well known, Britain considered Piedmont to be the most
liberal state on the Italian peninsula, and it has been
believed that the hostility between Piedmont and the
Papacy, which became more intense after the Pope's
reactionary policy was introduced, led to antagonism
between Britain and the Papal States. However, the
situation was not so clear-cut, and it is therefore
necessary to investigate closely Anglo-Vatican relations
after the Pope's return to Rome in April 1850.
1850 was, however, the year not only of the restoration
of Papal authority in Rome but also of the re-
establishment of the Catholic Hierarchy in England. It
was no coincidence that these two incidents took place in
the same year, as the return of the Pope to Rome was a
precondition for the achievement of Cardinal Wiseman's
ambition. Wjsenian's elevation to the rank of Cardinal was
significant not only for the English Catholic Church, but
also for British domestic politics, for which it had
important ramifications. Wiseman's triumph had the effect
of shifting the issue of Papal temporal power from
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foreign to domestic affairs, because it provoked the
spectre of a Roman Catholic threat to Britain. The timing
was doubly unfortunate as these events coincided with
Mazzini's presence in London, leading to the danger that,
as a symbol of No-Popery, he might be able to transfer
the issue of revolution and republicanism from the
Italian to the English context, thus threatening the
British government. The English public and the British
government reacted differently to the situation: while
the English public was hostile to the Papacy as well as
to Catholics in Britain, the government was forced to
react quickly to contain any 'No-Popery' agitation.
The approach of this thesis, in contrast to previous work
on this period, is more international in scope, and
instead of concentrating only on British domestic
affairs, it looks to fit the 'No-Popery' movement into a
broader Risorgimento context. Our interest is
concentrated on the particular anti-Papal movement period
during 1850-52 rather than anti-Catholicism in its widest
sense. Emphasis will be put upon the link between the
anti-Papal movement and Mazzini's republicanism and
nationalism. Another intention is to integrate religious
and political issues, as in Wolf fe and Paz's work, in
order to demonstrate that anti-Catholicism was not simply
anti-Irish in the political context. 1
Section One discusses the British government's foreign
policy towards the Papacy in the light of the latter's
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troubled diplomatic relations with Piedmont and France,
which has been examined by Scott, Coppa and Martina. 2
Section Two examines the process of achieving the
restoration of the Catholic Hierarchy, looking at the
divisions within the English Catholic Church and the
impact of Wiseman's Ultramontanism. Section Three
assesses the rise of anti-Papal sentiment, including the
involvement of the radicals and Mazzini. Section Four
analyses the extent to which the movement led to
incidents of anti-Catholic violence and Section Five
Russell's response to the growing agitation within the
country.
Section I: The restoration of Papal authority in Rome.
After the French, Spanish and Neapolitan armies invaded
Rome to restore Papal authority, it took a good while
before the Pope actually returned to the city of Rome,
because he thought the conditions for his restoration
suggested by France were inadequate. One reason for this
was Pius IX'S resistance to French demands that he
support liberal reforms.	 Another reason was that it
was necessary to wait until people in Rome had been
pacified following the intervention and the collapse of
the Roman Republic.
In August 1849 Corcelle was sent from Rome to Gaeta to
persuade the Pope to consider an early return to his
lands, but after the failure of his mission to Naples, in
late January 1850 the negotiations were transferred to
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Paris and there came to a rapid conclusion. On January 28
1850, the French government sent a letter to the Pontiff,
congratulating him on his intention to return to Rome,
but this was premature, since Cardinal Antonelli, the
Secretary of State, was not convinced of the wisdom of an
immediate Papal restoration. He regarded this as a new
intervention by the French and therefore turned back to
his old project for concerted action by the Catholic
powers.
After negotiations between the Pope, the European Powers,
and the other Italian states, Pius IX finally decided to
return to Rome on 11 April. Following his return, the
triumvirate of Cardinals who had exercised authority in
his absence was dissolved, and power was concentrated in
the hands of Cardinal Antonelli.
The Pope's return was greeted with brilliant and
spontaneous illuminations throughout the capital.
An English traveller recorded the following:
It seemed to me that the population never
slept; they were perambulating the streets
chanting "Viva Pio Nono" all night; there was
the same crowd, with the same excitement. 6
He lamented, however, that 'History of the last two years
has taught us to set very little reliance on any
demonstrations of public opinion" and he recorded his
belief that the future was uncertain:
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Thus far prognostications have been defeated.
The Pope is in the Vatican. Let us hope the
prophets of evil may again find their
predictions falsified; but alas ! It is
impossible to be blind to the fact that within
the last few days the happiness of many homes
have been destroyed and that the triumph of the
one has been purchased by the sorrow of the
many. 8
Petre also witnessed the enthusiastic response to the
Papal procession, and noted to Hamilton on 13 April that
the Pope had been received 'in a manner ... widely
different from that in which he used to be greeted by the
hireling mobs of the Clubs'. Petre also observed that
'the poorest of the population joined in the rejoicings',
which was not surprising to see as 25,000 dollars had
been distributed to the poor on the order of the Pope. 12
April would afterwards be celebrated annually in the
Papal States. Antonelli claimed that these demonstrations
of support disproved the lies about the Pope's
unpopularity.
Shortly afterwards the Spaniards and Neapolitans
withdrew, the French reduced their forces to one division
in the vicinity of the capital, and the Austrians
maintained one division in the Legations. 	 The Pope
became increasingly reactionary and rejected all reforms
that seemed likely to weaken Papal government. The
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Sovereign Pontiff had returned to the Holy See,
unencumbered by any condition other than his published
Motu-Proprio of 12 September 1849, but was slow to
introduce even to a limited degree the reforms promised
in this address. His temporal power was intact, and his
spiritual authority was not diminished but enhanced. As
the Pontiff, relying on France and Austria to maintain
him in power, was no longer an independent sovereign, his
authority had to be enhanced by using his absolute power
over the Catholic Church. 10 Louis-Napoleon was content
to let the programme of reform and reconciliation between
the Papacy and Italian nationalist opinion rest,
accepting the philosophy of reactionary conservatism
which the Cardinals had imposed upon the State of the
Church.
This resigned acceptance that the Pope would not
introduce any reforms was not only limited to Louis-
Napoleon, but can also be seen in the practical attitude
of Palmerston. 12 Although politically the British
government became much more cautious than it used to be
in support of the Pope, because of Pius Ix's rejection of
any kind of liberal reforms and Antonelli's policy of
adhering to the Catholic Powers, the British government
did not abandon its policy of trying to improve its
diplomatic relations with the Vatican. 13
At the diplomatic level the existence after 1849 of a
Concert of the Catholic Powers, whose major concern was
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'the Roman Question', meant the exclusion of Britain from
international consultations about the future of the
Papacy. Britain, however, still continued searching for a
role in the discussions regarding the future of Rome. 14
Ivan Scott has argued that the restoration was given an
oblique endorsement by Palmerston in the House of Commons
on 9 May 1851, when he said 'the occupation of Rome by
the French troops was a measure undertaken by France upon
her own judgment'. This was true, but his assessment that
'the unilateral action of France was opposed by no power
and accepted in principle by all', 15 was not completely
accurate. Although at the official level the British
government had co-operated with France to destroy the
Roman Republic and to restore Papal authority in Rome, in
fact the British ambassador in Turin was critical of the
conservative nature of French policy, which was based on
Napoleon's desire to obtain Catholic votes for the
election. Abercromby wrote to Palmerston on 19 September
1850 that:
The Sardinian ministers are perfectly alive to
the real objects of the French mission, in thus
attempting to make tools of the Piedmontese in
the hope thereby to curry favour with the
church faction in France, and at Rome, & to
secure the influence of both for the President
at the ensuing Election. 16
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In fact Piedmont resented French conservative policy, and
was angered by the French intervention in Rome which
favoured the return of the old order. French action was
also unpopular, because it encouraged a noticeable rise
in conservative sentiment in Italy, particularly in Rome
and Naples, which was to have immediate and far-reaching
consequences for the relations between France, Piedmont
and the Papacy.
The specific issue which led to confrontation was the
dispute which arose between Piedmont and the Papacy in
March 1850. In this month the Piedmontese minister, Count
Siccardi, sought Papal sanction for legislation which had
been presented to the Parliament in Turin in early March
1850, and included the suppression of religious orders,
the introduction of civil matrimony, and the termination
of the clergy's ecclesiastical jurisdiction, a programme
totally unacceptable to Pius. 17 Following Turin's
unilateral emancipation of non-Catholics on 9 March,
relations between Piedmont and the Papacy became tense.
Pius and Antonelli resented the legislation which
restricted ecclesiastical control over education, with
the supervision of the curriculum in the hands of the
state, and were therefore reluctant to make any
concessions to Piedmont. 18 In mid-March Siccardi,
seeking approval for the projected changes in Piedmont's
ecclesiastical laws, met with the Secretary of State at
Portici. 19 However, Antonelli responded to Siccardi's
request by observing that the Pope could not remain
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indifferent to the harm done to the Church's power, and
threatened to issue a formal protest. He reiterated
Pius's dictum that Piedmont's actions violated the
Concordat, arguing it was unacceptable for a Catholic
state to introduce without the consent of the Holy See
changes which might prove detrimental to the Church.
Irritated by anti-Piedinontese sentiment in the Curia, and
convinced that no agreement could be reached at Portici,
Siccardi returned to Turin at the end of the month. 20
With the failure of these talks Piedmont's challenge to
the Catholic Church escalated, with its assertion that
the state should not be subordinate to the Catholic
Church, but that the Catholic Church should submit to the
state. The next challenge came immediately after the Pope
returned to Rome on 12 April, when the Piedmontese
government introduced the Bill of 17 April by which
ecclesiastical tribunals and jurisdiction would be
abolished. 21 In addition, there was outrage within the
Vatican when public pressure in Piedmont against the
Catholic authority led at the beginning of April to the
expulsion of the Archbishop of Turin, Luigi Fransoni, and
the Bishop of Asti, Filippo Artico, from their dioceses.22
Tensions continued to rise during the summer and reached
a peak in August when the Archbishop of Turin was placed
under arrest by Bianchi, a local official. 23 This
revealed the extent to which it was public pressure that
was stirring up anti-Papal actions, and that the
government in Turin was losing control of the situation.
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This was understood by d'Azeglio and Abercromby observed
to Palmerston on 16 August:
The Turin Sardinian government rightly judging
that so indecorous an attack upon the head of
the Roman Catholic religion ought not to be
quietly passed over, have taken the resolution
of intimating to Bianchi that he must quit
Sardinia for eight days. Because Azeglio was
very sensitive to the violent relation with
Rome which is already critical, and he did not
want to give any pretext to the Pope to
complain. 24
In spite of d'Azeglio's hope that further crisis could be
avoided, this incident caused outrage in Rome. Antonelli
wrote to Turin on 2 September:
It is easy to recognize what kind of insult has
been done to the Church by the secular
authority, with assuming the judicial law of
operating the sacred ministers about sacrament,
and how much offence has been caused by hostile
decision concerning the ecclesiastical issues,
and especially with the new attack committed
against the sacred person of the Monsignor
Archbishop of Turin. 25
Antone lii continued:
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Meanwhile in order to meet the duties imposed
by his position as Supreme Leader of the
Catholic Church, His Holiness has specifically
asked me, the Cardinal and Under-Secretary of
State, to advance formal complaint and protest
even in the current extremely disgusting
circumstances, and to demand, in the Pontiff's
name, proper compensation for the above-
mentioned events. 26
In response to the Vatican's threatening letter, Piedmont
did not hesitate to show its strong hostility to the
Papal authority and, in line with public opinion, refused
to compromise. 27
France tried to encourage Piedmont to seek reconciliation
with the Pope, but the French suggestion that the anti-
clerical legislation should be withdrawn was rejected by
d'Azeglio. Lord Abercromby noted to Palmerston on 19
September 1850:
M. Azeglio replied to the [French] that he and
his colleagues are most desirous to settle
matters with Rome, but that they can only do so
in such a manner as will be consistent with the
dignity of the King, and an observance of the
principles of the constitution. 28
Abercromby also observed that the French Secretary in
Turin, M. Pirest, Whom he described as 'an insincere
ambitious intriguer', 29
 had advised d'Azeglio to
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sacrifice Siccardi, but that d'Azeglio had firmly
rejected the French suggestion.
he {d'Azeglioj answers that he can
positively assure him [Pirest], that neither
the king, nor the Cabinet would ever for a
moment entertain the thought of purchasing the
favour of the Papal Court by the sacrifice of
M. Siccardi ••• 30
Abercromby was very critical of this French intervention,
in spite of the fact that Britain had originally co-
operated with France to restore Papal authority, saying
the following:
The French at Turin are acting a very shabby
part. Mr Barrot urged Mr d'Azeglio to come to
some arrangement with Rome, but without giving
any plan by which the Cabinet of Turin can do
so with credit, leaving it credibly to be
understood that he wishes Piedmont to surrender
unconditionally. 31
As the religious rivalry between Piedmont and Rome
developed into political antagonism, this confrontation
became of interest not only for France but also for
Britain. The English public's political stance was
favourable towards Piedmont because of Britain's anti-
Papal feeling and opposition to French conservatism,
especially after the restoration of the Papal authority
in Rome. 32
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On the other hand, the British government's attitude
towards the crisis between the Papacy and Piedmont was
more ambivalent. In late May d'Azeglio tried to involve
Britain directly when he wrote to Palmerston asking for
Britain's military protection and co-operation in the
diplomatic field. Palmerston responded to d'Azeglio on 4
June. He noted in regard to the proposal of diplomatic
co-operation:
Her Majesty's Government will readily
instruct Her Majesty's Diplomatic Agents at
Foreign Courts to communicate with their
Sardinian colleagues upon all matters of common
interest in which the two countries may be
concerned, and Her Majesty's Government will be
very glad that Her Majesty's Diplomatic Agents
should in such matters have the benefit of the
cooperation of the Diplomatic Agents of the
King of Sardinia as far as the instructions
sent to such Agents from their own Government
at Turin may enable them to afford it.
It continued:
communications which have already passed
between Her Majesty's Government and the
Government of Turin have conveyed to the
Government of His Sardinian Majesty the
assurance that the British Government must from
traditional recollection, from the remembrance
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of faithful alliance, and from the dictates of
sound policy with reference to the balance of
power and to the maintenance of peace in
Europe, take a deep interest in the welfare and
independence of the Sardinian Monarchy, and Her
Majesty's Government sincerely hope that those
dangers by which you think it possible that the
Kingdom of Sardinian may under certain
contingent circumstances be threatened may
never come to be realized.
After this fairly positive statement, Palinerston,
however, showed great hesitation about supporting
Piedmont without reservation, as the following passage
indicated.
But as I have already had the honour of stating
verbally to you and to the Marquis Ricci, there
are many weighty reasons which render it
inconsistent with the habits of the government
of Great Britain to enter into prospective
engagements and to contract obligations
applicable to events which have not happened,
and with regard to which, if they should ever
happen, it is impossible to tell beforehand by
what particular combination of circumstances
they might be accompanied. It is the habitual
policy of the Government of Great Britain to
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keep itself free with regard to future events.35
Palmerston thus rejected any hint of an alliance.
Ivan Scott has argued that Britain was not fully prepared
to support Piedmont, because of Britain's desire not to
antagonize France. 36 While this is true to some extent,
in fact the problems facing Palmerston were more
complicated than this, for British support of Piedmont
would not only alienate France, but also perhaps lead to
a confrontation with a wider coalition of the European
Catholic Powers. In addition, one must note that,
although Palmerston wanted to continue good relations
with Louis-Napoleon, his policy was also designed to
restrict French influence over both Piedmont and the
Papal States. The only way to counter France was to
maintain reasonable ties with both Italian states but not
to favour either one. Britain could therefore make only
limited gestures of support towards Piedmont, most
notably diplomatic co-operation and the conunercial
entente of 6 July 1850.
One of the reasons that Palmerston was unenthusiastic
about supporting Piedmont was that Britain was
constrained by its relation with the Papacy. After the
political and religious disputes between Turin and Rome,
it was assumed that Britain's obvious support of
Siccardi's plan might damage Anglo-Roman religious
relations and thus strengthen French influence over the
Vatican. The British Foreign Office, and particularly
347
Abercromby, was opposed to France's reactionary and
conservative policy in the Italian peninsula' 38 and
believed that the conservative tendencies of Papal
domestic policy were influenced by France and that France
was also attempting to give conservative political advice
to Piedmont. This meant that, although Britain
disapproved of the Pope's reactionary domestic policy, it
did not want to worsen its diplomatic relations with the
Papacy, and attempted to maintain a neutral position in
order to counter French influence.
It seems to be contradictory and inconsistent that the
British government did not show absolutely clear support
to Piedmont in spite of its hope of seeing liberal reform
in the Papal States. This can be explained through
Britain's misguided perception of Papal temporal and
spiritual power which we have seen in chapter III.
However, the important point was that to be pro-Piedmont
was not necessarily to be hostile to the Pope, while the
British ministers and diplomats, such as Palmerston,
Abercroniby, Russell, Petre and Freeborn held slightly
different sentiments and ideas concerning the policy to
the Papacy. This helps to explain Britain's ambivalent
attitude to the Papacy.
British policy was further complicated in the summer of
1850 by its dispute with the Papacy over the Freeborn
case. By the end of 1849 the Pope had discovered that
Freeborn, as the British Consular Agent in Rome, had
fabricated a number of passports for the Roman
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republicans to escape from the Papal States to Malta. The
Pope was deeply offended by Freeborn's imprudent action,
and as early as July 1849 the Papal Nuncio in Paris had
put pressure on Lord Normanby to have Freeborn withdrawn
and prosecuted for his irregularity. 	 The Ambassador
admitted that Freeborn had been culpable, but that he was
protected against dismissal by Lord Minto and the Foreign
Office. 40 Palmerston's position was that he agreed that
Freeborn had been in error, but he asserted that it was
necessary to find out more about the political situation
in which this incident had occurred.
After one year the issue had still not been resolved, and
on 10 August Antonelli decided, in the light of the
failure of the Paris talks, to negotiate confidentially
with Palmerston by passing correspondence to London
through Petre. Antonelli insisted that Freeborn had made
a disturbance and broken the tranquillity of the Papal
States, and therefore asked Britain to dismiss and
replace him. 41 Petre who as a Catholic was keener to
avoid offending the Pope than Freeborn and Palmerston,
informed the latter on 10 August that:
The Cardinal ... observed that from the manner
in which Mr Freeborn had mixed himself up in
political affairs in general during the so
called Republic, and from his granting
passports to, protecting and assisting numbers
of those most hostile to the Papal Government
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putting aside the affair of Padre Achilli and
other things - it was impossible for H Holiness
Government to have any confidence in him. 42
Antonelli especially put emphasis on Freeborn's
assistance to Dr Achilli, who was a member of the Roman
Republic and became an outspoken supporter of the anti-
Papal aggression in England.
Against the Vatican's accusation Palmerston, who was at
heart hostile to the Papacy and regarded the Pope merely
as a means for maintaining the status quo, attempted to
justify Freeborn's action. He noted to Petre in his
letter of 28 August:
Freeborn acted in perfect accordance with what
Lord Palmerston considers to have been his duty
and all his acts have either been the result of
previous instructions or have been sanctioned
by subsequent approval.
He also emphasised that Freeborn's actions had to be seen
in context:
A tragedy made by the French army in Rome
required such a compromise to give a passport
to the non-British people in order to escape
from the city of Rome, otherwise they (who were
involved in the Roman Republic, and were
arrested by the French army) would have been
killed.
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Palinerston therefore refused to accept the call for
Freeborn's dismissal. What is noticeable about the
Freeborn issue was that, although Palmerston had in 1849
admonished Freeborn over his conduct, he was not willing
in 1850 to give in to Papal pressure to remove the
Consular Agent. This was a matter of principle which
outweighed the need to curry favour with the Papacy.
In spite of Palmerston's antagonistic policy to the Pope
regarding Freeborn and the passports, Britain still had a
desire to see a settlement between Turin and Rome. In
fact, its desire to lessen tensions became even more
urgent, as Piedmont and the Papacy threatened to move
even further apart. Abercroinby noted to Palinerston on 19
September:
It is much to be desired on every account that
something should be settled with Rome before
the opening of the second Parliament;- for
otherwise I fear that the Government will have
fresh complications to deal with, from the
increasing desire in the public to see the
Revenues of the Church appropriated by the
state, and the clergy paid a fixed salary.-
Except that such a measure would give the
Government additional power over the Priests,
they cannot desire to see it adopted, because
from all I can learn, it does not appear that
351
in a financial point of view it would be
advantageous for the government.- should the
measure be proposed by the left in the Chamber
I am afraid the Government would find it
difficult to make a successful opposition to
it, so general is the feeling in the public in
favour of such a plan, [Siccardi's plan].- 46
Another facet of British policy towards the Vatican-
Piedmont confrontation was that, although Britain
disliked French conservative policy towards the Italian
peninsula, the British government could not ignore the
continued importance of the Papacy in regard to Ireland.
This too made it important for Britain not to offend the
Pope by supporting Piedmont.
Since 1848 British policy towards Ireland had achieved
little progress either in terms of the Queen's Colleges
or government endowment of the Catholic clergy. The
situation became worse in February 1850 when the Pope
appointed Paul Cullen as Archbishop of Armagh and Primate
of Ireland. Cullen was an ultramontane churchman who, it
was feared in British government circles, was close to
MacHale. This appointment seemed to make it even less
likely that the Catholic church in Ireland would agree to
accept British policy and such an assessment proved to be
correct when in September 1850 a synod at Thurles
organized by Cullen voted to condemn collaboration with
the colleges.
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In order to counter this new wave of Irish Catholic
recalcitrance it was decided by Russell to send the Irish
M.P., Richard L. Sheil, a former supporter of Repeal, to
Rome as a special envoy to present Britain's case once
again. Also it was hoped that Dr Wiseluan, who was
travelling to Rome in August 1850, would 'persuade the
Pope that he has been misled by MacHale and Cullen'.
Before his departure for Rome, Wiseinan was asked
unofficially by Russell to present to Pius Britain's
views on Ireland and its desire for good relations with
the Papacy. In addition, Wiseman got the impression that
Russell was willing to offer a further inducement.
Wiseman's visit to Rome came at a time when the
negotiations for the restoration of the English Catholic
Hierarchy had virtually reached their conclusion;
Russell, according to Wiseman, hinted to him that the
government would not oppose the Hierarchy. 48
This new campaign to influence Pius did not last long. In
October the restoration of the English Catholic Hierarchy
was announced and consequently by November 1850 Anglo-
Papal relations were in turmoil. To understand why, after
Russell's hint to Wiseman, this sudden shift in British
foreign policy towards the Papacy took place it is
necessary to look at the Catholic question in the context
of British domestic policies.
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Section II: The re-establishment of the English Catholic
Hierarchy
As has been argued in chapter II, the British
government's interests in the Papacy and its attempt to
restore diplomatic relations with Rome, can be partly
explained by the development of the Catholic revival
movement in Britain. This revival reached its peak in
1850 with the re-establishment of the Catholic Hierarchy.
The restoration of the Hierarchy was a significant issue
in terms of politics as well as religion, and raised
serious problems for Russell's administration. Russell's
policy towards the Catholics and other ecclesiastical
matters was complex. It is true that Russell relied
partly on Catholic votes and followed a favourable policy
towards the Catholics in England, which was reflected in
his foreign policy to the Papacy, especially around the
1847 election period.
Therefore Russell faced a real dilemma in 1850 when the
restoration of the Hierarchy was announced. This decision
caused problems, because government approval of the
restoration would be seen as favourable towards the
Catholics and Tractarians in England and the Catholics in
Ireland, which contrasted with traditional Whig values on
the importance of civil authority. 50 This would not have
mattered so much if the government had been stronger; it
could then have afforded to follow a more decisive policy
one way or the other, but torn between factions it was
forced to take a more ambivalent stand.
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To understand the problems raised by the restoration of
the Hierarchy, it is necessary to examine the wider
background to this development, including the Catholic
revival movement. The process of restoring the English
Catholic Hierarchy was twofold; first, religious
activities outside Britain, particularly in Rome, which
were mainly undertaken by Wiseman and his followers
within the Propaganda, and, second, activities in
Britain. 51
As we have seen in chapter II, Wiseman's negotiations and
activities to obtain the Hierarchy took place in both
Rome and England. Wiseman and his followers' main
contribution to the re-establishment of the Hierarchy in
England was to encourage interest in this project within
the Propaganda in Rome. In addition, Wiseman was able to
exploit conditions within Britain. The rise of the Oxford
movement, which had resulted in a number of conversions
from the Anglican Church, due to the latter's internal
political conflicts, 52 provided Wiseinan with a excellent
opportunity to integrate the Catholic Revival movement
into the pursuit of his own ambition, the restoration of
the English Catholic Hierarchy.
The Catholic revival and expansion can be attributed to
three main developments: the influx of poor Irish
immigrants into the industrialized cities, the rise of
the middle-class intellectuals, who had converted from
Anglicanism during the period of the Oxford movement, and
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the influence of the old Catholic aristocratic families
who, although small in number, wielded power in British
politics.	 The fourth Earl of Oxford, the eighth Earl a
Countess of Abingdon, the Countess of Gainsborough, and
the Countess of Kenmore were among the twenty-seven per
cent of the nobility that one chronicler was to record as
Roman Catholic converts during the Victorian era.
The problem with the expansion of the numbers of
Catholics, both Oxford movement converts and Irish
immigrants, was that it made the English Catholic Church
more difficult to govern. The running of the English
Church was actually controlled by the Sacred Congregation
of Propaganda in Rome, under whose jurisdiction, England
was ruled as a missionary territory. Appeals to the
Congregation of Propaganda, by one bishop against
another, and from disputes between the regular and the
secular clergy, were frequent.	 The documents in the
Propaganda archives suggest that the English mission was
more difficult to govern than other areas. The
difficulties were the result of a lack of acquaintance
with Roman procedures and protocol, rather than hostility
to Roman authority. 56 In addition, the eight Vicars
Apostolic which Britain already possessed, had become
incapable of dealing with major problems of
organization.57
The Catholic revival therefore provided Wiseluan with a
convincing justification for his own ambition, the
restoration of the Hierarchy. This hope became a reality
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on 29 September 1850 when, after an intermission of
nearly three hundred years, the privilege of being
governed directly by Rome was restored to the English
Catholics. The Pastoral Letter front Pius IX declared:
For on the twenty-nine day of last month, on
the Feast of the Archangel St Michael, Prince
of the Heavenly Host, His Holiness Pope Pius
IX, was graciously pleased to issue his letters
Apostolic, under the Fisherman Ring, conceived
in terms of great weight and dignity, wherein
he substituted, for the eight Apostolic
Vicariates heretofore existing, one
Archiepiscopal or Metropolitan and twelve
Episcopal Sees: repealing at the same time, and
annulling, all disposition and enactments, made
for English by the Holy See, with reference to
its late form of ecclesiastical government. 58
The re-establishment of the English Catholic Hierarchy
meant the reorganization of the geographical diocesan
division and the introduction of a new administrative
system. By the Papal brief, England and Wales was formed
into one province under the new Archbishop of
Westminster, Cardinal Wiseinan, with twelve suffragan
sees, Beverley, Birmingham, Clifton, Hexham, Liverpool,
Newport and Menevia, Northampton, Nottingham, Plymouth,
Salford, Shrewsbury, and Southwark.
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In theory, the Hierarchy was an elaborate achievement for
the English Catholic Church, however, in practice it
created management problems, especially because Wiseinan
was not very good at organizing the dioceses. This kind
of maladministration created opposition to him within the
English Catholic Church, in particular because the re-
establishment of the English Catholic Hierarchy involved
the redistribution of the existing bishops. This kind of
change brought confusion and dissatisfaction among the
bishops. 60
Another problem which the Hierarchy failed to overcome
was how to reconcile the different interests among the
different social classes within the English Catholic
Church, because they were very much divided socially and
theologically. To appeal to the Vatican through the
Propaganda it had been necessary to show not only that
the expansion of the Catholic population in England
justified a new division of the dioceses, but also that
Catholics in England were united. 61 In reality Wiseman
mainly relied upon the religious support of the English
aristocratic Catholics such as Lord Shrewsbury, who had
always had close contact with Wiseman, but he had also
emphasized the large number of Irish immigrants, although
he was anti-Irish. 62
Substantial disagreements emerged over the nature of the
restoration. Wiseinan and other ultramontane clergy wanted
to revive the English Roman Catholic Church on a Roman
model, believing that this was the only way to unify the
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various groups within the English Catholic community, and
they failed to see that this would only lead to further
division. In particular, they faced opposition from some
conservative elements, such as the old Catholic
aristocratic families who were used to the times, when
clergy, even the bishops, were almost family retainers,
and who were suspicious of centralized authority. 63
Wiseman himself caused a great deal of discontent. 64
Wiseman's style of Catholicism created more enemies than
necessary, because he always talked about Rome and the
Roman style of Catholicism. Wiseman had spent more time
in Rome than in Britain, and therefore he lacked
sufficient knowledge about the situation of the Catholics
in Britain.
Wiseman always talked about Rome as a good
example, and wanted to introduce the Roman
style as a whole system into England, which
seemed to suggest that he expected to see
another Rome in Britain. 65
Wiseman's style of Catholicism was therefore seen as
'more Roman than Rome', and this brought him into
conflict with the English liberal Catholics, in
particular converted Catholics during the Oxford
movement. 66 The divisions within the English Catholic
Church can be seen in Wiseinan's letter of 30 September
1850 to William Ullathorne, the Vicar Apostolic of the
central district of England, criticising Newman's
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liberalism. 67 Newman in turn disagreed with Wiseman, and
criticized Wiseman's absences from Britain which he
claimed had alienated converted Catholics. Ullathorne,
who became first Bishop of Birmingham, was caught in the
middle of this dispute. Ullathorne knew much more about
the Catholics in Britain than Wiseman, and had actually
contributed to the conversions to Catholicism, and
therefore was suited to act as a mediator between Wiseman
and Newman over their disagreements about Catholic
theology and their confrontations over the internal
politics of the English Catholic Church. 68
Wiseman, however, believed that the only influence which
could unite and organize the varied and conflicting
groups and sects, which formed the English Catholic
community was that of Rome, and therefore of himself as
the obvious representative of Rome. What he apparently
failed to appreciate was that his Romanized style and his
support for ultramontanism created friction between his
and other factions which would increase existing
divisions. 69
Wiseman's difficulties in reconciling the different
English Catholic elements and his own ultramontane
beliefs are not just of abstract interest, for his strict
allegiance to Rome made the restoration of the Hierarchy
even more unpopular and increased the pressure on Russell
to act.
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Section III: The 'No-Popery' movement as a reaction to
the restoration of the English Catholic Hierarchy.
To understand the domestic policy of Russell and his
government on ecclesiastical matters, as well as his
foreign policy towards the Papacy, it is necessary to
take account of the English public; reaction, that is the
rise of 'No-Popery'. It is well known that the
government's acceptance of the Catholic Hierarchy
provoked anti-Papal and anti-Catholic sentiment among the
English public. However, it is important to recognize
that this movement was not just a direct reaction to the
government's policy but was also based upon the public's
misunderstanding of what the government and the English
Catholic Church intended. In particular, it is necessary
to look at the role of traditional anti-Catholic
sentiment. This section describes the English public's
perception of the Pope and the English Catholic Church.
The phenomenon of the 'No-Popery' movement, which should
be distinguished from anti-Catholicism, sheds light upon
several significant developments in 1850 and 1851. On the
one hand, anti-Catholicism was not only a reaction to the
re-establishment of the English Catholic Hierarchy, but
also reflected a broader religious and historical
tradition in society. On the other hand, the phenomenon
of anti-Papal agitation that was to emerge was formed by
specific social, economic and political forces in the
particular historical moment. To understand the nature of
the movement in 1850-51 it is important to note that it
followed the outrage felt at the Maynooth Grant and that
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the re-establishment of the Hierarchy was considered to
be an act of Papal aggression against Britain.
There has been extensive interest in anti-Catholicism
recently from a number of different angles. Finn argues
that anti-Catholicism should be seen in the context of
English radicalism directly inherited from the Chartists;
asserting that it was inspired by republican, anti-
catholic, and nationalist impulses. As she states 'the
Italian revolutions offered Chartist internationalists as
much scope for nostalgic election as for liberal
panegyric. Liberal intellectuals, inspired by long-
standing family traditions of opposition to Catholic
despotism were naturally attracted to the revolutionary
cause.' For example, Ernest Jones, one of the leading
Chartist figures, responded to Papal Aggression by
calling upon 'Democrats and Dissenters to unite against
the seized forces of Rome, thirsting for the blood of
Garibaldi and Mazzini'. In addition, Finn argues that the
Protestantisin against Popery was widely shared by
working-class radicals and offered an ideological link to
the late Chartist movements. 70
The anti-Papal movement during the restoration of the
English Catholic Hierarchy in 1850-52 was based upon an
idea that the Pope's restoration of the Hierarchy
virtually constituted an invasion of England and was an
attack upon the Queen's sovereign as head of the Church
of England as well as of the state. This kind of feeling
was demonstrated in eighteen pamphlets on the Anglican
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versus Roman Catholic controversy entitled 'Is the Pope
coming to England ? Everybody who would not be a Roman
Catholic was to be burnt!' 71 and also illustrated in a
Punch cartoon entitled 'daring attempt to break into a
church'. 72 At the local level it was feared that the
Anglican parishes would be taken over by the newly
established Catholic dioceses, that at the national level
Catholicism would become the national religion, and that
the church of England and its head, the Queen would be
abolished.
'The Pope's Bull!' an address to the people of England by
a protestant patriot in December 1850, announced:
The real objection is to be found in the true
and genuine character of Popery, which renders
it entirely different from all forms of
Protestant Dissent; it is the dark design in
the back ground of this measure; it is the
intolerance of Popery; it is the claim it has
often asserted and never abandoned to grasp
territory for the purpose of governing it.
These ideas and reactions were far beyond the reality of
the situation, but the problem was that Wiseinan's first
apostolic letter and his subsequent 'Appeal to the
English people' implied his intention to do so.
The problems began on 30 September 1850, when the Pope
announced the creation of a territorial Hierarchy of
twelve bishops and the elevation of Wiseman, Vicar
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Apostolic of the London District and the most prominent
leader of the English Roman Catholic Church, to head the
new Hierarchy as the first Cardinal Archbishop of
Westminster. On receiving his red hat, Wiseman issued his
first pastoral letter and started out for London on 12
October. When news of Pius's and Wiseman's actions
reached London, The Times started to organize attacks
against the new Hierarchy, emphasizing its assumption of
supreme spiritual authority over the nation and its
denial of the validity of Anglican orders on 19 October.75
Wiseman's first pastoral letter, which was read in London
chapels on 28 October and appeared in the Press, claimed:
Your beloved country has received a place among
the fair churches which are normally
constituted from the splendid aggregate of
Catholic Communion: Catholic England has been
restored to its orbit in the ecclesiastical
firmament, from which its light had long
vanished, and begins now anew its course of
regularly adjusted action, round the centre of
unity, the source of jurisdiction, of light and
vigour. 76
Wiseman's language used in the Apostolic letter was
regarded as arrogant. Furthermore he made a provocative
statement regarding Catholicism's bitter history in
England.
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We will pray that His rule over the Church may
be prolonged to many years, for its welfare;
that health and strength may be preserved to
Him for the discharge of the sublimity of His
office; and that consolations temporal and
spiritual, may be poured out upon Him
abundantly, in compensation for past sorrows
and past ingratitude.
Not only the spiritual, but also the temporal existence
of the Pope through the Catholic Church created a fear in
the English people. This letter has been cited by some
historians such as Paz and Wolf fe arguing that it was
Wiseman's greatest mistake. 78 In addition, when Wiseman
received the Cardinal's title he issued a famous 'Appeal
to the English people' on returning to the country. This
pamphlet appeared extensively in daily newspapers
including The Times, replying to the various attacks on
and agitations over the restoration of the Catholic
Hierarchy. ' Wiseman asserted that the internal nature
of the new reorganization would not affect the royal
prerogative, insisted on tolerance as a right, and argued
that the establishment of a canonical Hierarchy was
essential to Catholicism. However, Wiseman's appeal was
also aggressive, and illustrated the extent to which he
was capable of showing contempt for the Church of
England, which he attacked on several occasions. He
accused the Anglican bishops and clergy of using anti-
Papal feeling to regain lost influence, because of a fear
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of increasing Catholic influence in England. The contents
of the 'Appeal' were reported in The Times on 21 November
1850:
The Royal Supremacy is not more admitted by the
Scottish Kirk, by Baptists, Methodists,
Quakers, Independents, Presbyterian,
Unitarians, and other dissenters, than by the
Catholics. None of these recognized in the
Queen any authority to interfere in their
religious concerns, to appoint their ministers
for them, or to mark the limits of their
separate districts in which authority has to be
exercised. 80
In reply to Wiseman's statement, Punch wrote:
All disaffected individuals, who would rejoice
in the humiliation of their country, and who
are ready to abet any foreign Intrigue against
the Queen, her Crown and dignity: Are requested
to read the following direction which are
offered by way of hints, as to the course they
had better pursue, with the view to defeat the
national determination to put down the Pope's
attempt to domineer over England-. As soon as
meetings cease to be held, and addresses to be
voted in reference to the Papal invasion, begin
to pooh-pooh the whole movement, and go about
366
saying that all interest in the subject is
subsiding. 81
Punch's hostility to the Papacy was echoed during the
period 1850-51 by a majority of the English press, which
attacked Papal aggression, no matter what their political
tendency, even The Times. In particular the radical
newspapers such as The Northern Star, the Reynolds's
Newspaper and the Newcastle Chronicle launched intensive
attacks on Papal Aggression. Between October and December
in 1850, they argued for the anti-Papal movement in the
context of favouring Mazzini and opposing the
government's favourable policy towards the Papacy.
Northern Star at the beginning of November cited an
argument that appeared in The Times on 29 October 1850:
...the danger is that this audacious violation
of the oath which declared that "no foreign
prince or potentate shall have any spiritual or
temporal jurisdiction within this realm,"
together with the open declaration of the
zealous Romanist party, that they mean to
reclaim England to the fold of the true church,
will have the effect of provoking a reaction in
which many of the religious liberties which
have been slowly conquered by Roman catholics,
will be swept away. It shows that humbled as
the Papacy is at the centre, it is still
aggressive in its essence,.. 82
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Regarding this point, The Northern Star gave qualified
support for The Times' argument;
The Times suggests that as the Pope has chosen
to interfere with England, Palmerston should
give him some work at home, by encouraging the
Italian patriots. We trust that however anxious
they may be for the emancipation of their
beautiful county from political and spiritual
thraldom, they will never become the cat's paw
of an oligarchical minister, who stood solidly
aloof in the hour of their need, and mocked
them with barren words of sympathy. Better to
wait until they are able to fight the battle of
freedom on their own ground without the
necessity for such hollow, selfish and
treacherous support. 83
This passage indicated that as far as the radical press
was concerned their hostility towards the Papacy did not
lead them towards any reconciliation with the government.
If anything they regarded the Pope's intervention in
England as having been encouraged by the government's
tacit acceptance of the restoration of the Hierarchy.
Against such severe attacks, and accusations of Papal
invasion the English Catholic Church sought to defend
itself. In spite of the divisions that still existed
within the English Catholic Church, when Wiseman was
attacked by the press for his assumption of supreme
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spiritual authority over the nation and his denial of the
validity of the Anglican orders, he received support from
the other senior figures including Newman. On 27 October
Newman defended Wiseman proclaiming that God was leading
England back to the true church and that the restoration
of the Hierarchy was one of the most important
achievements for the whole English Catholic Church. 84
Thus Wisenian and Newman, who had originally disagreed
over the style of Catholicism, on this occasion had to
fight together against the attack on 'Papal Aggression'.
The perceived solidarity between Wiseinan and Newman
further antagonized the English public, and led to the
'No-Popery' movement becoming increasingly virulent. In
addition, the movement spread to include attacks not only
on the Catholic Church, but also on the Tractariaris
within the Anglican Church, because of their use of
'Roman practices', and their association with converts to
Catholicism such as Newman who were regarded as
treacherous by most Protestants. This phenomenon could be
seen in a number of meetings and public lectures. For
example, in Birmingham in December 1850, George Dawson, a
Baptist pastor, 85 published a pamphlet based on one of
his 'No-Popery' sermons entitled 'On the Romish Church
anc her Hierarchy'. He stated:
"The Puseyite party" state that the Roman
Pontiff has been greatly influenced in his
policy towards this country by the information
which must have reached him concerning the
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existence in the Church of England of a certain
number of clergymen whose opinions and
practices approximate to "the Church of Rome."
Considering the character, given by the
promoters of this address, to the Pope's doing
and to the church of Rome generally we must
take this as intended to be a condemnation of
the Tractarian party. 86
Another example of the bitterness generated by the
Tractarians can be seen in Westminster Review which
stated in January 1851:
But why ask us for condemnation out of hand?
Have the Tractarians been insidious? For
seventeen years the Anglican movement has been
going on; all England has heard of it: if it
was what it is now the fashion to say of it why
did not the Church expel her traitor sons? Now
it is said the Puseyist is to be dealt with and
anti-Papal indignation is to be turned to anti-
Tractarian account. 87
This kind of argument was also reflected in The Northern
Star and Reynolds's Newspa per. The former noted on 9
November 1850:
One great cause of this delusion in the mind of
Wiseman and that of his fellow conspirators,
against the civil and religious liberties of
England is to be found in the existence of what
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difficult afterwards to super-induce the
dominion of Rome itself. Instead of resisting
this movement, many of the bishops of the
Established Church took an active part in it.
Others were conveniently mysterious and vague
in their condemnation and suspiciously tolerant
in their conduct. 89
It was argued that these Oxford movement contingents such
as the Tractarians had paved the way for the restoration
of the Hierarchy, and thus were a legitimate target for
attack.
This kind of anti-Tractarian sentiment was further
developed and organized by the Evangelical movement. It
would be a mistake to believe that the No-Popery movement
was just a result of mass spontaneous demonstrations. In
fact, it was highly organized and institutionalized by
several political and religious societies such as the
Protestant Association, the Dissenters, Voluntaryists,
and the Free Church Organization. Among these Protestant
societies were both Anglicans and Dissenters, but the
most influential group was the evangelical movement,
including the Evangelical Alliance, which used its
periodical, The Record, to disseminate anti-Catholic
propaganda. 90
Evangelical hostility to the Tractarians was based upon
the belief that Catholicism, both Anglican and Roman,
'substituted forms for true spirituality and encouraged a
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reliance on the institutional church, avoiding the self-
abasement and upheaval required by conversion and
justifications by faith alone.' 91 In particular they saw
this issue as justifying their belief that all links
between Church and state should be abolished. They feared
the possibility that the Anglican Church, already
'infected' by Tractarianism, might be subverted by Rome,
which would have ramifications for the British
constitution. They felt that the Papacy must be resisted
not by societies but through the better dissemination of
anti-Roman propaganda, in order to secure unity among the
ministers of all Protestant denominations and organize
the unchurched masses.
Although there were various prominent figures who
contributed to 'No-Popery' movement among the
evangelicals, the most prominent was Dr Achilli. Achilli
was a most celebrated and influential orator for Italian
nationalism and republicanism. He used his position and
experience as an ex-Doininican priest and thus as a first-
hand observer of the internal corruption of the Catholic
Church in Rome, and as a Roman Republic exile working for
Mazzini, to launch vicious attacks on the Papacy. 92 He
managed to translate his hostility against the Pope's
temporal power, which he shared with Mazzini during the
Roman Republic, into the context of the English 'No-
Popery' campaign. It was also good timing for him that
his arrival in England coincided with the restoration of
the Hierarchy and the anti-Tractarian movement. He
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contributed to turning traditional English anti-
Catholicism, which was a rather abstract concept, into
the much more concrete idea of 'No-Popery' by replacing
the Pope with domestic targets such as Wiseman and
Newman. In addition, Achilli managed to translate the
experience of the English 'No-Popery' movement into
Italian nationalist terms. In particular he stressed the
danger arising from the Pope's claim to temporal power in
an attempt to elicit sympathy and support from English
radicals for the Italian cause.
Even before the re-establishment of the Hierarchy,
Achilli had been a thorn in the side of the English
Catholic Church. Wiseinan had attempted to counter
Achilli's anti-Papal propaganda by revealing in an
article in the Dublin Review in June 1850 that Achilli
had not left the Catholic Church for high, moral reasons
but for sexual irregularities. This attack inflamed
Achilli who later stated in his memoirs that the article
'stigmatises me to the religious world, as a mere
political adventurer, while to the political world it
represents me as a religious enthusiast, changeable,
inconsiderate, and inexperienced, and an immoral person,
and a hypocrite to boot.' (Indeed Newman's repetition
of Wiseman's account of Achilli's background in a speech
in Birmingham in the summer of 1851 led Achilli to bring
libel proceedings against Newman and in 1852 the infamous
Achilli v. Newman trial took place.) 	 It is difficult
to believe that Achilli's hostile lectures on Wiseinan and
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'Papal Aggression' in 1850 and 1851 were not influenced
by this personal attack.
Achilli's activities were not just limited to appealing
to the public, but also extended to trying to influence
the government directly. Using his contacts in high
circles he managed in November 1850 to hold a meeting
with Palmerston. On 11 November Palmerston informed
Russell that:
Dr Achilli ... says there are a number of
Italians, Roinans & others now in London who
wish to record as Catholics their disapproval
of this last move of the Pope, and they would
be glad to know in what way they could most
properly do so, and whether for instance they
might be allowed to present or send an address
to you. What shall I say? 96
Unfortunately Russell's response to this overture was not
recorded, but this episode and the general importance of
Achilli demonstrated one of the most remarkable and
important problems for Anglo-Roman diplomatic relations
in the context of the Risorgiinento, which was the
activity of the Italian nationalists who were exiled in
Britain.
There were other notable Italian nationalist contributors
to the English 'No-Popery' movement. One significant
figure was Alessandro Gavazzi. Gavazzi was a Piedmontese
Protestant who had been led by the logic of his Italian
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nationalism to reject first the Pope's temporal power and
then even his spiritual power. He had participated in the
lay movement in Piedmontese politics which led to the
challenge to the Papacy in 1850. The development of
Protestantism in Italy had been organized by the Chiesa
Cristiana Libera.	 This Protestant church in Piedmont
was formed from a union of several scattered Italian
Protestant communities and its leading figure was
Gavazzi. In Italy the Free Church gave moral support to
those reformers who saw the Risorgimento as an anti-papal
movement, and also by its endorsement of the Sardinian
government's attitude to the Papacy tried to encourage
Anglo-Sardinian friendship. 98
Because its expansion in Italy was hampered by the
absolutist Papal government, it was not surprising that
in 1849 the Free Church people in Italy and in Britain
had welcomed the Pope's overthrow. Most were not in
favour of violent revolution, though some were prepared
to accept it as an inevitable consequence even if not a
desirable one, but they were united in welcoming the
opportunities given by the revolutions for 'the
undisturbed spread of the gospel.' The Sardinian
government seemed to provide them with alternative means,
since Sardinia was one of the Italian states which
allowed freedom of religion.
Achilli and Gavazzi, through the actions of ultra
evangelicals and Nonconformists, had been brought to
I	 England in March 1850 as living proof of 'Popish
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despotism'. Although not as significant as Achilli,
Gavazzi was important in using his own experience within
Chiesa Christiana Libera to inspire the Scottish Free
Church. In late 1851, he toured Scotland and helped to
organize a number of 'No-Popery' meetings and to build on
the base already established by 'the General Committee of
the Free Church of Scotland on Popery'. In addition,
Gavazzi's article in Northern British Review was one of
the most comprehensive criticisms of Catholicism to
appear. It brought together the religious and political,
and the foreign and domestic issues in such a way as to
transform the aspirations of the Italian nationalist
movement into issues of universal significance. 100
There are four reasons to argue that there were links
between the 'No-Popery' campaign and Mazzini's presence
in England, whether he was directly involved with the
anti-Popery aggression campaign or not: 1) he was often
quoted in public lectures on the No-Popery campaign,
organized by the Anglican priests; 2) he was supported by
Chartist contingents who were involved with Protestant
Societies' movements; 3) Mazzini's link with Achilli; and
4) The Anti-Popery Evangelical Alliance's tendency
towards patriotism was inspired by Mazzini's nationalism.
Mazzini himself was cited in 'No-Popery' propaganda in
England. George Dawson argued in his two lectures on the
'Papal Aggression' controversy in front of inhabitants of
Birmingham at a public meeting assembled at the end of
1851:
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Separate church and state in Rome and we shall
hear little more of Papal aggression. The
temporal sovereignty of the Pope, we have been
told, is the element of danger in the
appointment of this hierarchy: . . .Mazzini tells
us "Papacy excluded from Rome, is, it is well
known, papacy excluded from Italy." Place the
Pope at Lyons or Seville- he will no longer be
Pope: he will only be a dethroned king. Well
may he say Protestantism has not understood
this: because Mazzini believed as an Italian
national leader, that Church and State need to
be separated elsewhere too. Not in England only
but in Rome. What political danger there may be
to us in Romanism lies chiefly in the fact of
the Pope being a prince in Rome. 101
Mazzini's idea of opposing Papal temporal power was
developed in the English anti-Papal context, as we have
seen, by political exiles from the Roman Republic, such
as Achilli, and Piedmontese Protestants such as Gavazzi,
and became one of the main arguments used to gain radical
support.
The issue of Mazzini's link with the anti-Papal movement
brings into question the degree to which radical
political, as well as radical religious, groups were
involved in this cause. Here it is worth looking at the
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relative strength of the radicals and what kind of links
existed between them and Mazzini.
It is generally said that the Chartist movement declined
or died out after the failure of the 1848 uprising:
however, as Finn has argued in After Chartism, there
still remained a radical movement which was inspired by
Mazzinians and continental revolutionary elements. 102 As
Taylor has argued, the common ground between Chartisni and
radicalism was heightened after the defeat of the
movement in 1848, with a reconciliation between the
mainstream of radical and liberal politics. These views
were expressed in the radical newspapers such as the
Nonconformist, the Leader, Reynolds' Weekly Newspaper and
others. Those associated with the Leader took over from
the radical reformers the running of several of the
Anglo-European groups such as the Society of Friends of
Italy and the Hungarian Association, with which, needless
to say, Mazzini was closely associated. 103
Taylor particularly emphasizes the strong link between
the Leader and the Nonconformist's anti-clerical
tendencies, which were encouraged by the rise of
Tractarianisin. Both newspapers provided a forum for
dissenting ministers and free-thinkers. Most of the
latter who became prominent contributors to the Leader
were essentially anti-clericalists opposed to both the
Anglican and Catholic Churches. 104• Taylor notes that the
strength of the anti-Catholicism in London may well have
stemmed from London Chartist aspirations to a secularized
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society, which presumably liberated them from religious
obligations. 105
The degree to which Mazzini influenced the radicals is a
matter of debate. Taylor has argued that Mazzini's
political ideas had only limited significance within
British radical circles, because he failed to understand
the British political context. Even a close acquaintance
such as David Masson held different ideas on republican
socialism from Mazzini's. Masson, who was a member of the
Leader's circle, and a former student of Thomas Chalmers,
the founder of the Scottish Free Church, believed that
the British political context could best be understood by
reference to Mill and Carlyle, and disagreed with Mazzini
over the importance of Louis Blanc. 106
However, Mazzini's entry into the circle of radicals and
liberals around the Leader was facilitated by his role in
the Roman Republic. David Masson was deeply impressed by
Mazzini's idea about Italy and became the first secretary
of the Society of Friends of Italy, which was set up in
May 1851 in order to support Mazzini against the
threatened Alien Bill. 107 This shows that while it is
true that Mazzini's political ideas and principles were
not always shared by the English radicals, particularly
in regard to socialism, he had enough charisma to attract
their attention to Italian republican and nationalist
issues. The International League and its followers were
both broad-based groups, combining moderate Chartists
with a nucleus of London radicals. Although the moderate
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Chartists and the London radicals did not agree on every
political point, Mazzini's Lea gue had still managed to
attract their support. 108 It could be argued in a way
that Mazzini's League acted as an agency to reconcile
different radicals' interests into one broad movement.
The Nonconformists, including the Nonconformist
newspaper, were particularly attracted by Mazzini's
stance over the anti-Papal sentiment. Again opposition to
Papal aggression was one of the few causes that all
radicals shared, and acted as a glue to bring together
radicals who sometimes held different political opinions.
The radical support for Mazzini naturally led to
opposition to the Pope. The Northern Star on 28 September
1850 argued that the Pope and Mazzini were diametrically
opposed. If one supported loyalty toward the Pope it
meant supporting death for Mazzini and his republicanism.
In contrast, opposing the Pope, Pius IX who had give the
Cardinal's hat to Wiseman, meant supporting Mazzini's
republicanism and nationalism. There was no middle
ground. This shows that the target of radical attack was
not just Catholicism which could be an abstract idea, and
not just the Papacy, but Pius IX himself. It was a
personal attack on the Pope. 109
Mazzini's presence in Britain was not only of interest to
the radicals, it also concerned the government. The Home
Office and the Foreign Office both displayed an interest
in Mazzini's activities due to his revolutionary
reputation. Mazzini was believed to be trying to
381
engineer better cooperation between Italian, French and
English republicans and revolutionaries, and was
therefore seen as a dangerous figure. This threat was
confirmed when on 3 June 1851 Norinanby in Paris wrote to
Palinerston that:
General De La Hilte showed me an address from
Nazzini to various corresponding societies,
which had been found by the police upon a man
who had been arrested the other day. The
purport of this document was to establish an
universal European connexion between the
Revolutionists of all countries for the
overthrow at one and the same time of all
monarchical government in Europe. There was
much caution contained in it as to waiting for
simultaneous action, of which due notice would
be given. This paper was dated 'La Suisse" but
the general had learned from M Barman the Swiss
Chargé d'Affaires that N Mazzini had passed
through Paris last week and was at this moment
in London. The paper spoke in the name of the
Triuinvirs and more particularly alluded to Rome
as the head quarters which it probably is, of
any designs with which N Mazzini is specially
charged. 110
This information prompted Henry Addington, the Permanent
Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office, to ask H.
Waddington, Permanent Under-Secretary at the Home Office,
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on 10 June 1851 for more information about Mazzini's
revolutionary society
An earlier scare had come in November 1850 when The
Northern Star revealed that an Italian Revolutionary
Fund, called the Mazzini-Italian National Fund, had been
established in London. This article entitled the 'The
Italian revolutionary government in London' was published
on 12 November 1850 and noted:
The new Italian ( Mazzini) loan of
l0,000,000f., for the purchase of ammunition to
reconunence revolution in Italy, and it is to be
presumed, in all continental Europe the
proposals for which were published in La
Republique of yesterday is the subject of
remark in the papers of today. They express
their astonishment at such a document being
published and dated in London, and the fact of
three Englishman forming part of the
commissions for the management of the funds.
It continued:
An English banker says the Opinion Publique,-
Receiving the money of the subscribers, and
delivering certificates stamped with the arms
of the Roman republic, a committee depositing
at the Bank the funds, purchasing arms and
forming an arsenal on the quays of London - is
rather too much, and if Lord Palmerston submit
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to it he will certainly wear out the patience
of all Europe. Let us wait to see the effect of
the circulars of Mazzini on the English
government. There is on one side a certain law
in England which we believe is called the Alien
bill, and on the other international law: one
permits action, the other exacts it. But if by
chance it were part of a system, if there
existed an idea of responding to the Bull of
the Sovereign Pontiff by Mazzini's circulars,
if it were found useful to prepare for Italy
what eighteen years ago was prepared for
Portugal why Europe must only look to herself.
People are fond of declaiming against Prussia.
Let them look a little to England, and let them
ask her if she is determined to enrol in her
service the revolutionary party. 112
Following this on 16 November Reynolds's Weekly Newspaper
appealed to their audience to support the Mazzini fund in
an article entitled 'Italian nationality and
independence.':
We have received from the national committee
the following official circulars to which we
give insertion. Circular No 1 Italian national
loan. ... The money obtained will be deposited
in London, at the banking house of Hessrs,
Martin Stone and Martin 68 Lombard-Street. The
committee has the right of changing the place
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of deposit according to circumstances. This
committee consists of the following Italian and
English: William Herty Ashurst, jun. and
William Strudwicke, Antonio Ferrara, Vincenzo
Cattabeni and Federico Perucelli. "Prestito
Nazionale Italiano" London agent James
Stansfeld 2 Sidney-place, Brompton. For the
national committee, Mazzini Sirtori Montecchi
Saffi Saliceti. On the face of the notes are
two impressions in the form of seals, one being
the arms of the republic, the other the
inscription, Italian national committee. 113
It was already known in government circles that Mazzini
had obtained from the English radicals not only
ideological but also financial support, and it was widely
believed that Mazzini had used the International League
to receive money through W.J. Linton and to raise
subscriptions for his Italian National Fund. 114 This
kind of British radical support for Mazzini was worrying
for the British government, but its concern became even
greater when the idea of a Mazzini fund was openly
discussed by the radical press. This disquiet was clearly
reflected when, on 12 November 1850, H. Waddington, the
Permanent Under-Secretary at the Home Office reported to
the Home Secretary:
...I beg to report having made further
inquiries respecting the Mazzini Loan and have
heard from good authority that there is no such
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company in London at present as the one
mentioned. 115
Another enquiry into the Mazzini Fund was made in
February 1851 due to a report in Reynolds's Weekly
Newspaper on the money that had been received from
various Italian states. A report by the Home Office on 27
February noted there was no record of money being
deposited by British citizens. 116
Although it turned out that the Fund was not supported to
any great extent by English radicals, the Metropolitan
Police kept a close watch on Mazzini's activities. On 12
August 1851 a Home Office report on European
revolutionary exiles in London, including Mazzini, noted:
Close observation has been reported on those
Refugees from each Country more especially with
regard to any proceedings that might affect the
tranquillity of our own country and I believe
there is no cause to apprehend any movement by
them at present. 117
In November 1851 a further report revealed that Mazzini
was still under surveillance and was associating with a
group of French revolutionaries who met frequently in
Soho. 118
Although there was no clear evidence that the radicals
were involved in Mazzini's continuing revolutionary
activities, the danger remained that with his past
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history as a leader of the Roman Republic he could turn
into a symbol of No-Popery, and thus provide a bridge
connecting English radicals with European
revolutionaries.
Section IV: The government's response to the anti-Papal
movement
The British government was seriously concerned about the
link between the 'No-Popery, movement and Mazzini's
republican and revolutionary campaign. They feared that
Mazzini might use this link to spread his anti-Papal
ideas in Britain, particularly because England had such a
strong anti-Catholic tradition.
In fact, the 'No-Popery' movement was not merely a
phenomenon associated with English radicals such as the
Chartists, who had a direct contact with Mazzini; it also
had widespread popular support. Contemporary press
reports in newspapers such as The Times, The Northern
Star and Reynolds's Weekly Newspaper, illustrate the
extent of mass demonstrations against the Papal
aggression. This was particularly evident on Guy Fawkes
Day 1850. The fifth of November - Guy Fawkes Day - was
traditionally a symbol of anti-Catholicism, but in 1850
it saw a particularly virulent outpouring of anti-Papal
sentiment because it was just after the restoration of
the Catholic Hierarchy on 29 October 1850.
In southern England there were several large-scale 'No-
Popery' demonstrations. These protests included many
387
characteristics - elaborate effigies of PIUS IX and
Wiseman dressed in full pontifical robes and sometimes
horned; men dressed as monks and nuns; a torchlight
procession; anti-Catholic, patriotic and sometimes anti-
Tractarian banners; and a ceremonial burning in a public
place, accompanied by patriotic songs. 119
The Northern Star reported the people's enthusiasm for
the 'No-Popery' movements in several parts of London in
detail in its edition of 9 November 1850:
"Guys of large growth" presented themselves in
the more frequented thoroughfares, attended by
numberless idlers, who kept up a running fire
of pellets against the Pope and Popery. "No
Popery", "No wafer Gods", "No Catholic humbug"
and similar anti-Roinanist expressions.
The Guys were received with more than usual
welcome by the populace and the conductors of
the several groups found no difficulty in
levying handsome mail on the passengers. 120
The report also noted that, with the return of Cardinal
Wiseinan, his 'red hat' had become one of the symbolic
targets:
This pageant included an animate effigy of the
new Cardinal Wiseinan attired in the gaudy
canonical robes of the Romish Church, and
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wearing the red and broad-brimmed hat
appertaining to his office, St Imprudence. 121
The Northern Star reported that two large protests took
place in London, one in the centre where an effigy of the
Cardinal Wiseman was carried around the West End, and one
in the East End:
Several thousands people assembled in the
Cambridge Heath Road, Bethnal Green and the
various avenues adjoining for the purpose of
witnessing the destruction by fire of the
effigy of Cardinal Wiseman with those of the
eleven bishops. 122
The greatest insult to the Pope and Cardinal Wiseman was
the use of effigies and of animals dressed in Catholic
robes.
Whilst the fireworks were being let off, a
large figure, representing His Holiness on a
donkey was lead into the ground. The animal
wore a cardinals hat and round his neck was
hung a large bill on which was printed
"Wiseman". Several persons, representing "right
rev, fathers", walked at the side of the
animal. 123
The demonstrations also expanded into the suburban parts
of London, where in one case Wiseman's dress was mocked
with an ostentatious crown symbolizing the corruption of
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the Catholic Church. The Northern Star informed its
readers that protests had taken place in:
Surrey, Richmond, Hampton Court, Kensington,
Blackheath Park, Guildford, Godalming. The
chief object of attraction was followed, borne
by men: it was a gorgeous effigy of Pius IX in
full pontifical robes, sitting in a chair of
state two incense bearers proceeding: he wore
the triple crown, magnificently ornamented with
a profusion of jewels. A large white shoe was
prominent, supposed to encase that important
functionary, the Pope's toe, or papal
chamberlain, by which the faithful, who liked,
were introduced to His Holiness. 124
The 'No-Popery' gatherings were also influenced by the
belief that the Roman Catholic Church was, through the
establishment of the twelve bishops, attempting
aggressively to expand its ecclesiastical and political
power. 125 The Catholics, who had been used to a weak
position before, were now stronger, and it was believed
that they aimed to take revenge after a history of 300
years of justified persecution.
The lesser star Wiseman was only divided from
the sovereign pontiff by an immense corsair and
this effigy also was dressed in perfect keeping
with his rank a cardinal the hat and collar and
robes included. Behind him, twelve men dressed
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in white with a red cross on each of their
backs, and head covering of a combination of
mitre and helmet, significant of the Romish
church being militant, bore each a placard of
his title; and although there was no time to
read the names no doubt all the 12 bishops were
there. Then came placards and banners ad
infinitum. 126
The important point about these demonstrations was that
their target was clearly focused on Cardinal Wiseman and
Pius IX, they were not anti-Irish. In addition, the fact
that they concentrated so much on an anti-Papal target
meant that these mass protests must have been highly
organized. This was frightening for the government as it
proved that the masses could be easily integrated into
and dictated to by the anti-popery radicals.
As Paz has pointed out, mass demonstrations using the
symbol of Bonfire Night provided an opportunity to affirm
loyalty, solidarity and cultural cohesion. 127 It was not
just a series of mass riots as a result of an abstract
idea of anti-catholicism, but was rather a coherent anti-
Wisenian and anti-Pius IX campaign.
These Bonfire Night processions were the beginning of a
series of popular, large-scale 'No-Popery' demonstrations
which sometimes erupted into violence and continued
throughout 1850-52. If anything, after Guy Fawkes Day
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1850, the political activities against the 'Papal
aggression' became more organized.
For example, the Home Office documents record that an
anti-Popery public meeting was held in Hertford on 3 July
1851 which passed resolutions to petition the Queen and
Privy Council asking them to defend the liberty of
England and refuse to accept the restoration of the
Catholic Hierarchy. 128 This was but one of a series of
petitions presented to Parliament and the Queen against
'the Papal encroachment'. Several meetings around the
country were held to organize petitions, and signatures
were even collected after Church services.
These meetings were not always very rational or peaceful,
and there were several incidents where demonstrations
against the 'Papal aggression' led to violence. The most
notable example is the riots that took place in Liverpool
and Birkenhead on 20 November and 27 November 1850
respectively. In both cases a meeting held by Protestants
to demonstrate against the Hierarchy led to violent
protests by the local Irish Catholics. 129
The local magistrates reported on 20 December 1850 about
the incident in Birkenhead, which was the more serious of
the two, that:
A public meeting for the purpose of presenting
a loyal address to the Queen, against the
Encroachments of Rome, found a Mob assembled
round the place of meeting with sticks and
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stones who attacked the Town Hall, and the Room
where the Magistrates were assembled and
violently assaulted the police. 130
Paz has categorised the Liverpool and Birkenhead riots as
"pro-catholic anti-police riots", as much of the violence
was committed by Irish Roman Catholics against the
police. 131 Certainly it was a clash between the police
and the Irish which reflected the bitter sectarian
divisions in the Merseyside area, but it is noticeable
that the original spark that led to the disturbances was
the campaign against 'Papal Aggression'. While
acknowledging other background factors, the fact that it
was 'No-Popery' meetings that led to the violence
indicates the depth of feeling that this issue generated,
and it is indicative that after the second meeting was
disrupted a petition with one thousand signatures was
sent to the local magistrates calling for the punishment
of the 'misled and misguided Romanists'. 132
The riots on Merseyside were, however, the exception
rather than the rule, brought about by the severity of
the sectarian divide in the region. Elsewhere the 'No-
Popery' campaign did not lead to serious outbreaks of
violence. The reason for this is a matter of debate. Paz
has argued that anti-Catholic violence during this period
has been over emphasized as a phenomenon, and instead has
contended that violence in these years was more often
associated with economic and domestic causes rather than
religious ones. He has asserted that the crime rate
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related to violence against persons and property declined
during the 1850s and 60s, and in particular has noted to
prove his point, the relatively small number of reported
attacks on Catholic priests in 1850-51. 133
One can agree that the number of such attacks was small,
but the contention that this was a result of the public's
reluctance to commit violence against the Catholics is
open to question. Evidence from Home Office sources
suggests that one has to look closely at the government's
role in deterring violence. There are a number of
examples of attacks against Roman Catholics leading to
the government's sending police to keep order. One such
case took place in August 1851, when the Home Office
decided in response to local Roman Catholics' complaints
about violence promptly to send twenty-five special
constables to protect the East Church in Sittingbourne,
Kent. 134 Further evidence can be seen in December 1851,
when the Metropolitan Police produced a report on the
scale of violence against Catholic priests in London.
This report was a response to a request for information
from the Foreign Office. 135
In November 1851 Palmerston received a letter from the
Vatican regarding anti-Papal violence against Catholic
priests in England, which was based on reports which had
been received by the Propaganda Fide. 136 This matter
obviously required investigation and prompted the Foreign
Office to send a letter requesting information from the
Home Office. This letter of 27 November 1851 read:
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I am directed by Lord Palmerston to state to
you that reference has been made by a Foreign
government to violence and insult alleged to
have been committed in London towards the
ministers of the Catholic Church on the
occasion of the institution of Roman Catholic
Bishoprics by the Pope in the course of the
last twelve months, and Lord Palmerston is
desirous of knowing whether any thing took
place at the time and on the occasions alluded
to, which bore the character of violence or of
insult to Roman Catholic Priests or to their
religion.
I request Sir George Gray, to obtain through
the commission of police exact information. 137
After the Metropolitan Police had provided the necessary
information, the Home Office forwarded to the Foreign
Office on 6 December 1851 the reports of enquiries by
each Superintendent within London. Waddington noted in
his covering letter that:
I beg to state that whenever application was
made for the aid of police for the protection
of any place of the Roman catholic or of any
Roman catholic ecclesiastic and wherever there
was any apprehension that violence or insult to
Roman catholic priests on their religion might
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be committed special and effective arrangements
of police were made to prevent them. No
complaints have been received at this office
that the police failed in the performance of
this duty and I believe the Roman catholic
priests felt assured that full protection was
given them. 138
The reports from the Metropolitan Police demonstrated
that, thanks to their protection, there were no major
incidents of insults and violence towards the Roman
catholic priests and that even when minor disturbances
took place the police were quick to act. A summary of the
Superintendents' reports shows the level of incidents in
different parts of London. 139 The summary stated that
there were no serious disturbances around the central
part of London, such as Marylebone, Holborn, Covent
Garden and Whitehall. It also observed that;
In Whitechapel Division area, Stepney area, and
Lainbeth Division area, no insult, and the
authorities have expressed their thanks for the
attention of police, in Southwark Division, no
disturbance.
It did note, however, that there had been an incident in
October 1851 when a large crowd had gathered outside
Wiseman's house in Golden Square shouting 'No popery',
but that it had been quickly dispersed by the Police, and
a Constable stationed to keep the peace. 140 Special care
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and attention to Wiseman had also been given in February
1851 when he had held a mass in the Catholic chapel in
Tottenham. This area had the reputation of being strongly
anti-Catholic, and had seen disturbances in 1850 as a
result of Wiseman's Appeal during the restoration of the
English Catholic Hierarchy, and it was therefore decided
to send two Constables to the chapel to ensure order. The
summary also noted that:
...the attention of constables on beats where
Roman catholics are situated has been called to
pay particular attention to prevent annoyance.
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However, there was one incident when a man had insulted a
Catholic priest. He had been arrested by a constable and
charged with making a disturbance in a Catholic Church.
The same report noted that there were always police
situated around Finsbury, especially during the Catholic
mass, because of the large number of foreign immigrants
that resided in the area. The report observed that:
In Finsbury area, Mr Ferrati, a Roman catholic
priest was assaulted by 3 Men supposed Italians
between 9 and 10 Pm on the 25th Nov while
passing along Baldwin's Gardens his eye
blackened and nose cut.
In this neighbourhood a great many foreigners
reside and is specially watched by a constable.
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At the Roman Catholic Chapel in Rosainon Street
a constable is always on duty during divine
service and Wilmington Square in which the
minister resides is frequently patrolled by the
Police. 142
There were no disturbances in the Greenwich Division,
but, Hampstead, Hammersinith and Wandsworth saw some
incidents. In particular, in
the Camberwell Division at the time of the
consecration of the Roman Catholic Church
Clapham in May last it was stated that Father
Ignatius Spencer who was dressed in his
vestments had been insulted on his way thither
and on the 5th October last a man named Henry
Herbert was charged with making a disturbance
in the church but it being found he was of weak
intellect he was discharged. A constable is
always near the church on Sundays and the
Commissioners have sworn in a local constable
for the place. 143
Within a few days of this report being sent to the
Foreign Office another incident had taken place. The
Metropolitan Police reported on 12 December 1851 that a
problem had arisen in Greenwich because of demonstrations
against the building of a new Catholic Church. On 2
December protests organized by respectable tradesmen took
place in Blackheath Lee and Lewisham in which 'colossal'
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effigies of the Pope and Wiseman, which appeared to have
been constructed at 'considerable expense', had been
burnt. 144 Once again the Metropolitan Police was forced
to take action to reassure local Catholics that they
would not be the object of attack.
Paz has used the Home Office document of 6 December 1851
as an example that there were in fact very few anti-
Popery riots during 1850-51. 145 Although this was true
to some extent, the fact is that the government was fully
aware of the danger of this phenomenon. The reason why
there were not many 'No-Popery' disturbances was not
because it was not significant socially, but rather due
to the government's prompt intervention to control
popular anti-Papal violence. The number of incidents was
low around this period, because the government managed to
stop several potentially violent 'No-Popery' protests by
sending Special Constables. The problem with Paz's
approach is that it relies too much on statistics and
figures to analyse a social phenomenon; this is
especially a problem in regard to religious matters
because figures do not show the complexity of the
religious and social background of the anti-Catholic and
anti-Papal movements. In addition, Paz has failed to
recognize the way in which the government used the police
force as a means of social control; the government used
its power to protect Catholic subjects and suppress the
anti-Catholic riots, thus maintaining law and order.
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The evidence therefore proves that the government's reply
to the social disturbances associated with 'No-Popery'
agitation was very prompt and effective. Particularly it
seems that special care was taken of Wiseman, not just
because he had become the main target of 'No-Popery'
aggression in England, but also because he was still
closely linked with the Vatican. In fact it was Wiseinan
who had informed the Pope about the anti-Papal attacks on
Roman Catholic priests in England. 146 The government did
not want any more embarrassment in terms of its
diplomatic relations with the Papacy, and therefore any
possible offence against the Catholics had to be
prevented.
Section V: The Ecclesiastical Titles Bill
While in terms of foreign policy there was a desire to
placate the Papacy, within the context of domestic
politics the restoration of the Hierarchy forced Russell
to pose as an opponent of 'Papal aggression'. His initial
move in this direction came in his open letter to the
Archbishop of Durham on 4 November 1850, shortly after
the restoration.
This notorious letter has been interpreted in a number of
different ways by historians, and there is still a debate
over how sincere Russell was in his newly discovered
anti-Catholicism. In addition, there is a controversy
over whether he had already committed himself at this
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early stage to passing penal legislation against the
Catholic Hierarchy, such as that later seen in the
Ecclesiastical Titles Bill. Russell's behaviour is
difficult to judge because it seems so contradictory to
his usual practice. He had after all devoted his life to
advancing religious toleration and knew that anti-
Catholic legislation was a constitutional anachronism.
Furthermore, it was clear that his government depended on
the votes of Irish Catholics. 147 	 -
The most important passage in his letter to the Bishop of
Durham read:
There is an assumption of power in all the
documents which have come from Rome - a
pretension to supremacy over the realm of
England, and a claim to sole and undivided
sway, which is inconsistent with the Queen's
supremacy, with the rights of our Bishops and
clergy, and with the spiritual independence of
the nation, as asserted even in Roman Catholic
times. 148
This was strong language, but Russell soon found that it
was not enough to pacify the 'No-Popery' movement. In
particular, a defence based upon the Established Church
was unlikely to win over the Dissenters and the radical
Nonconformists, who were already deeply suspicious of the
growth of Tractarianism within the Church of England.
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In addition, Russell faced the problem that he was still
perceived as pro-Popish. It was widely believed that
Russell had followed a favourable policy toward the
Papacy and the Catholics ever since 1846, when his
administration had conie to power. In particular, the
restoration of the Hierarchy in 1850 revived criticism
against the Maynooth Grant, which was a serious issue for
the weak Russell ministry, depending as it did upon both
Catholic and Dissenter's votes. 149 Punch commented at
the time:
Will your Holiness please to tell me what I am
to say next session to Sir Robert Inglis, and
Mr. Plumptre, and Mr.Spooner, now that you have
created an Archbishop of Westminster,
particularly if you have created an Archbishop
of Westminster, particularly if you sanction
the decree of the Thurles Synod against the
Queen's College? Then, if you confirm the
condemnation of the Queen's Colleges how am I
to defend the Maynooth Grant against
Messrs.Spooner and Plumptre? By what logic
shall I attempt to persuade the House of
Conunons that it is reasonable and right to vote
the nation's money for the purpose of training
up priests to defeat the ends of good
government? And with what possible face can I
continue to advocate the admission of Roman
Catholics to take degrees at Oxford or
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Cambridge? Here - though, of course, your
Holiness understands your own business best - I
venture to ask whether it will be quite politic
of you to condemn the Queen's Colleges, which
are merely neutral institutions, whereas, you
have all along allowed Roman Catholics youth to
go to the positively Protestant University of
Dublin? I always thought that Roman Catholicity
never contradicted itself. Will your Holiness
give a handle to the heretics? 150
More serious criticisms of Russell could be seen in the
no-Popery pamphlets of the period. In one pamphlet
entitled "Is the Pope coming to England?": the Pope's
Bull, an address to the people of England by a protestant
patriot published in December 1850, Russell and his
government were clearly accused of pursuing a favourable
policy towards the Catholics and the Papacy. The writer
noted:
we see Lord John Russell the Prime
minister, the most liberal of Pro-popish
Legislators, throwing all the blame of the
recent Papal Aggression upon the Puseyites. On
the other hand we behold the Bishop of Exeter,
the most decided patron of Puseyism on the
Episcopal Bench, addressing his Clergy at
Exeter in a speech in which he shews up the
encouragement afforded to the Church of Rome by
Earl Grey, the Secretary for the Colonies in
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the House of Lords, and by Lord John Russell,
the Prime Minister in the House of Commons.
The Bishop quotes from authentic speeches in
Parliament, in which Earl Grey mourned over the
existence of a Protestant establishment in
Ireland, expressed fervent aspirations for the
establishment of Popery in that country, and
breathed forth an ardent desire to see Roman
Catholic Prelates in the House of Lords. The
Bishop also quoted sentiments from Lord John
Russell in favour of territorial titles by
Prelates appointed by the See of Rome. 151
The writer emphasized in one passage that Russell in his
letter to the Archbishop of Durham had made much of his
previous conciliatory policy towards the Catholics, and
continued:
This I take for granted is a brief but rather
obscure allusion to the measures of support
which his Lordship has bestowed for many years
upon the Ecclesiastical system of Popery. It
appears then from Lord Russell's own shewing,
that he had been fostering and promoting the
inuinmeries of superstition, and using his great
personal and political influence in favour of a
system which confines the intellect and
enslaves the soul. 152
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The government's position was made more awkward by the
fact that its claim that it knew nothing of the plans for
restoring the Hierarchy was challenged by Wiseman, who
claimed, that in the autumn of 1847 the Pope had shown
Minto the plans for the restoration and that therefore
the British government should have known that this action
was contemplated. In response to this claim, Minto
protested that all he had done while in Rome was to pass
a letter from Father Connelly, which was critical of
Wiseman, to Cardinal Ferretti, and that that was the
extent of his involvement in the affairs of the English
Catholics, and he stated in a letter to Russell on 21
November that Wiseman's account was a 'lie'. Ninto's
denial did not, however, convince either the public or
the Opposition, and it was widely believed that the
government only pretended that it had no forewarning.
Against the background of No-Popery agitation, and
criticism of the government, Russell finally decided to
introduce the Ecclesiastical Titles Bill. He informed the
House of Conunons on 7 February 1851 that the intention
behind the Bill was to outlaw the Hierarchy by preventing
the new Catholic Archbishops and Bishops from assuming
their positions and that any endowment given to those
taking such titles would be seized the Crown. Over the
next six months, until it finally received Royal Assent
in August, the Bill was discussed extensively in
Parliament and provoked a number of different reactions.
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As might be expected the Bill was opposed by the Irish
Catholics, but it was also resisted by some of the
Liberal members of the House of Commons, such as John
Bright and Richard Cobden, and many of the Peelites,
including Lord Aberdeen and William Gladstone. The
reasons for opposition were forcefully expressed by John
Roebuck, the Radical M.P. for Sheffield, who told the
House on 7 February:
Some centuries hence, when people would look
back to this period, they would not be so much
astonished at the display of stupid bigotry
manifested by the people out of doors, as at
the position taken by the noble Lord who had
been heretofore foremost in religious
toleration; that in the midst of this warm gush
of anti-Papal zeal, he should be found to yield
himself up to the control of the ignorant
multitude; and, still more that he should come
to Parliament to propose a law which would
prove itself the most absurd Act of Parliament
that had ever been passed, and one that would
disgrace the legislation of the most bigoted
times. 153
To the supporters of the 'No-Popery' movement the Bill if
anything did not go far enough. 154 Instead of
tranquillizing the 'No-Popery' movement against the
Hierarchy, the Bill inflamed anti-Papal feelings. One of
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the arguments used to attack Russell was that it had been
his policy towards the Papacy which had encouraged Rome
to restore the Hierarchy. The leading proponent of this
view was Benjamin Disraeli, who in his speech of 7
February noted that the Prime Minister's argument that
the restoration had come as a surprise was untenable. as
Russell had, ever since 1845, taken a favourable stand
towards Catholic issues; he asked the House:
when the Pope was aware that these were the
opinions of so eminent a personage - when the
representative of our Sovereign was himself
indecently communicating with him in a tone of
deferential homage - when he might read in the
records of the Irish Court that his archbishops
and bishops took the highest precedence ... I
ask the House, is it just, is it fair, is the
noble Lord authorjsed to state, to-night, that
the conduct of the Pope was "a blunder on the
sudden?" 155
Outside Parliament there was much criticism of the Bill.
One pamphlet entitled The Whigs versus the Pope, the case
of the day. by an old Whig published at the end of 1851,
complained:
The clergy canted, the squires ranted, and the
people howled, and No popery was the cry of the
day. The premier's manifesto crowned the
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glorious explosion of Protestant feeling. It
took a fling at the Pope and a kick at the
Puseyltes, leaving the issue to the wisdom of
Parliament. It has agreed to the introduction
of a bill for nullifying the appointment of
Roman Catholic Bishops; and for rendering them
incapable in that capacity of holding trusts in
behalf of the church - be they money grants or
lands in mortmain. Thus Parliament, at Whiggish
instigation, bites at Popery, but only barks at
Puseyism. The first is unendowed, and hence may
be a fitting object of persecution. The last is
powerful, or linked to those who are and cannot
be touched. 156
The Bill completely failed to pacify the anti-Papal
agitation, for as this lecture emphasized 'If the object
of the Whiggish bill be the arrestinent of conversion to
the Roman Catholic belief, it will utterly fail.'
It was fortunate for the government that Disraeli and the
public did not know that even at this time the government
was still attempting to win the Pope's support for its
policy in Ireland. As early as 19 October 1850 Minto had
told Russell that it might be possible to use the
outbreak of animosity against Rome to put pressure on the
Pope to accept the British government's position over the
Irish colleges. 158 The desire to see Shell represent
British opinions in Rome thus continued unabated despite
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the 'Papal Aggression'. Palmerston informed Russell on 21
October that Shell would be an excellent appointment as
he was 'master of all Irish matters'. 159 He continued to
express this view even as the anti-Papal agitation grew
steadily worse. On 28 January 1851 Palmerston told
Russell that it was still his intention to make Shell the
British voice in Rome in order to counter the 'Irish
malcontents', and noted:
Depend upon it that when Shell gets to Rome he
will put matters upon a much more satisfactory
footing; and I believe the best thing we could
do would be to send him on there unofficially
and without credentials, as soon as our measure
is launched in Parliament. 160
Shell, Palmerston wrote, was to tell the Pope that there
was no intention to use the Ecclesiastical Titles Bill to
launch actual prosecutions. Incredibly it was believed
that such an assurance would satisfy Rome. Shell arrived
in Florence in January and began to try to influence the
Pope to approve the plan for the Queen's Colleges.
However, the British government's policy was once again
doomed to failure, as on 25 May Sheil died in Florence.16'
This last failed attempt to win over the Papacy was not
the only political set-back for Russell, for the domestic
events of 1850-51 also brought his government into a
disastrous situation. Far from public opinion being
409
tranquillized by the Bill violence and attacks on the
Catholic clergy continued and even increased, as has been
seen above in the cases of violence against the Catholic
priests until the end of 1851. Not only was Russell
unable to terminate these attacks but also the Bill
created more enemies in Parliament such as the Peelites
and the Irish and non-Irish Catholic voters. In 1852 his
Whig government was finally forced to resign.
Conclusion
In spite of the Pope's reactionary policy after his
restoration, the British government still kept a
favourable policy towards the Pope for international and
domestic reasons, including Ireland and the need to
secure the Catholic vote. However, at the domestic level
the restoration of the English Catholic Hierarchy led to
the people's anger being turned against the English
Catholic Church and the Pope in the form of anti-Papal
demonstrations. This posed a difficult dilemma for the
government; how to contain the movement without offending
either the British public or the Papacy.
Certainly one can see some of the government's actions in
1850-51 as intended to defuse the political agitation
over 'Papal aggression'. The problem for the Russell
administration was, however, that its policies became
contradictory, at one point protecting Catholics and at
the next point introducing anti-Catholic legislation
410
without satisfying either camp. One could argue that the
policy which Russell had pursued since 1846 had come to
its logical conclusion and that he could no longer
satisfy the different elements in his coalition.
It is possible, however, that there was a deeper motive
behind the government's treatment of the anti-Popery
movement in 1850-51. Although one can argue that the
government protected Catholics in England from anti-
Popery attacks simply to maintain law and order, it is
tempting to speculate that fear of revolution may have
been an influence. As the British government had already
recognized a link between the No-Popery movement and
Mazzini's republican activities in England, there may
have been anxiety that the No-Popery demonstrations might
get out of hand. The government's decision to send in
special police ensured that this did not happen and that
civil peace was maintained.
However, the result of the government's intervention to
contain the anti-Papal violence was to direct the fire of
the radicals towards the government and the Establishment
itself.
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Conclusion
During the years of Italian unification between 1859 and
1861 Britain was the state outside of the Italian
peninsula which did the most to undermine and bring to an
end the temporal power of the Papacy. Indeed, as Mclntire
has noted, Britain's assistance in the destruction of the
Papal States was one of the most important of its
contributions to the process of unification. In the light
of this it is remarkable to find that only a few years
earlier the British reaction to the early years of the
Papacy of Pius IX was enthusiastic, and that there was a
surprising degree of British interest in and governmental
support for the Pope. For a period of six years between
1846 and 1851 the Pope was a central figure who
influenced not only the course of Britain's foreign
policy but also on its domestic politics.
There are a number of ways in which to explain this
unexpected entente between Britain and the Pope. It is
tempting at first glance to assume that British
enthusiasm for the Pope during these years was due solely
to the relief that at last a 'good' Pope had taken charge
in Rome and the hope that his subsequent reforms would
transform the government and administration of this
stronghold of autocracy. This is true to an extent; there
was indeed a genuine welcome in 1846 and 1847 to the
concept of a liberal Pope and it was believed that Pius
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could set a positive example to the monarchs of Italy and
demonstrate that reform rather than reaction was the best
means to avoid revolution.
The positive response to the Pope was also, however, due
to the recognition on the part of the British government
that Pius's liberalism could be useful in terms of the
balance of power within the Italian peninsula. The
abiding British fear in this period, which was
particularly held by Palmerston, was that the next
general European war would break out as the result of a
Franco-Austrian confrontation over an Italian issue. In
this context support for the Pope was a means of opposing
Austrian domination and of encouraging an indigenous
nationalist movement which would not rely on France.
The appearance of an enlightened Pope was not welcome
only to the British government, it also appealed to a
significant element of the British public as well.
Suddenly newspapers and periodicals began to treat the
Pope as a fighter against despotism and as a hope for the
future of Italy. Even radicals, including, Nazzini joined
in the chorus of support and acclaim.
The events of 1848, however, served to demonstrate that
the hopes that had been placed in the Pope were based on
a misconception of what Pius intended to achieve. Pius
may have wished to see a less corrupt system of
government within the Papal States, but this did not mean
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that he was willing to sacrifice any of his temporal
ppwers to achieve this, particularly if such concessions
encroached on his spiritual authority. He was therefore
not prepared to act as a figure-head constitutional
monarch, nor would he agree to declare war on Austria.
It would be logical to assume that the failure of the
Pope in the summer of 1848 to act as a rallying point for
Italian nationalism and his opposition to further
constitutional reform meant Britain's positive policy
towards the Pope then ended. To a degree this was true as
the British government due to its concern for the Italian
balance of power, began to transfer its support to
Piedmont, while British radical opinion favoured the
Roman Republic. However, but it could not be said that
Britain turned its back on the Papacy completely. Indeed
attempts to keep on relatively good terms continued until
1851.
The fact that the British government did not give up on
Pius demonstrates that it was not just his 'liberalism'
that attracted support and that other motives were in
play. In part, one can explain British policy by stating
that Britain was reluctant to abandon the Pope even when
he had renounced reform for fear that he would become the
political puppet of the French or Austrian governments.
This was evident in 1849 when Britain supported the
restoration of the Pope to his seat in Rome and opposed
the Roman Republic, and also in 1850 when Britain was
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reluctant to give its unequivocal backing to Piedmont in
its clash with the Papacy. In addition, one can point to
the importance of the pressure being exerted on both the
Vatican and the Russell government for the re-
establishment of the Hierarchy. There was, however, an
even more significant factor that required Britain to
show favour to the Papacy - Ireland.
From the autumn of 1847 onwards the rise of political
tensions in Ireland meant that a consistent theme of
British policy towards Rome was that the Pope had to be
persuaded to take action to help. This policy included
pressing the Pope to give his sanction to British
reforms, such as the Queen's Colleges and the endowment
of the Irish Catholic Church, and to use his power to
quell the pro-Repeal activities of the Irish clergy. This
was the issue that dominated the thinking behind the
Diplomatic Bill of 1848, even though the government could
not admit it publicly, and it was still exerting its
attraction in 1851 when R.L. Sheil was sent as the
British minister to Florence.
It appears that the need for a solution to the Irish
Question was so serious that it blinded the British
government to reality and forced it to enter into avenues
which prejudiced the outcome of its diplomacy. If the
period between 1846 and 1847 was based on a naive
perception of the Pope then this was even more the case
from 1848 to 1851, when a lack of understanding of Pius's
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position coincided with a failure to recognize that
support for the Pope could not be reconciled with the
pressures of British domestic politics.
The first example of the contradictory approach of the
British government was evident in the Diplomatic Bill of
1848, which was designed to open the way for diplomatic
relations with the Papacy in order to balance the
influence of the Irish College. Due, however, to the
weight of conservative anti-Catholic sentiment in
Parliament the government was prohibited from dealing
with Rome on anything but a temporal basis, although it
was the Pope's spiritual power which the government hoped
to utilize in Ireland, and the result was the Pope's
rejection of the British overture.
The second example of this failure of perception and
political acumen came in August 1850 when Russell
apparently led Wiseman to believe that the restoration of
the English Catholic Hierarchy was acceptable to the
British government. This hint did nothing to help Britain
in Ireland; it led rather to the restoration of October
1850, which was greeted with outrage by both conservative
and radical public opinion. Faced with this powerful if
unlikely coalition Russell was forced to backtrack and
introduced the Ecclesiastical Titles Bill, which was to
seal the fate of his government and destroy all hopes of
better relations with Rome.
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By the summer of 1851 it was clear that five years of
diplomacy had achieved very little. The Papal reforms of
1846 and 1847 were reneged upon, Austria and France still
vied for control over the Italian peninsula, and no
solution to the Irish problem was forthcoming. In time
the image of the 'good Pope' would be consigned to
memory, and when he died Pius IX would be remembered not
for his early liberalism but for his opposition to
Italian unification and his promulgation of Papal
Infallibility. In addition, the high point of Anglo-
Vatican relations and the diplomatic revolution attempted
between 1846 and 1851 were also to disappear from view.
However, the period of British support for the Papacy is
significant and should not be dismissed as an aberration.
It illustrates the nature of British attempts to seek a
solution to the Italian national question before the rise
of Piedmont, and shows that an alternative to unification
by Turin was, for a time, a possibility. It tells us much
about the influence of public opinion on foreign policy
and the difficulty of pursuing a policy which ran
contrary to the mass of public opinion. It also shows
that the issue of Ireland was so vital to British
interests that it too helped to shape policy towards the
Papacy. Beyond all of this, however, it demonstrates
quite clearly that there was consistently a complex
interplay between political and religious issues and that
despite all the pressing political reasons for seeking
better relations with Rome the fundamentally anti-
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Catholic nature of British society made this impossible
to achieve. Britain's attempt to utilize Papal influence
in Italy and over the Catholic clergy in Ireland to suit
its own interests failed because Britain could never
overcome its aversion to formal and complete recognition
of the Pope. In the end there was a basic contradiction
between religion and politics.
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